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Abstract 
In light of the corporate collapses and global financial crisis, risk management 
has been highlighted as an ever increasing important element of corporate governance. 
As risk management committees (RMC) bear the fundamental responsibility of risk 
management, RMCs’ human capital performs a crucial role in risk management 
governance and warrants further investigation.   
The purpose of this study is to investigate the association between firms’ RMC 
human capital and firms’ management of risk, in terms of firm performance and the 
likelihood of financial distress. This study is motivated by the paucity of research on 
risk management governance and the Australian Security Exchange Corporate 
Governance Council’s (2014) third edition of Corporate Governance Principals and 
Recommendations. While a body of literature has examined board human capital, the 
primary focus has only been on one characteristic - board independence, resulting in a 
deficiency in understanding board human capital as a whole. Moreover, previous 
studies have called for future researchers to explore more detailed and comprehensive 
measures of board human capital.  
Based on human capital theory and resource dependence theory, this study has 
developed a theoretical framework to explain the relationship between RMCs’ human 
capital and firms’ management of risk in terms of firm performance and the likelihood 
of financial distress. Accordingly, this study addresses the following research 
question:  
Is firms’ risk management committee human capital associated with the firms’ 
management of risks? 
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Six hypotheses were developed to answer the research question. Before 
examining RMCs’ human capital, this study first investigated the association between 
the existence of RMCs and the existence of separate RMCs on firms’ management of 
risk in terms of firm performance and the likelihood of financial distress, leading to 
the development of the first two hypotheses. The next two hypotheses addressed the 
relationship between the human capital of RMCs members and firms’ management of 
risk. Lastly, the remaining two hypotheses paid particular attention to firm-specific 
and general human capital.  
This study used a sample of the top 300 ASX listed companies between 2007 
and 2014 to capture whether there was a growing emphasis on risk management 
practice in firms over time. Two models were developed and tested. The first was an 
overall human capital score derived from RMCs’ human capital characteristics using 
principle component analysis; the second examined individual RMCs’ human capital 
characteristics.  
With respect to the association between RMCs, separate RMCs existence, and 
firms’ management of risk in terms of firm performance and the likelihood of financial 
distress, the results revealed that the number of firms with a separate RMC remained 
stable over time, whereas there was an increasing trend of combined RMC 
establishment, and a decrease in the number of firms without a RMC. The regression 
results reveal that the existence of a RMC and a separate RMC were not significantly 
related to firm performance and the likelihood of financial distress. However, the 
findings show that the existence of a separate RMC moderated the relationship 
between firm risk and a firm’s accounting performance. In terms of RMC human 
capital, the overall RMC human capital score was positively related to firm 
performance and market measurement of the likelihood of financial distress. With 
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respect to individual RMC human capital characteristics, the total amount of 
experience (as a type of general human capital) was positively related to accounting 
performance, while RMC members’ board tenure (as a type of firm-specific human 
capital) was negatively related to market performance. 
The findings make several important contributions. Firstly, this study contributes 
to the literature by providing empirical evidence about human capital theory from a 
risk management perspective, and draws on research to determine whether human 
capital is associated with firm performance and research that determines the 
association between risk management and firm performance. Secondly, this study 
informs policy setters about the current risk management practice in Australia, and 
provides implications for regulating risk management practices. Overall, the findings 
of this study highlight the importance of RMCs’ human capital. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Risk management has been recognised as an ever increasing component of the 
corporate governance of firms (Australian Stock Exchange Corporate Governance 
Council [ASXCGC], 2014). Failure to recognise and manage risks can adversely 
impact companies, as well as other stakeholders, such as employees, customers, 
suppliers, creditors, consumers, taxpayers, and the boarder community in which the 
entity operates risk management. Companies with good risk management may protect 
investors’ value and assist firms in identifying opportunities to create value 1 
(ASXCGC, 2014). Therefore, risk management plays a crucial role in corporate 
governance (ASXCGC, 2014).  
Previous studies have identified that inadequate or inefficient risk management 
has largely contributed to corporate collapses and the global financial crisis 
(ASXCGC, 2014; Kirkpatrick, 2009; Rosen, 2003). Rosen (2003) specifically 
examined the failure of Enron from the perspective of risk management and corporate 
governance. Rosen (2003) suggested that the board of directors failed to monitor the 
company’s activities and knowingly allowed the company to engage in high-risk 
practice without proper assessment of its risks. Enron’s board failed to demand, 
understand, and analysis risk information, which lead to insufficient monitoring of risk 
management practice (Rosen, 2003). Similarly, according to a study by Kirkpatrick 
(2009), weak monitoring by the board of directors contributed to the severity of the 
                                                 
 
1Previous research suggests that successfully managing risk can lower the firms’ expected tax payments, 
encourage and protect firm specific investments, assist firms in developing financial plans and funding 
programs, and reduce financial distress and bankruptcy costs (Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein, 1993; Kaen, 
2005). 
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global financial crisis. As the boards are the ones who review and guide risk policy, 
ineffective board oversight leads to ineffective risk management (Francis, Hasan, and 
Wu, 2010; Kirkpatrick, 2009). Therefore, board knowledge and expertise are closely 
associated with firms’ risk management. Board of directors’ human capital, such as 
qualifications and experience, can be regarded as an indicator of how well the risk 
management practices work in the companies (Minton, Taillard, and Williamson, 
2010). As a result, it is expected that firms’ risk management human capital plays a 
significant role in firms’ management of risk and warrants further investigation. 
1.2 MOTIVATION 
This study has several motivations. Firstly, it has been suggested that accounting 
research has paid little attention to risk management governance (Gordon, Loeb, and 
Tseng, 2009). This study adds to the literature by examining risk management 
governance from a human capital perspective. As risk management committee (RMC) 
members bear the fundamental responsibility of risk management, their human capital, 
such as qualifications and experience, plays a crucial role in risk management 
governance. The human capital of RMCs determines the boards’ ability to monitor 
companies’ risk management practices, control managers’ risk-taking behaviour, and 
ensures appropriate risk governance functioning of RMCs (Bilimoria and Piderit, 
1994; Carter, D'Souza, Simkins and Simpson, 2010). In addition, a number of studies 
have pointed out the importance of risk management human capital in efficiently 
managing risks. For example, Rosen (2003), Kirkpatrick (2009), and Pirson and 
Turnbull (2011) suggested that the chance of bankruptcy increases for companies with 
insufficient knowledge to monitor, understand, and analyse risk information. It is 
therefore important to examine firms’ risk management human capital.  
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Secondly, the majority of previous studies on board human capital have focussed 
only on board independence, and found mixed results between board characteristics 
and firm outcomes (K. Campbell and Vera, 2010; Dionne and Triki, 2004; Johnson, 
Schnatterly and Hill, 2013, Marsden and Prevost, 2005; Volonté and Gantenbein, 
2016). The inconclusive results may stem from the fact that previous studies have only 
considered one attribute of the board of directors and omitted other important 
variables. Most importantly, researchers have argued that board independence is not 
an important board human capital characteristic, as it does not provide a good scope 
of the board’s role (Volonté and Gantenbein, 2016). Therefore, there is a growing 
demand to examine more relevant human capital characteristics, such as specific skills 
and experience, as suggested by resource dependency theory (Fama and Jensen, 1983; 
Johnson, Schnatterly and Hill, 2013; Volonté and Gantenbein, 2016). Specifically, 
after conducting a review of the studies on board human capital characteristics, 
Johnson, Schnatterly and Hill (2012) called for future researchers to explore more 
detailed and comprehensive measures of board human capital, instead of only focusing 
on board age, size, and independence.  
Thirdly, the Australia Stock Exchange Corporate Governance Council 
(ASXCGC) issued the third edition of Corporate Governance Principals and 
Recommendations (CGPR) in 2014. Principle 7 of the ASX CGPR provides primary 
guidance applicable to companies for risk management in Australia. In the third 
version, this guideline stresses the importance of RMCs and recommends Australian 
companies establish a RMC (ASXCGC, 2014), as delegating a committee to address 
different elements of risk can provide an efficient and effective mechanism to provide 
transparency, focus, and independent judgement to oversee the entity’s risk 
management framework (ASXCGC, 2014, p 29), which consequently enhances the 
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level of risk management. Most importantly, the ASX CGPR (ASXCGC, 2014) 
suggests that RMCs should have members with the necessary technical knowledge and 
experience in order to meet their risk management responsibilities. This highlights the 
increased attention by regulators regarding RMCs’ human capital.  
1.3 RISK MANAGEMENT DISCLOSURE IN DIFFERENT SETTINGS 
Debate about the importance of risk disclosure started in 1998, when the Institute 
of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales published a discussion paper that 
proposed that directors need to disclose risk information in the annual report (Linsley 
and Shrives, 2006).  There is currently no consensus regarding whether risk 
management disclosures should be mandatory or voluntary, and the International 
Accounting Standard Board has not issued a mandatory risk reporting standard 
(Cabedo and Tirado, 2004; J. L. Campbell, Chen, Dhaliwal, Lu and Steele, 2014). 
Regulators are undecided when it comes to whether or not risk management 
disclosures should be mandated. On one hand, if it is compulsory for firms to disclose 
risk information, risk management disclosures may become uniform, providing less 
useful information to investors. On the other hand, if risk management disclosures are 
voluntary, companies may provide little or no risk management information (Jia, 
Munro and Buckby, 2016). As a result, different countries have adopted different risk 
management disclosure strategies.  
Many countries, such as the US, UK, and Germany, require risk disclosure in 
both the notes for financial statements and supplementary management reports. Risk 
disclosures for the financial statement are mainly related to financial risk and the use 
of financial instruments. Specifically,  countries such as Canada, Australia, and the 
UK, have adopted the International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS); IFRS7 
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“Financial Instrument: Disclosures”2, which mandates risk information and requires 
firms to disclosure their risk information in the notes to the accounts for financial 
instruments (Jia, Munro and Buckby, 2016). Different countries tend to have different 
preferences in terms of financial statement note disclosure. By comparing risk 
disclosure in the notes to financial statements, previous studies have suggested that the 
US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles regulations focus on specific, detailed, 
and usually more complex risk disclosure, whereas Canadian regulators – the Canadian 
Institute of Chartered Accountants, appear to deal more comprehensively with 
different types of financial instruments usage disclosure (Lajili and Zéghal, 2005). 
Risk disclosure in the management report section primarily concerns material 
risks that could adversely affect firms’ financial positions. Specifically, in the US, 
Financial Reporting Release NO.48 (FRR 48) was introduced in 1997, and requires 
Securities Exchange regulator registrants to provide information in the management, 
discussion, and analysis section of the 10K-reports, which mainly focus on the 
materiality of risks and significant risk exposures, such as financial risk information 
relating to operations, financial condition, and forward-looking information. Similarly, 
Canada, North America, and Europe also require firms to disclose risk information in 
the management, discussion, and analysis section, including a description of business 
operations and description of risks and uncertainties (Dobler, Lajili, and Zéghal, 2011).  
Domestic regulations may take different approaches regarding risk disclosures 
in the management report. For example, the US Securities Exchange requires detailed 
disclosure of off-balance sheet arrangements and internal controls (FRR36). Forward-
looking risk management disclosure is only encouraged in Canada (Lajili and Zéghal, 
                                                 
 
2 Also in International Accounting Standard IAS 32 and 39 
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2005). In Germany, German Accounting Standard 5 mandates a risk reporting section 
in the management report, covering risks of any category (Dobler, Lajili and Zéghal, 
2011). In the UK, the Company Act requires a description of principle risks and 
uncertainties faced by the firm and the main factors that are likely to affect the firms’ 
future development (Dobler, Lajili and Zéghal, 2011). Specifically, in 2014, the 
Financial Reporting Council issued the Strategic Report 3 , which is equivalent to 
management, discussion, and analysis, to provide guidance regarding narrative 
disclosure, including risk disclosure. It is required that firms’ strategic reports must 
contain a description of the principal risks and uncertainties facing the company under 
S414C (2) (b) of the Company Act (2001). It also requires firms to disclose an 
indication of financial risk management objectives and policies, including the policy 
for hedging major types of forecasted transactions for each hedge accounting if risks 
are material under Schedule 7.6 (1) (a) of the ‘Large and Medium-sized Companies 
and Groups (Accounts and Reports) Regulations 2008’. Additionally, firms need to 
disclose any material risk exposures, which is mandated under Schedule 7.6 (1) (b) of 
the ‘Large and Medium-sized Companies and Groups (Accounts and Reports) 
Regulations 2008’. 
On the other hand, some risk management information is disclosed voluntarily 
by firms and is mainly contains non-financial risk information. For example, in 
Canada, disclosures that relate to non-financial risks and management’s policies to 
manage risks are largely voluntary (Dobler, Lajili and Zéghal, 2011). Similarly, in 
Malaysia, non-financial risk management information is disclosed on a voluntary 
                                                 
 
3The strategic report placed the operating and financial review (OFR) report in 2014. 
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basis, and only financial risk information is required to be disclosed under Malaysian 
Financial Reporting Standards (Abdullah, Abdul, Mohamed and Ahmad, 2015).  
Some countries disclose risk information based on the principle of “comply or 
explain”. That is, if firms do not disclose risk information they must explain the 
reasons. For example, in the UK, the Financial Reporting Council introduced the 
Combined Code on Corporate Governance in 2003, based on the concept of “comply 
or explain” (Financial Reporting Council Ltd, 2003). This report was revised in 2008, 
2010, and 2012, and focuses on a board’s engagement with the shareholders regarding 
risk management. Specifically, under section C 2 “risk management and internal 
control,” it suggests that the board is responsible for determining the nature and extent 
of the principle risks it is willing to take in achieving its strategic objectives. In 
addition, section 2 indicates that the board should maintain sound risk management 
and an internal control system (Financial Reporting Council Ltd, 2003). This is in line 
with certain mandatory disclosures, such as Disclosure and Transparency Rules 7.2.5 
R, which states that the corporate governance statement must contain a description of 
the main features of the company’s internal control and risk management systems in 
relation to the financial reporting process (Financial Reporting Council Ltd, 2003). 
Section C 2.1 of the Combined Code on Corporate Governance recommends that the 
directors describe principal risks and explain how they are being managed or mitigated 
(Financial Reporting Council Ltd, 2003).  
Australia adopted a similar corporate governance code. Australian regulators, 
through the Australian Securities Exchange Corporate Governance Council 
(ASXCGC) introduced Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations 
(CGPR) in 2003, which was subsequently amended in 2007, 2010, and 2014. One of 
the principles of the ASX CGPR - Principle 7 provides the primary guidance 
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applicable to companies for risk management disclosures in Australia, and it illustrates 
the increasing importance of risk management as a part of the recommended corporate 
governance practices (ASXCGC, 2014). Although corporate governance principles 
and recommendations are not mandated, companies are required to comply with an “if 
not, why not” approach in disclosing risk management information, which is consistent 
with the UK’s “comply or explain” approach. This ‘self-regulatory’ principle provides 
an ideal setting in which to examine firms’ risk management practices and differs from 
other jurisdictions where risk management disclosure information is purely voluntary 
or mandated (Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004).  
As evidenced by the changes to ASX CGPR (ASXCGC, 2014), there is a 
growing emphasis on risk management practices in Australian firms. Due to the drastic 
consequences of the global financial crisis, corporate collapse, and the increasing 
complexity of business environments, risk management practice plays a significant 
role in safeguarding shareholders’ wealth and value creation (ASXCGC, 2014). This 
guideline recommends that Australian companies have a RMC (ASXCGC, 2014). 
Specifically, the ASX CGPR recommends that  
“A risk committee should be of sufficient size and independence, and its 
members between them should have the necessary technical knowledge and a 
sufficient understanding of the industry in which the entity operates, to be able 
to discharge the committee’s mandate effectively” (ASXGCG, 2014, p. 29). 
This means that firms need to have RMC members with the necessary technical 
knowledge, experience, and a sufficient understanding of the industry in which the 
entity operates, in order to effectively oversee risk management.   
In summary, most mandatory rules and voluntary recommendations for risk 
disclosure primarily relate to financial risks and their potential impact on the firms. 
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Australia is the only country that has paid particular attention to RMCs and RMCs’ 
human capital in the CGPR. Therefore, Australia provided the ideal setting for this 
study to examine firms’ risk management human capital.  
1.4 OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Human capital literature suggests that individuals and society can produce 
economic benefits by investing in people, and higher levels of human capital can 
increase people’s productivity (Becker, 1993; Mincer, 1974; Sweetland, 1996). 
Therefore, firms with a high level of risk management human capital may increase risk 
management efficiency and generate positive outcomes. The aim of the study is to 
investigate the association between firms’ RMC human capital and firms’ management 
of risk in terms of firm performance and the likelihood of financial distress. In order 
to achieve this objective, the principal research question is:  
Is firms’ risk management committee human capital associated with firms’ 
management of risk? 
In order to address the research question, this study first examines the 
relationship between the existence of RMCs and firms’ management of risks in terms 
of firm performance and the likelihood of financial distress. Specifically, this study 
examines two types of RMC, a combined RMC4 and a separate RMC5.  
This study then focuses on firms’ RMC human capital and examines its 
relationship with firms’ management of risk.  
                                                 
 
4 A combined RMC is where risk management committee is combined with other committee, such as 
audit and risk committee.  
5 A separate RMC is a stand-alone committee only in charge of risk management.  
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1.5 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
In addressing the research question, this study drew on a number of theories and 
previous studies to develop the theoretical framework. Firstly, human capital theory 
provides insight into the overall theoretical relationship among firms’ risk 
management human capital, firm performance, and firms’ likelihood of financial 
distress. Specifically, human capital theory highlights the importance of firms’ human 
capital and the positive impact of a high level of human capital on firms’ productivity 
and efficiency. As a result, firms with high risk management human capital may 
increase their risk management efficiency and generate positive outcomes. 
Secondly, resource dependence theory suggests that firms require parties who 
can bring crucial resources to companies and thus provide strength to the company. 
This crucial resource, such as previous experience, may help firms to decrease 
uncertainty and lower transaction costs, leading to positive firm outcomes. Hence, 
resource dependence theory highlights the importance of firms’ human capital, such 
as experience and qualifications, and its positive association with firms’ outcomes. 
Thirdly, firms’ risk management human capital is expected to contribute to the 
reduction of agency costs. According to agency theory, there is a conflict of interest 
between managers and shareholders due to the separation of ownership and control, 
leading to agency costs. Managers may have incentives to act opportunistically in 
order to maximise their own wealth at the expense of shareholders’ value (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1990). As a result, it is important that shareholders monitor managers’ 
behaviours, especially their risk-taking behaviours. It is proposed that firms with a 
high level of risk management human capital are more likely to have the capacity to 
monitor managers’ risk-taking behaviours, leading to lower agency costs.   
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Within this framework, six research hypotheses were developed to address the 
research question. Before examining RMC human capital, this study first investigated 
the association between the existence of RMC and the existence of a separate RMC on 
firms’ management of risk in terms of firm performance and the likelihood of financial 
distress by developing the first two hypotheses. The next two hypotheses addressed 
the relationship between the overall human capital of RMC members and firms’ 
management of risk. Lastly, the remaining two hypotheses paid particular attention to 
firm-specific and general human capital.  
1.6 RESEARCH DESIGN  
This study examined firms’ risk management human capital and firms’ 
management of risk based on a sample of top 300 ASX between 2007 and 2014. The 
time frame of 2007 to 2014 was chosen to perform a longitudinal analysis of RMC 
human capital in Australia for several reasons. Firstly, in 2007, the CGPR was revised 
(ASXCGC, 2007). Therefore, 2007 is the starting point of when Australian companies 
began to comply with the revised edition of ASX CGPR. In addition, this study also 
takes into account the effect of the 2007-2008 global financial crisis. As a result, it was 
also appropriate to choose 2007 as the first year in this study to capture whether there 
has been a growing emphasis on risk management practice in firms since the global 
financial crisis period. The year 2014 was selected because this is the latest date risk 
management data was available for this study.  
This study chose the top 300 ASX listed firms of each year (i.e., unbalanced 
panel dataset) based on the expectation that this corporate group could provide an 
overall representation of the risk management practice of ASX listed companies (Van 
der Laan and Dean, 2010). The top 300 ASX companies cover large, mid, and small-
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cap components of all ASX listed companies, thus, it provided enough variation in the 
sample to be representative of all listed firms.  
The research methods used to examine the firms’ risk management human 
capital and firms’ management of risk included both univariate and multivariable 
analysis. Specifically, risk management human capital was investigated by utilising 
two research models based on a risk management human capital score derived from 
principal component analysis, and on individual risk management human capital 
characteristics developed from the literature. The random effects regression analysis 
method was adopted to assess the relationship between RMC human capital and firms’ 
management of risk.  
1.7 SUMMARY OF MAJOR FINDINGS 
The analysis of RMCs revealed that the number of firms with a separate RMC 
remained stable, whereas there was an increasing trend of combined RMC formation 
of sampled companies, with the number increasing from 121 (40.3%) companies in 
2007 to 186 (62%) in 2014. The number of companies that did not have a RMC 
dropped during the same time span, with almost half of the sample companies (155) 
not having a RMC in 2007 down to only 84 companies (28%) in 2014. The regression 
results on the association between the existence of a RMC and firms’ management of 
risk revealed that the existence of a RMC and a separate RMC were not significantly 
related to firm performance and the likelihood of financial distress. However, the 
finding shows that the existence of a separate RMC moderated the relationship 
between firm risk and accounting performance, indicating the existence of a separate 
RMC was associated with better risk management.  
By developing an overall risk management human capital score utilising 
principal component analysis, the results on the association between risk management 
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human capital and firms’ management of risk revealed that risk management human 
capital was positively related to firm performance (both accounting and market 
performance) and market measurement of the likelihood of financial distress. Most 
importantly, risk management human capital moderated the relationship between risk 
and the likelihood of financial distress. The results suggest that at higher risk, firms 
increasing the level of RMC human capital will decrease the likelihood of financial 
distress. This highlights the value of RMC human capital of firms.  
The results of the model using individual risk management human capital 
characteristics to test the association between firms’ general and firm-specific risk 
management human capital and firms’ management of risk show that the total amount 
of experience, as a type of general human capital, was positively related to firms’ 
accounting performance, while RMC members’ board tenure, as a type of firm-specific 
human capital, was negatively related to market performance. Firm-specific and 
general human capital characteristics had no association with the likelihood of 
financial distress. 
The overall results highlight the importance and the value of firms’ risk 
management human capital. They also provide evidence regarding the importance of 
forming a separate RMC. However, contrary to expectations, no strong evidence was 
found regarding the relationship between firm-specific, general human capital and 
firms’ management of risk.  
1.8 CONTRIBUTION OF THIS STUDY 
This paper contributes to human capital literature, and more generally to 
corporate governance literature, in several aspects. Firstly, it has been suggested that 
accounting research has paid little attention to risk management governance (Gordon, 
Loeb and Tseng, 2009). This study contributes to the literature by providing empirical 
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evidence about human capital theory from a risk management perspective, and draws 
on research attempting to determine whether human capital is associated with firm 
performance (e.g. G. Chen and Hamrick, 2012; Crook, Todd, Combs, Woehr, and 
Ketchen, 2011) and research determining the association between risk management 
and firm performance (e.g. Gordon, Loeb, and Tseng, 2009; Orlitzky and Benjamin, 
2001; Pagach and Warr, 2010). 
Secondly, the majority of previous studies have only focused on one element of 
human capital characteristics, such as board independence or board diversity. 
Therefore, this study adds to the literature by going beyond the limited characteristics 
identified in previous studies and focussing on a wider variety of directors’ human 
capital characteristics, thereby providing a more comprehensive picture of RMC 
human capital. In addition, in contrast to previous research, which has largely 
examined the association between specific indicators of human capital and specific 
outcomes (Carpenter, Pollock and Leary, 2003; Hillman, 2005; McDonald, Westphal 
and Graebner, 2008), this study extends this area of research on the value of board 
human capital by empirically arguing and testing the relationship between a number 
of human capital indicators and overall firm outcomes.   
Thirdly, the practical contribution of this study is that it informs firms about the 
benefits of RMC human capital. Additionally, this study informs regulators about 
current RMC human capital practice in Australia and provides implications to policy 
makers in relation to regulating risk management practice from the perspective of 
firms’ human capital. Specifically, a number of findings provide implications for 
future policy decisions. Firstly, the findings demonstrate the importance of RMC 
human capital in firms, as it is positively related to firm performance and negatively 
related to firms’ likelihood of financial distress. Secondly, the results show that the 
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total amount of experience obtained by RMC members is positively related to firm 
performance and markets penalise firms with long-tenured RMC members. As a result, 
future reviews of the corporate governance recommendations may consider providing 
improved guidance to Australian firms regarding the composition of RMC members, 
with a particular emphasis on the experience and tenure of RMC members.  
1.9 STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY 
The remainder of the thesis is organised as follows. The next chapter provides a 
brief overview of risk management literature, including risk, risk management, the 
responsibilities of managing risks, and risk governance research. A human capital 
literature review is also presented, including human capital research regarding the 
board of directors and committee members. Using human capital and resource 
dependence theory as a basis, Chapter 3 explains the relevant risk management 
theories and reviews the findings of previous literature, followed by the hypotheses 
development for this study. Chapter 4 describes the research design of this study, 
including the sample, study period, research models, and definition of the variables. 
The results of the statistical analysis of this study (regarding the existence of RMC and 
RMC human capital) are reported in Chapter 5, along with a discussion of the results. 
The final chapter concludes the thesis with a summary of this study and the main 
findings. The final chapter also highlights the contributions and limitations of this 
study and opportunities for future research.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 INTRODUCTION  
Risk and risk management have captured the attention of regulators and financial 
report users. Previous studies have investigated risk management from different 
perspectives, and this chapter provides a literature review of the research in relation to 
risk, risk management, and risk governance, as presented in Section 2.2. Section 2.3 
describes the corporate governance mechanism that bears the responsibility of risk 
management, namely the board of directors, who may delegate this responsibility to a 
RMC (either a combined or separate RMC). The theories that explain the importance 
of establishing a RMC are also described in this section. Section 2.4 provides an 
overview of human capital literature. A relevant review of board human capital and 
committee member human capital research is also presented, embedded with the 
theories used to illustrate the importance of firms’ human capital. Section 2.5 presents 
the concluding comments of this chapter.  
2.2 RISK, RISK MANAGEMENT, AND RISK GOVERNANCE 
2.2.1 Risk  
In the light of accounting corporate collapses and the global financial crisis, risk 
and risk management have been highlighted as important components of corporate 
governance (risk governance), in particular, how they have been underemphasised 
(Van Asselt and Renn, 2011). As a core objective of the risk management procedure, 
risk governance translates the substance and core principles of governance into the 
context of risk and risk management (Froot, Scharfstein and Stein, 1993; Psaros, 2009; 
Van Asselt and Renn, 2011). The recognition of different types of risk is central to risk 
governance (Van Asselt and Renn, 2011).  
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According to AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009, risk is defined as “the effect of 
uncertainty on objectives” (ISO, 2009, p13). In a more general sense, risk is any 
opportunity or prospect, or any hazard, danger, harm, threat or exposure that has 
already impacted upon the company or may impact upon the company in the future 
(Linsley and Shrives, 2006). All of these activities are “material” if misstatement or 
omission could influence information users’ decision-making about the price or value 
of a company’s securities (ISO, 2009). “Material” changes to a company’s risk profile 
can affect investors, as well as shareholders’ decision-making. Therefore, it is 
important that companies identify their material business risks. According to the 
International Accounting Standards Board (2010), entities should make judgments on 
the significance of a variety of issues, based on their nature (how it relates to 
companies) and their magnitude (how significantly it affects companies) that may 
affect their financial reporting. Additionally, in 2010, ASX CGPR 2nd edition 
(ASXCGC, 2010) recommended that each company must determine the material 
business risks they are facing, especially the most significant areas of uncertainty or 
exposure at a whole company level that could impact the achievement of 
organisational objectives. These areas present opportunities and threats for financial 
gains or loss.  
Most business risks can be determined by choice of company activity, the external 
environment, and the nature of company assets. Factors such as the health of the 
industry sector, market share, market size, competition, industrial relations, foreign 
exchange and interest rates, equity and commodity prices, and political visibility will 
influence the risk profile. There are also risks associated with the direct internal 
activities of an organisation, such as those emanating from operational performance, 
compliance, financial control and reporting, technology, people and skills, and quality 
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of management related issues. All of these risks may be relevant to a company’s risk 
profile. Internal and external risks that a company faces, can be broken down to 13 risk 
categories, including operational, environmental, sustainability, compliance, strategic, 
ethical conduct, reputation or band, technological, product service quality, human 
capital, financial reporting and market-related risks (ASX CGPR, 2010). Similarly, the 
“Group of 100” identify risks into four broad risk categories with different sub-
categories of risks: financial risk (including market, liquidity and credit, accounting 
and reporting, and capital structure), strategic risk (including governance, planning and 
resource allocation, stakeholders, and market dynamics), compliance risk (including 
standard of business conduct, regulatory, and legal), and operations risk (including 
value-chain, physical assets, people, knowledge, and information technology). The 
main risk categories and their definitions that frequently disclosed in companies’ 
reports are:  
 Operational risk –the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal 
process, people and systems or from external events (WBC6, 2013; ANZ7, 2013; 
QBE8, 2013; Basel II9) 
 Credit risk – the risk of financial loss where a customer or counterparty fails to 
meet their financial obligation (WBC1, 2013) 
 Compliance risk- the risk of legal or regulatory sanction, and financial or 
reputation loss, arising from our failure to abide by the compliance obligations 
required of us (WBC1, 2013)         
                                                 
 
6 Westpac Banking Corporation  
7 Australia and New Zealand banking group Limited 
8 QBE Insurance Group 
9 Second of the Basel Accords 
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 Strategic risk – the current and prospective impact on earnings and or capital 
arising from strategic business decisions, implementation of decisions and 
responsiveness to external change (QBE3, 2013) 
 Reputation risk – the risk to earnings or capital arising from negative public 
opinion resulting from the loss of reputation or public trust and standing 
(WBC1, 2013)                                                                                                                                                                   
 Market-related risk – the risk of an adverse impact on earnings resulting from 
changes in market factors, such as foreign exchange, interest rates, commodity 
prices and equity prices (WBC1, 2013).  
As each organization is exposed to different levels of uncertainty in their business 
environment, it is foreseeable that different organizations exposed to different kinds 
of risk category would have different risk profiles. For example, Westpac (2015) 
recognised their risk profile consistsof credit risk, liquidity risk, market risk, 
operational risk, compliance risk, business risk, environmental, social and governance 
risks, equity risk, insurance risk, related entity risk, and reputation risk,while QBE 
insurance (2015) identifiedtheir risk profile only consists of strategic risk, insurance 
risk, credit risk, market risk, liquidity risk and operational risk.          
 
2.2.2 Risk management                                                                                                                      
After recognising the risks that companies are exposed to and identifying what 
types of risk are involved in their business environment, the next step is to manage 
risk, that is, risk management. Risk management is coordinated activities that direct 
and control an organisation’s risk (ISO, 2009), with an objective of maximising the 
wealth of company owners and ensuring companies are not jeopardised by excessive 
risk taking behaviours (Kaen, 2005). This is in line with the CGPR (ASXCGC, 2010), 
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which suggests that risk management should be designed to identify, assess, monitor, 
and manage risk (p.32). Alternatively, risk management can be recognised as a series 
of activities performed by companies that are designed to minimise the negative impact 
of uncertainty regarding potential losses (Schmit and Roth, 1990). As risk taking is 
fundamental to business activities (Spira and Page, 2003) and all firms take risks, the 
main purpose of the risk management function is to mitigate the risk of large losses 
(Ellul and Yerramilli, 2011), by taking smart, well-informed, and considered risks and 
potentially exploring business opportunities (Psaros, 2009). 
2.2.3 The importance of risk management   
Managing risk is necessary for companies because risk management can 
decrease the probability of incurring bankruptcy or organisation costs, help firms enter 
into contracts with better terms (with suppliers, customers), reduce the incidence of 
value-decreasing investment decisions (Triantis, 2005), and enhance the environment 
for identifying and capitalising on opportunities to create value and protect established 
value (ASXCGC, 2010; Froot, Scharfstein and Stein, 1993). 
Successfully managing risk can provide many benefits to companies: it can 
lower the firm’s expected tax payment, protect firm-specific investments, assist firms 
in developing financial plans and funding programs, and reduce financial distress and 
bankruptcy costs (Froot, Scharfstein and Stein, 1993; Kaen, 2005). For instance, risk 
management strategies allow firms to utilise more debt, that is, increase their financial 
leverage. As a result, risk management can be used as a way to reduce taxes by letting 
a firm borrow more money and obtain interest expense tax shields. In addition, 
companies can use risk management strategies to mitigate the potential financial 
problems associated with currency risk. Companies can hedge their exchange rate 
exposure and adopt other exchange rate exposure strategies, such as currency swaps 
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for financing foreign operations, which reduce the likelihood of companies 
experiencing severe financial problems from unexpected exchange rate movements 
(Kaen, 2005). Additionally, risk management strategies, such as hedging, can be used 
to reduce agency costs and therefore increase the market value of the company. Unlike 
shareholders, managers cannot diversify away the unique risks associated with the 
company, which are known as unsystematic risks. By using risk management 
strategies, such as hedging, managers can eliminate unsystematic risks. Therefore, 
managers would be more likely to undertake projects that are profitable based on their 
systematic risk exposures, not on unsystematic risks, which is in line with the interests 
of shareholders (Kaen, 2005). Most importantly, good risk management contributes to 
the achievement of objectives and improvement of performance in a wide range of 
activities, such as project management, product quality, and efficiency in operations, 
governance, and reputation (ISO, 2009). In contrast, failure in risk management can 
lead to difficulties in achieving the company’s objectives, which can substantially 
increase its financial failure (Psaros, 2009). 
As risk management plays a crucial and significant role in increasing firm value 
and future growth, it is important to consider how companies manage their risks once 
they have been identified.  
2.2.4 How to manage risk  
Risk treatment  
After companies identify their risks, there are five options they can take in order 
to decrease the effect of risks on their companies.  
Firstly, companies can avoid the problem by not proceeding with the risky 
activity; however, risk avoidance may lead to other consequences. For example, firms 
may miss the opportunity to exploit a profitable project. 
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Secondly, companies can choose the step of reducing the likelihood of risks 
occurring, for example, through auditing and compliance programs designed to protect 
firms from exposure to risk. Firms can generally reduce risk through diversification by 
creating a portfolio of business divisions or product lines. The likelihood of risk 
occurring can also be controlled through decreasing either financial or operating 
leverage. Decreasing leverage can sacrifice upside gains in order to eliminate 
downside risks (Triantis, 2005). As the ultimate goal of each company is to maximise 
their profit, companies are likely to invest in real options in order to manage their risk 
without sacrificing profit. Real options provide an opportunity for firms to limit their 
downside risk while still holding profit on the upside (Miller and Waller, 2003). By 
investing in real options, firms can avoid risky projects but still gain the valuable 
opportunity that risky projects may provide. Real options place firms in a position to 
delay investment without losing their competitive advantage, to abandon a project 
when it is unprofitable, or to adjust its operating strategy at low cost, or avoid risks 
and exploit profitable opportunities. Firms can take advantage of real options, and then 
use financial contracts to transfer and control any residual risk, consequently achieving 
value maximisation. However, firms need to have an ability to delay their investment 
without losing out to competition, otherwise real options may be worthless (Triantis, 
2005).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
Thirdly, the company can reduce the impact of risk if it occurs, for example, 
through contingency planning or disaster recovery plans (DRP) that have been 
developed within companies. These plans are designed to help an organisation respond 
effectively and efficiently to a significant future situation or event that may or may not 
happen.  
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Alternatively, companies can transfer some or all of the risk to an external party 
that has the capacity to bear the risk or may be able to manage or control the risk more 
effectively, for example, insurance contracts, joint ventures, and financial derivatives. 
In some cases, it can bring together two parties with opposite risk exposures and 
neutralise the risk exposure for both parties (e.g. a Chinese company’s exposure to US 
dollars risk and a US company’s exposure to RMB dollars risk) (Triantis, 2005).  
Lastly, companies can choose to retain the risk, while monitoring the 
consequences of the residual risk.  
The way companies manage risks 
Traditionally, companies manage different types of risk in a segmented and 
separated way, which is the “silo approach” to risk management (Laux, 2005). 
Different risks are managed by different instruments. For example, pure risks, such as 
property, liability, and work injury risks, are usually managed individually through a 
combination of loss control, retention, and insurance contracts. Price risks, such as 
interest rate, exchange rate, commodity price, and credit risk, are addressed through 
derivative contracts, including options, forwards, futures, and swaps (Laux, 2005). 
Since the late 1990s, many researchers have questioned the appropriateness of 
traditional risk management by arguing that firms should consider managing their risks 
at an enterprise level in order to increase firm value and risk management efficacy (see 
Hoyt and Liebenberg, 2011; Liebenberg and Hoyt, 2003; Meulbroek, 2002). This 
approach is usually called enterprise risk management (ERM) or integrated risk 
management. Previous studies have highlighted that a portfolio view of risk 
management is essential because risks are not just simply added up. Mitigating one 
type of risk may increase the whole company’s risk portfolio if that risk is a natural 
hedge for another (Laux, 2005). Additionally, managers might not recognise some 
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risks when they are considered individual and unrelated. As a result, a good 
understanding of the firm’s risk cannot be obtained by managers. This could lead to 
financial loss and lack of competitiveness in the market. Whether a company chooses 
a silo-based approach or enterprise-based approach is still based on firm-specific 
characteristics, such as firm size, business factors, and the costs of risk management 
(see Pagach and Warr, 2007, 2010), suggesting that different companies can choose to 
adopt different risk management approaches based on their own firm characteristics. 
There is no one risk management approach that fits all companies.  
Risk management process and framework 
Given the breadth, depth, and intertwined nature of risk areas, organisations need 
to have coordinated policies and risk management structures in place in order to 
identify and manage risks (Psaros, 2009). ISO 31000:2009, risk management – 
principles and guidelines, provides principles, a framework, and a process for 
managing risk for Australian companies (ISO, 2009). Risk is generally managed 
within a risk management framework that each Australian company is required to have 
(ASXCGC, 2014). A risk management framework is “a set of components that provide 
the foundations and organisational arrangements for designing, implementing, 
monitoring, reviewing, and continually improving risk management throughout 
organisation” (ASXCGC, 2014, p34). Management designs and implements that 
framework to ensure the entity operates within the risk appetites set by the boards. 
Additionally, ISO (2009) identified the process of risk management (Figure 2.1), to 
guide companies in risk management. As illustrated in Figure 2.1, the process of risk 
management can be broken into five steps. Firstly, communication and consultation 
with internal and external shareholders should take place at an early stage, and should 
address the risks, such as the causes, consequences, and treatment. Secondly, 
 Chapter 2: Literature Review 25 
companies should identify the internal and external business environment of the 
company. The company can then conduct a risk assessment, including risk 
identification, risk analysis, and risk evaluation, to assess its potential risk. Next, 
organisations should assess and modify risks to ensure the risks are managed within a 
tolerable level. Finally, continuous monitoring and reviewing should be undertaken in 
order to oversee the companies’ risk management processes and ensure risk 
management activities are sound over time.  
 
Figure 2.1: ISO risk management process (adopted from Australian/New Zealand 
Standard AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009) 
 
2.2.5 Risk governance literature review 
Risk governance indicates how firms manage their risks, and which decisions 
about risks are taken and implemented (Van Asselt and Renn, 2011). Therefore, risk 
governance is closely related to risk management, and firms require a governance 
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structure to manage their risks. Specifically, firms analyse and formulate risk 
management strategies to avoid risk uncertainty and economic loss caused by risks. 
Research has investigated firms’ risk governance from the viewpoint of the board of 
directors, who oversee the risk governance of firms. Previous literature in this field has 
mainly examined the relationship between board characteristics and risk management 
from two perspectives: risk management activity and risk taking.  
 
Corporate governance and risk management activity.  
Previous research has examined the association between corporate governance 
characteristics and risk management activity (such as dealing with financially 
sophisticated tools and implementing enterprise risk management [ERM]) (Dionne 
Maalaoui Chun, and Triki, 2013), with an emphasis on the linkage between board of 
directors and firms’ risk management activities. Among those studies, the majority 
have paid attention to one characteristic of board of directors – board independence. 
The findings seem to have inconclusive results regarding the association between 
outside directors (independent directors) and risk management activities. Dionne, 
Maalaoui Chun and Triki (2013) found that board independence plays an active role 
in firms’ risk management through increasing hedging activities. Similarly, the results 
of Borokhovich, Brunarski, Crutchley, and Simkins (2004) showed that the proportion 
of independent directors on the board increases interest derivatives usage. However, 
Dionne and Triki (2004) and Marsden and Prevost (2005) reported that the presence 
of independent directors had no effect on a firm’s risk management policy, such as 
decisions about a hedge or the extent of the hedge. Whidbee and Wohar (1999) 
conducted an empirical study based on a sample of bank holding companies and the 
results were similar to Dionne and Triki (2004) and Marsden and Prevost (2005). They 
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found that the presence of independent directors increased derivatives usage only when 
non-independent directors held a large proportion of shares in the firm (Whidbee and 
Wohar, 1999). These inconclusive results may stem from the fact that board 
independence is not the main factor related to risk management activities and only 
considering one attribute of the board of directors may omit other important board 
characteristics. Therefore, it is necessary for scholars to examine other attributes of the 
board of directors. Additionally, Dionne, Maalaoui Chun and Triki (2013) provided 
insight into the association between the financial educational level of board members 
and the extent of hedging. Specifically, they suggested that boards with a majority of 
financially educated directors are more active in managing their risks. Their results 
highlight the importance of board human capital in relation to risk management 
activity and provide the initial empirical evidence in regards to the relationship 
between board human capital and risk management activities.  
While the board of directors oversee the governance process, they also need to 
co-operate with other parties, such as managers, to fulfil their governance 
responsibilities. As a result, other studies have investigated the association between 
managers’ characteristics and risk management activities and suggested that firm and 
managerial characteristics may have an impact on risk management activities. For 
example, Tufano (1996) examined risk management practices in the US gold mining 
industry. His results revealed that managers who own fewer shares manage more risk, 
and firms with a greater outside shareholding tend to manage less risk. Most 
importantly, he also examined the tenure, age, and stock ownership of CEOs and CFOs 
and found that CFOs with shorter tenure seemed to manage more risk. In addition, the 
presence of a Chief Risk Officer (CRO), board independence, and the apparent support 
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of ERM processes by the CEO and CFO were positively related to the stages of ERM 
implementation (Tufano, 1996).  
Corporate governance and risk taking  
Many studies in this field have adopted agency theory, which suggests that there 
are agency conflicts between shareholders and managers, and certain characteristics of 
corporate governance may influence risk taking and firm performance (Eng and 
Marek, 2003). However, the relationship between corporate governance and risk 
taking has not been confirmed, as arguments can be made from both the positive and 
negative sides. A high level of corporate governance (governance compliance) and 
better investor protection may reduce managerial discretion and limit opportunities for 
more risk taking behaviours, whereas a high level of investor protection may also lead 
managers to undertake riskier but more profitable projects (John, Litov and Yeung, 
2008; Minton, Taillard and Williamson, 2010).  
A great deal of research has empirically examined the relationship between 
shareholder ownership and risk, and consistently found a positive relationship between 
these two variables. For example, C. R. Chen, Steiner, and White (2001) documented 
that when management ownership increases, the alignment of interests of managers 
and owners enhances, leading to greater risk taking by managers. Similarly, Eng and 
Mak (2003), He and Sommer (2011), Nguyen (2011), and Calomiris and Carlson 
(2016) confirmed the importance of ownership structure for corporate governance on 
risk taking. In addition to shareholder ownership, Eng and Mak (2003) suggested that 
corporate governance elements, such as compensation, monitoring, and ownership 
structure are all significantly related to risk taking. Other research has investigated the 
relationship between board structure and composition, such as board size and board 
independence, in relation to corporate risk taking. In the UK, McNulty, Florackis and 
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Ormrod (2013) reported a negative relationship between board size and financial risk 
using a questionnaire survey. However, Akbar, Kharabsheh, Poletti-Hughes and Shah 
(2017) found no significant effect of board size on corporate risk taking in the UK 
financial sector. By examining US banks, Pathan (2009) revealed a negative 
relationship between the percentage of board independence and total risk, idiosyncratic 
risk, systematic risk, and assets return risk. Similarly, Akbar, Kharabsheh, Poletti-
Hughes and Shah (2017) confirmed the Pathan (2009) finding in the UK and reported 
a negative relationship between the presence of independent directors and corporate 
risk taking.  
Other studies have examined board human capital in relation to risk taking and 
firm performance. For example, Minton, Taillard and Williamson (2010) found that in 
the banking industry, the financial expertise of the board was associated with more 
risk taking, higher firm value before the GFC, and lower firm performance during the 
crisis. This study suggested the importance of firms’ human capital in relation to risk 
taking level (Minton, Taillard and Williamson, 2010). In addition, Akbar, Kharabsheh, 
Poletti-Hughes and Shah (2017) provided preliminary evidence showing that the 
existence of a risk committee in the board structure reduces corporate risk taking. Their 
results highlight the linkage between RMC and risks (Akbar, Kharabsheh, Poletti-
Hughes and Shah, 2017).  
In summary, prior literature has shown the impact of human capital on risks and 
the potential linkage between RMC and risks. The next section examines bankruptcy 
risk and reviews the previous research that has examined firms’ bankruptcy risk in 
relation to corporate governance.  
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Corporate governance and bankruptcy risk 
Although corporate governance is apparently related to bankruptcy risk, the 
evidence in this area is sparse. Existing research has mainly examined the relationship 
between corporate governance and performance (either operating or firm performance) 
(see Darrat, Gray, Park, and Wu, 2016). In addition, a number of studies have indicated 
the relationship between corporate governance and bankruptcy risk (Darrat, Gray, 
Parker and Wu, 2016; Fich and Slezak, 2008; Parker, Peters, and Turetsky, 2002). 
However, the majority of past research has only examined corporate governance 
characteristics, without considering firm-specific attributes, such as directors’ human 
capital in firms. In general, prior research has only examined a few corporate 
governance characteristics, such as board size, board independence, board diversity, 
and a powerful CEO, in relation to bankruptcy risk. In terms of board size, a large 
amount of research has suggested complex firms with a larger board perform better 
(Boone, Field, Karpoff and Raheja, 2007; Darrat, Gray, Parker and Wu, 2016; Linck, 
Netter and Yang, 2008). Fich and Slezak (2008) contended that a smaller board is 
positively related to bankruptcy risk for financially distressed firms. In relation to 
board independence, Darrat, Gray, Parker and Wu (2016) documented that the 
relationship between board independence and bankruptcy risk depends on some firm-
specific circumstances, such as specialist knowledge. Board independence is 
negatively related to bankruptcy risks in firms that require more specialist knowledge 
(Darrat, Gray, Parker and Wu, 2016). Other research has indicated that diverse boards 
are negatively related to bankruptcy risk (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Darrat, Gray, 
Parker and Wu, 2016) and a powerful CEO (who serves as board chair or holds a large 
proportion of the firm’s stock) is more likely to increase a firm’s bankruptcy risk 
(Adams, Almeida, and Ferreira, 2005; Darrat, Gray, Parker and Wu, 2016).  
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2.3 WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MANAGING CORPORATE RISK? 
Given that good risk management practice is very important in companies’ daily 
activity, who is best equipped to take on the role of risk management? There are three 
risk related corporate governance mechanisms that may enhance the level of risk 
management practice: the board of directors, a combined RMC, and a separate RMC. 
2.3.1 Board of Directors 
Responsibilities of boards - risk management  
Managers are responsible for the day to day running of a business, while the 
board is ultimately responsible for all corporate decisions, including risk management 
(Corps Act, 2001, Division 9.1). Managing risk is a fundamental concern in today’s 
dynamic global environment (Gordon, Loeb, and Tseng, 2009) and the board of 
directors plays a crucial role in risk management. According to McKinsey and 
Company’s (2002) global investor opinion surveys, investors perceive board practices 
to be as important as financial performance when they are evaluating companies for 
potential investment. This survey highlights that investors demand that boards 
communicate and report material matters to their shareholders, as well as responding 
to requests for information by investors in regards to governance issues, especially if 
the issue relates to risk management (Laksmana, 2008). This highlights the 
relationship between the board of directors and risk management.  
Theoretically speaking, the board of directors holds both monitoring and 
advisory roles. According to agency theory, due to the separation of ownership and 
management in companies, managers may engage in opportunistic behaviour at the 
expense of shareholders’ wealth. As a result, one of the main roles of the board of 
directors is to monitor managers’ opportunistic behaviour on behalf of shareholders, 
which in turn decreases agency costs (Adams and Ferreira, 2007; Dionne, Maalaoui 
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Chun and Triki, 2013; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). Effective monitoring by the board of directors can improve 
companies’ corporate governance practice, reduce agency costs, and consequently 
increase firm performance (Hillman and Daiziel, 2003). Additionally, effective 
monitoring by boards may increase the efficiency of companies using risk-related 
tools, such as hedging and derivatives (Marsden and Prevost, 2005). It is therefore 
expected that the board of directors may positively influence companies’ risk 
management practices.  
Resource dependency theory highlights the second role of the board of directors 
– their advisory role. The theory indicates the relevance of directors’ skills and 
characteristics in response to firms’ activities and advice management about firms’ 
behaviour, such as risk management behaviour (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Board 
characteristics, such board size, board expertise, and board independence, are very 
important components in determining the quality of the boards oversight function 
(Kirkpatrick, 2009). Previous risk management literature has suggested that a high 
percentage of independent board members contribute to a good risk management 
practice (Bhagat and Bolton, 2008; Mongiardino and Plath, 2010), as independent 
directors have a strong influence in determining and monitoring firms’ policy and 
corporate governance practice (Ajinkya, Bhojraj, and Sengupta, 2005). Additionally, 
board composition and board competence also play important roles in managing risks 
and establishing good risk management practices (Aebi, Sabato, and Schmid, 2012; 
Brancato, Tonello, Hexter, and Newman, 2006; Kirkpatrick, 2009). As a result, boards 
members should have relevant skills and expertise (such as financial skill and 
experience) in understanding, evaluating, and accurately interpreting risk information 
(Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005). In addition, Erkens, Hung, and Matos (2012) 
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suggested that firms should have board members, specifically RMC members with the 
relevant skills or experience, to monitor risks and safeguard their wealth, allowing 
investors to ascertain the risk associated with a firm and obtain sufficient risk 
information to achieve investment efficiency. These results highlight the importance 
of board human capital in terms of risk management.  
Delegating board responsibilities  
Legally, the board of directors have a set of formal duties referred to as corporate 
governance (including risk management), that include legal terms, such as the duty of 
care and duty of loyalty, as well as forming different stand-alone committees, such as 
audit and compensation committees (Feld and Ramsinghani, 2013). The board of 
directors also has responsibilities related to risk management, such as determining the 
risk appetite of a firm – the firm’s overall risk level and what kind of risks the firm 
takes (ASXCGC, 2014; Stulz, 2008), deciding the nature and extent of the risks it is 
prepared to take to meet the objectives of a company, and lastly reviewing and guiding 
the firm’s risk management policies (ASXCGC, 2014; Naciri, 2010). It is therefore 
necessary for board members to understand and identify different risks that a company 
is involved in and the consequences for the firm’s operation (Stulz, 2008). 
In the early life of a company, the board is often small, around three to five 
members. As a company grows, the amount of issues that boards need to consider and 
manage grows as well. Given that the complexity of the business and the level of board 
oversight increases, boards must rely on others to assist them in decision making and 
other decision making matters (Feld and Ramsinghani, 2013). Therefore, the board is 
likely to delegate their responsibility to other parties, such as committees.  
The delegation of responsibility to others is constrained by law, for instance, the 
Corporations Act 2001 (Commonwealth of Australia (Cth), 2001). The law recognises 
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directors’ right to delegate only to the extent that the board is confident that it can 
demonstrate to the court that members are performing their duties within the duty of 
care and duty of diligence. According to S 198D (1) of the Corporations Act 2001 
(Cth, 2001), directors have the power of delegating responsibility to others, including 
to a committee of directors, a director, or an employee of the company. This means 
that boards are entitled to delegate some of their responsibilities to others. However, 
the delegate must exercise the powers delegated in accordance with any directions of 
the directors (Cth, 2001, 198D (2)). The exercise of the power by a delegate is 
considered to be as effective as if the director had exercised it (Cth, 2001, S 198D (3)). 
Without the opportunity to delegate some of the responsibilities of the board, the 
workload and effectiveness of the main board would be compromised. Although the 
board of directors can delegate their responsibility to others, the directors need to 
ensure that there is reasonable ground to believe delegation will act in conformity with 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth, 2001), and it is reliable and competent, and does not 
impair their duty of care and duty of diligence. In addition, if the directors delegate 
power under the situation of Corporations Act 2001 (Cth, 2001, S198 D), that director 
is responsible for the power exercised by the delegate as if the power had been 
exercised by the directors themselves.   
Given that the board has a wide range of responsibility and functions that require 
advanced expertise, most corporate governance reforms require the board to form a 
number of specific committees to help accomplish the tasks (Naciri, 2010). The board 
is likely to delegate their responsibility to specific committees in order to manage the 
company’s daily activities effectively and efficiently. These specific committees, 
known as standalone committees, can be recognised as a sub-committee of the board, 
which recommend policy for approval by the entire board, as well as undertaking 
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duties and reporting their results back to the entire board. Generally, these specific 
committees include audit, compensation, and nomination committees (Naciri, 2010), 
with existing board members serving on these committees. Depending on the size of 
the full board, board members often serve on more than one of these committees (Feld 
and Ramsinghani, 2013). Based on the characteristics of companies, the board is 
allowed to have as many committees as required. However, boards tend to form other 
committees when a reoccurring issue appears to be too complex to be addressed by all 
board members. For example, a standalone committee is formed when the board 
members cannot make a conclusive decision on a matter, or some of the board of 
directors may not have the relative skill or knowledge for assessing a particular matter 
(Naciri, 2010). In addition, governance regulators identify and recommend the 
formation of specific committees following economic and business disasters. For 
example, the importance of the audit committee received much attention following the 
bankruptcies of the 2000’s (global corporate collapses such as Enron, Parmalat, 
WorldCom, and HIH). There has been added interest in risk committees, nominating 
committees (specifically from a gender diversity perspective), and compensation 
committees following the global financial crisis. 
Delegating the board responsibility to committees is becoming more and more 
important and beneficial to organisational corporate governance. It allows the board to 
rely on more expertise, to gain flexibility and more effective control over the 
organisation. In addition, it allows the committee to be more effective in dealing with 
complex or specialised issues and uses directors’ time and expertise more efficiently. 
Forming specific committees allows directors to deepen their knowledge of the 
organisation, develop expertise, and become more actively engaged in the companies’ 
activities (Naciri, 2010).  
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According to agency theory, there is a separation of ownership and management 
in companies, and managers may engage in opportunistic behaviour at the expense of 
shareholders’ wealth. As the board is the body that develops governance policy and 
procedures (Feld and Ramsinghani, 2013), agency theory suggests that one of the 
many roles of the board of directors is to monitor managers’ opportunistic behaviour 
on behalf of shareholders, which in turn decreases agency costs and consequently 
maximises shareholder value (Adams and Ferreira, 2007; Dionne, Maalaoui Chun and 
Triki, 2013; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). By forming a specific committee, the board can effectively monitor 
companies’ activities, which consequently improves companies’ corporate governance 
practices, reduces agency costs, and increases firm performance (Hillman and Daiziel, 
2003). Resource dependence theory also suggests that firms require others who have 
the relevant expertise to engage in the company’s activities, with the aim of bringing 
critical resources and strength to a firm (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Hillman, Withers, 
and Collins, 2009). Resources can help companies to reduce the dependency between 
the organisation and outside uncertainties (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), and decrease 
transaction costs (Williamson, 1984) and potential risks within the firm (Pfeffer, 
1972), which consequently increases firm performance. Similarly, Naciri (2010) 
suggested that the existence of committees may “signal” to investors that the board is 
taking the particular issues seriously, which may have a positive impact on investors’ 
investment decision making. The findings of Brick and Chidambaran (2007) support 
this theory that increased oversight and monitoring by the board through committees 
may lead to some increases in firm value. However, even if specific committees are 
able to add value to companies, the board of directors should always consider a number 
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of matters when developing specific committees, such as defining the specific needs 
to be entrusted to the projected committee. 
2.3.2 Types of risk management committees 
Risk management committee 
In order to effectively manage companies’ risk, boards are likely to charge an 
appropriate board committee to specifically oversee risk management (ASXCGC, 
2014). The board of directors usually oversees risk management through two of its 
specific committees: a combined RMC10 or a separate RMC. Consequently, RMCs are 
responsible for overseeing the functioning of the risk management system, the 
development of a risk management culture within the organisation, determining 
whether the risk management system meets the needs of the company, and also to 
ensure that its members are committed to risk activities (Naciri, 2010).  
Forming a RMC to oversee risk management (either a combined committee or a 
separate risk committee) may be more beneficial to companies than not having one. 
Similar to the board of directors’ function, RMCs can be treated as a monitoring 
mechanism for managing managers’ opportunistic behaviours in terms of risk 
management on behalf of shareholders, thereby reducing agency costs and increasing 
firm performance (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). Establishing a RMC may also increase 
the efficiency of companies using risk related tools, such as hedging and derivatives 
(Marsden and Prevost, 2005). In addition, in light of resource dependence theory, 
directors who sit on the RMC are expected to provide critical resources to companies, 
including their experience, expertise, reputation, and network with other firms and 
external contingencies (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). Resources are beneficial to 
                                                 
 
10 The majority of combined risk committees are audit and risk committees. 
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companies as they can enhance risk management strategies and strengths of a given 
firm (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Hillman, Withers and Collins, 2009).  Therefore, it 
is expected that companies with risk matters overseen by a RMC may be associated 
with better risk management compared to companies where risk matters are overseen 
by the entire board.  
Similarly, as suggested by ASXCGC (2014), each company should have a RMC 
to oversee risks, it does not matter whether the committee has a stand-alone risk 
committee (a separate RMC), or a combination of board committees (such as audit and 
RMC). Delegating a committee to address different elements of risk can provide an 
efficient and effective mechanism to provide transparency, focus, and independent 
judgment to oversee the entity’s risk management framework (ASXCGC, 2014), 
which consequently enhances the level of risk management practice. Therefore, RMCs 
play a crucial role in risk management.  
Combined or separate risk management committee (audit committee or risk 
management committee) 
Generally, the risk management activities of a company can be overseen by one 
of the following three bodies: the board of directors, a combined RMC, and a separate 
RMC. Depending on firm-specific characteristics, such as board size, some companies 
oversee their risk matters by the entire board, while some companies delegate risk 
management responsibility to their audit committee, and a few companies form a 
separate committee to specifically manage their risks (Subramaniam, McManus and 
Zhang, 2009).  
Research has suggested that delegating responsibility to a separate RMC instead 
of a combined committee to oversee risk activities is a more effective way for 
companies to obtain a better risk management practice (Aebi, Sabato and Schmid, 
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2012; Brancato, Tonello, Hexter and Newman, 2006; Kirkpatrick, 2009; Mongiardino 
and Plath, 2010). Having a separate RMC may provide specialised insight with regards 
to risk management decision making, which allows members to obtain necessary risk 
information, and make correct and timely risk management decisions (Karamanou and 
Vafeas, 2005; Pirson and Turnbull, 2011). Similarly, resource dependence theory 
states that having a separate RMC as a monitoring mechanism can provide direction 
to companies, especially in relation to risk management matters. Therefore, it is 
expected that a separate RMC is a better way of enhancing the level of risk 
management.  
As most combined RMCs consist of audit and risk, the literature review of 
research into the combined audit and risk committee and RMC indicates there are two 
reasons why a separate RMC contributes to superior risk management practice, and a 
combined audit and risk committee may not be as efficient in addressing risks within 
companies.  
Research suggests that the workload of audit committees has increased 
dramatically in recent years due to changes in regulation (Brown, Steen, and Foreman, 
2009). Due to increased workloads and responsibilities, scholars have suggested that 
it has gone beyond the scope and capabilities of audit committees to oversee the risk 
management functions of companies (Brown, Steen and Foreman, 2009). Similarly, 
Daly and Bocchino (2006) revealed that audit committee members feel that they have 
too much responsibility and do not have the time or inclination to oversee risk 
management. Time constraints and fatigue are more likely to occur in combined 
committees, which may consequently inhibit the committee members’ desire and 
ability to undertake a more rigorous review of the various reports and processes and 
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consequences that raise the potential for inefficiencies in risk management 
(Subramaniam, McManus and Zhang, 2009). 
In general, audit committees are focused on the oversight of financial reporting 
risks and related compliance risks rather than a wider scope for risk management 
(Brown, Steen and Foreman, 2009; Xie, Davidson, and DaDalt, 2003). Therefore, it is 
suggested that audit committees may have insufficient skills for overseeing non-
financial risks, such as operational, strategic, and regulatory risks (Brown, Steen and 
Foreman, 2009; Daly and Bocchino, 2006). One plausible solution to the issue is the 
creation of a separate RMC (Brown, Steen and Foreman, 2009). A separate RMC 
would enable the board of directors to cope more effectively with assessing the various 
threats and opportunities faced by an entity (Subramaniam, McManus and Zhang, 
2009). Most importantly, in 2014, the Australian Security Exchange Corporate 
Governance Council (ASXCGC) released the third edition of Corporate Governance 
Principles and Recommendations. Recommendation 7.1 recommends companies form 
a specific RMC for overseeing risks, which also highlights the importance of having a 
separate RMC within companies (ASXCGC, 2014).  
Due to the issues related to a combined risk and audit committee illustrated 
above, it is suggested that a separate RMC is required in order to efficiently manage 
companies’ risks (Daly and Bocchino, 2006). Harrison (1987) suggested that a 
separate committee enables directors to focus on specific areas of responsibility, 
enhancing legitimacy and accountability in corporations. It has also been suggested 
that separate committees have more influence on corporate performance (Klein, 1998). 
Therefore, it is expected that companies with a separate RMC are likely to produce a 
superior risk management practice compared to where the risk management function 
is delegated to the audit committee.  
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2.3.3 Theories – RMC existence 
Agency theory 
Agency theory is derived from the agency relationship, which exists between 
managers (agents) and shareholders (principles) (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978).  
Shareholders employ managers to act in their best interest and managers have ethical 
and legal duties to fulfil shareholders’ expected increases in value. However, due to 
the self-interested behaviour of managers, this may not always be the case. According 
to agency theory, there are conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders 
(Ismail and Rahman, 2011). Managers may have incentives to act opportunistically in 
order to maximise their own wealth at the expense of shareholders’ value (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1990). Agency theorists suggest that due to incomplete contracts, agency 
costs of monitoring and bonding are borne by the principle. Managers are likely to 
engage in opportunistic behaviours, such as risk avoidance or excessive risk-taking, to 
generate returns for themselves instead of for shareholders. Specifically, this agency 
problem arises from information asymmetry between ownership and management 
(Cotter, Lokman, and Najah, 2011). Managers have greater knowledge about the 
firms’ operations, finances, and the exposed risks of firms than shareholders (Cotter, 
Lokman, and Najah, 2011). Consequently, information asymmetry and differences in 
risk tolerance may impede the efficient allocation of resources in capital markets 
(Healy and Palepu, 2001). Specifically, agency theory suggests that there are divergent 
risk preferences of risk-neutral (diversified) shareholders and risk-averse managers, 
which necessitates monitoring by the board (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Specifically, 
unlike managers, who have a substantial proportions of their earnings tied up in the 
one firm, shareholders are assumed to hold a diversified portfolio of investments 
(Kaen, 2005). As a result, managers tend to be more risk-averse than shareholders. 
Consequently, without monitoring, risk-averse managers may reject profitable (but 
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riskier) projects that are attractive to shareholders who prefer the increased return from 
the higher level of risk. In order to minimise managers’ opportunistic behaviour, the 
board of directors monitors managers’ behaviour. Therefore, it is important for the 
board of directors to oversee companies’ risk activities and monitor managers’ self-
interested behaviour in terms of risk-taking. As a result, the board of directors may 
delegate a RMC (either a combined RMC or a separate RMC) to specifically address 
firms’ risk management matters. It is expected that establishing a RMC may reduce 
agency costs and control for managers’ opportunistic behaviours, in terms of risk 
taking and risk management.  
Signalling theory 
Signalling theory is useful in describing behaviour when two parties have access 
to different information, and it has frequently been used to explain information 
asymmetry (Connelly, Certo, Ireland and Reutzel, 2011; Spence, 2002). Signalling 
theory suggests information asymmetry can be reduced by the party with more 
information signalling it to others (Cotter, Lokman, and Najah, 2011). As a result, 
firms may communicate their corporate governance compliance through different 
communication channels, such as the annual report. In addition, it is beneficial for 
firms to disclose their corporate governance mechanisms to create a favourable 
image/reputation in the market. Specifically, establishing corporate governance 
practices may flag the firms’ commitment to better governance. As a result, it is 
expected to minimise any potential risk of investors’ devaluation of the firm 
(Subramaniam, McManus and Zhang, 2009). There is no current mandatory regulatory 
requirement for establishing a RMC in Australia. Therefore, firms may voluntarily 
form a RMC or a separate RMC to flag their commitment to risk management practices 
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to the market and indicate to external investors their effort in effectively managing 
risk.  
2.4 HUMAN CAPITAL LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.4.1 Human capital - “what you know” 
Human capital, as one category of intellectual capital, is defined by Bontis (1999, 
p443) as: 
Human capital represents the human factor in the organisation, the combined 
intelligence, skills and expertise that gives the organisation its distinctive 
character. The human elements of the organisation are those that are capable 
of learning, changing, innovating and providing the creative trust which of 
properly motivated can ensure the long-term survival of the organisation.  
Alternatively, human capital can be described as individuals’ knowledge and 
skills that allow for changes in economic growth and action (Becker, 1964; Coleman, 
1988). Human capital is embodied in the skills, knowledge, and expertise that people 
have, and may be developed through experience, training, and education (Baron and 
Armstrong, 2007; Dakhli and De Clercq, 2004). It is the knowledge and skills of 
individuals that create value and increase firm effectiveness, and firms need to focus 
on the ways of attracting, retaining, and developing their human capital (Baron and 
Armstrong, 2007). Firms do not own human capital, but human capital can be secured 
by the employment relationship (Baron and Armstrong, 2007).   
Human capital has been viewed as a valuable, non-transferrable, and non-
substitutable resource, as it is scarce and specialised knowledge (Coff, 1997). Human 
capital perceives individuals as valuable resources that can be developed and that can 
lead to economic outcomes and competitive advantage (Dakhli and De Clercq, 2004). 
Crook, Todd, Combs, Woehr and Ketchen (2011) conducted meta-analysis and the 
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results revealed that human capital accumulations are positively related to firm 
performance. Firms with a high level of human capital are more likely to profit from 
firm-specific knowledge, skills, and resources to sustain competitive advantage.  
A high level of human capital may potentially improve firm performance by 
increasing customer benefits and decreasing the costs associated with production and 
delivery (Becker, 1964; Mincer, 1974). Smarter workers may help lower production 
and delivery costs by developing new innovations that decrease costs and increase 
utilisation. In addition, better human capital may lead to better problem solving and 
planning, which are likely to increase product quality and enhance reliability 
production and delivery efficiency, leading to a low level of organisational costs 
(Youndt and Snell, 2004). Customer satisfaction would be increased when product 
quality and reliability are increased by knowledgeable workers, which may potentially 
be beneficial to firm performance (Youndt and Snell, 2004).  
Some leading economic scholars have provided the explanation of the benefits 
of human capital. For example, Schultz (1961) illustrated human capital as a form of 
capital where people obtain knowledge and skills through education and training, and 
that this capital is a product of deliberate investment that yields returns. One aspect of 
this explanation is that human capital is a stock of experiences, knowledge, and skills 
that generate returns for individuals and organisations. Human capital enhances firm 
performance, leading to a high level of productivity and profitability (Becker, 1964; 
David and Lopez, 2001; Romer, 1990; Schultz, 1961). Specifically, the human capital 
theory explains the gains of education, training, and experience as a form of investment 
in human resources (Aliaga, 2001), and the main argument is that people are 
considered a form of capital for development (Aliaga, 2001; Engelbrecht, 2003). As a 
result, education and previous experience can be seen as investments that increase the 
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productivity of individuals and organisations, as well as increasing the effectiveness 
of the production. Lucas (1988, 1990) suggested that the fundamental principle 
underlying human capital theory is the belief that peoples’ learning capacities are as 
crucial as other resources involved in the production of goods and services. It is 
beneficial to individuals, organisations, and society as a whole when the human capital 
resource is effectively utilised (Schultz, 1961). Therefore, the human capital theory 
provides insight into the overall theoretical relationship among human capital, firm 
performance, and individuals’ production effectiveness. 
Empirically, researchers have consistently suggested that human capital leads to 
better performance (Colombo and Grill, 2005). For example, Gimeno, Folta, Cooper, 
and Woo (1997), Pennings, Lee, and Van Witteloostuijn (1998), and Dimov and 
Shepherd (2005) found that human capital, such as education level and work 
experience, is positively related to firm performance. In addition, the positive 
relationship between human capital and employee performance is well accepted and 
many studies have provided empirical support (e.g. Mincer, 1974; Van Praag and 
Cramer, 2001). In general, the conclusion stemming from those studies indicates that 
people who are better educated, have more experience, and invest more time and 
resources into enhancing their skills are able to produce higher profits at both 
individual and firm levels. In addition, Dakhli and De Clercq (2004) found human 
capital was positively associated with firm innovation in 59 countries.  
Prior literature has identified three characteristics of human capital: education, 
experience, and knowledge. Studies have found these three characteristics are all 
positively related to firm performance and firm activity (Dimov and Shepherd, 2005; 
Gimeno, Folta, Cooper, and Woo, 1997). This is consistent with human capital theory, 
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which considers that knowledge may bring better cognitive skills to individuals, thus 
increasing their productivity and efficiency in firms (Becker, 1964).  
2.4.2 General and firm-specific human capital  
Human capital theory recognises the knowledge and skills that committee 
members have gained from firm or industry level experiences (Bailey and Helfat, 
2003), and human capital has been widely categorised as general human capital and 
firm-specific human capital (Becker, 1962). Firm-specific human capital is the 
expertise derived from the skills and knowledge gained in the position that is specific 
to the firm, and it increases the future marginal product of the firm (Wulf and Singh, 
2011). 
The value of firm-specific human capital remains within the firm, and the rights 
to the profits generated from investing in human resources also belong to the firm 
(Abdel-khalik, 2003; Donaldson and Earton, 1976). Unlike general human capital, 
firm-specific human capital cannot be used in the same way at multiple firms; and 
thus, it is not valued by all potential employers (Becker, 1962). Firm-specific human 
capital is only beneficial for that firm. 
Previous studies have suggested that firm-specific human capital increases the 
human capital of organisations, as it can retain companies’ value through competitive 
advantage and performance advantage, and competitors are not able to purchase such 
resources (Crook, Todd, Combs, Woehr, and Ketchen, 2011; Datta, Guthrie, and 
Wright, 2005). While the acquisition of firm-specific skills is valuable to the 
organisation, it is personally costly for the employee, not only because of the effort 
involved, but also because such skills are not perfectly marketable (Jaggia and Thakor, 
1994). In contrast, general human capital is valued by all potential employers, as it can 
produce value in different firm settings, and it remains within the individual, as the 
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cost is generally covered by the individual and not the firm (Becker, 1964; Kor and 
Sundaramurthy, 2008).  
2.4.3 Board of directors’ human capital 
The human capital of the board of directors plays a crucial role in firms. Board 
capital is intended to capture the capability and ability of the board of directors to 
provide resources to the firm (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). The board may provide 
firms with crucial resources through personal connections, skills, experiences, and 
legitimacy (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Hillman and Dalziel (2003) suggested that 
board capital is the sum of the board of directors’ human and social capitals, 
demonstrating the ability of the board of directors to manage firms and provide advice 
to the top management team. Human capital can be recognised as an individual’s 
experience, expertise, knowledge, and skills (Becker, 1964; Coleman, 1988), whereas 
social capital is “the sum of the actual and potential resources embedded within, 
available through, and derived from, the network of relationships possessed by an 
individual” (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998, p 243).  
The human capital of the board of directors has long been a subject of research 
in different disciplines (e.g. Johnson, Schnatterly, and Hill, 2012). Research on 
corporate boards generally suggests that board human capital is linked to board 
governance effectiveness. (Carpenter and Westphal, 2001; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; 
McDonald, Westphal, and Graebner, 2008; Rose, 2007). Board human capital can be 
seen as a proxy for the ability of the board to govern the firm, which may stimulate 
firm outcomes, such as firm performance (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Rose, 2007). 
Management literature has extensively adopted the human capital explanation to 
predict a firm’s outcomes, using upper echelons theory. Many studies have indicated 
that firms with a high level of human capital generate a number of positive outcomes, 
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such as better firm performance (e.g., Carpenter and Westphal, 2001; Westphal and 
Milton, 2000). It is suggested that board human capital is significantly related to the 
board’s capability to monitor and advise management teams (Kor and Sundaramurthy, 
2009). Specific board human capital may enable boards to monitor and advise 
managers in a more effective way (Carpenter and Westphal, 2001). Specifically, 
certain types of human capital may influence firm performance from different aspects. 
For example, Carpenter, Pollock and Leary (2003) revealed that directors’ 
international experience affects firms’ international sales. McDonald, Westphal and 
Graebner (2008) revealed that directors’ acquisition experience is positively related to 
firms’ acquisition performance. In another article, Hillman (2005) suggested that 
directors’ political connections, as a form of social capital, are valuable for firms 
operating in highly regulated industries.  
Previous research into board characteristics has mainly focussed on the structural 
factors of the board, such as board size, board independence, and association with firm 
performance. However, a review of board literature concludes that independence has 
little to do with firm performance and board effectiveness. More recently, research has 
begun to examine board human capital, such as education, experience, and its 
association with firm outcomes using resource dependence theory (Carpenter and 
Westphal, 2001; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; McDonald, Westphal and Graebner, 
2008). 
Resource dependence theory is very powerful in explaining directors’ human 
capital and firm outcomes (Hillman, Withers and Collins, 2009; Johnson, Schnatterly 
and Hill, 2013; Withers, Hillman, and Cannella, 2012). Specifically, resource 
dependence theory suggests that firms require parties who can bring crucial resources 
to companies, and thus provide strength to the company (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; 
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Hillman, Withers and Collins, 2009; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). The crucial resources 
help reduce dependence on the organisation and external parties, decreasing the 
uncertainty of the firm, lowering firms’ transaction cost, and consequently diminishing 
the bankruptcy rate of the firm, leading to an incremental increase in firm performance 
(Pfeffer, 1972; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Singh, House, and Tucker, 1986).  
Resource dependence theory has frequently been used to study boards of 
directors (such as Hillman, Cannella and Paetzold, 2000; Pfeffer, 1972; Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978). Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) indicated that board members can offer 
certain benefits to companies, including providing advice and expertise and access to 
resources and legitimacy. The results of previous empirical studies support these 
proposed benefits. 11  For example, Provan (1980) found that firms with powerful 
members of the community on the board are more likely to acquire crucial resources 
from the environment. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) showed that firms in regulated 
industries require more people with relevant experience. Similarly, Hillman (2005) 
found that firms operating in heavily regulated industries tended to have more former 
politicians on their board, as ex-politicians enable companies to have access to 
important political resources/information, and these resources play a crucial role in 
enhancing firms’ financial performance. Kor and Misangyi (2008) showed a lack of 
top management industry experience can be offset by the presence of external directors 
with significant managerial industry experience, suggesting directors supplement 
management with crucial resources and experiences. Crucial resources can also 
generate profit for firms. Peng (2004) suggested that resource-rich external directors 
are more likely to have a positive impact on firm performance than firms with poorly 
                                                 
 
11Also see Cowen and Marcel, 2011; Khanna, Jones and Boivie, 2014; Kor and Misangyi, 2008.  
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resourced external directors. The results suggest that it is very important for firms to 
attract board members with crucial resources in order to gain benefits for their 
company.  
Although the literature has begun to examine the relationship between board 
human capital and firm outcomes using resource dependence theory, the focus of this 
stream of research has only investigated a few human capital characteristics (Haynes 
and Hillman, 2010). For example, Tian, Haleblian and Rajagopalan (2011) used CEO 
experience and industry experience to represent board human capital, which is better 
classified as performance by management rather than the board. Peng, Sun and 
Markóczy (2015) identified two types of human capital: international experience and 
political ties. There is a lack of research examining board human capital in a more 
detailed and comprehensive way. In addition, RMC as a board subcommittee that 
specifically oversees firms’ risk activities, and the relationship between RMC human 
capital and firm outcomes or governance effectiveness remain underexplored. As a 
result, the aim of this study is to investigate RMC human capital in a more 
comprehensive and in depth manner. Moreover, in contrast to previous research, which 
has largely examined the association between specific indicators of human capital and 
specific outcomes (Carpenter, Pollock and Leary, 2003; Hillman, 2005; McDonald, 
Westphal and Graebner, 2008), this study extends this area of research on the value of 
board human capital by empirically testing and arguing the relationship between a 
number of human capital indicators and overall firm outcomes.   
2.4.4 Human capital of different committee members 
Few studies have examined the human capital of committee members and the 
human capital of the audit committee has been largely examined among other 
committees. In general, previous research has revealed that for firms with audit 
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committee members who have a higher level of financial knowledge, and financial or 
accounting management expertise, managers are more likely to make or update an 
earnings forecast, and their forecasts will be more accurate and precise, which elicits 
a more favourable market response (Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005). In terms of 
financial experience, prior studies have suggested that the financial experience of audit 
committee members is effective in constraining earnings management, reducing fraud 
and restatement, and enhancing firm performance in the market (Abbott, Parker and 
Peters, 2004; Aldamen, Duncan, Kelly, McNamara and Nagel, 2012; Bédard, 
Chtourou and Courteau, 2004; Carcello, Hermanson, and Ye, 2011; Xie, Davidson and 
DaDalt, 2003). However, other studies found no relationship between financial 
experience and earnings restatement (Lin, Li and Yang, 2006) and industrial 
experience (Chen, Moroney and Houghton, 2005). Zhang, Taylor, Qu and Oliver 
(2013) examined the association between audit committee characteristics and 
corporate risk disclosure and their findings revealed that the financial expertise of audit 
committee members was found to have no impact on the extent of risk disclosure. 
These inconclusive results may stem from the fact that only considering the financial 
experience of the audit committee may omit other important audit committee human 
capital characteristics. Therefore, it is necessary for scholars to examine other 
attributes of audit committee members. 
As for accounting experience, previous scholars have suggested that accounting 
expertise complements strong corporate governance (Krishnan and Lee, 2009) and is 
associated with improved accruals quality (Carcello, Hermanson and Ye, 2011; 
Dhaliwal, Naiker and Navissi, 2010) and fewer restatements (Carcello, Hermanson 
and Ye,  2011). Compared with financial experience, accounting experience plays a 
more important role in the audit committee. DeFond, Hann and Hu (2005) reported a 
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positive market reaction to the appointment of an accounting expert to the audit 
committee, but no reaction to the appointment of a financial expert. 
Other studies have indicated the significance of other human capital 
characteristics of committee members. For example, Aldamen, Duncan, Kelly, 
McNamara and Nagel (2012) suggested that accounting performance is positively 
impacted where audit committees include blockholder representation, the chair of the 
board, whose members have more external directorships and whose chair has more 
years of managerial experience. Tao and Hutchinson (2013) suggested that RMC and 
compensation committee characteristics, such as industry experience, board 
experience, accounting and/or finance qualifications, have an important role in 
managing the risk level of a firm.  
2.5 SUMMARY 
This chapter has provided the literature review relevant to this study, the first 
section reviewed the risk, risk management, and risk governance studies. This was 
followed by the party that bear the responsibility of risk management being discussed 
in detail, namely the board of directors, who may delegate this responsibility to a RMC 
(combined or separate), which embedded the theories that explained the importance of 
establishing a RMC. Human capital literature was then reviewed, with this study 
specifically examining the human capital of the board of directors and committee 
members.  
Previous research has highlighted the importance of risk and risk management 
in firms and highlighted the role risk governance plays in risk management. 
Specifically, this study reviewed the link between corporate governance, risk 
management activities, risk taking, and bankruptcy risk, which indicating the 
significance of RMC existence and human capital in risk management. After reviewing 
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the human capital research on the board of directors and committee members, previous 
studies have only focused on one element of human capital characteristics - board 
independence, and the relationship between board independence and firm performance 
have been mixed. The conflicting results of the prior research may be due to fact that 
board independence is not an important board human capital characteristic, as it does 
not provide a good scope for the board’s role. Therefore, there is a growing demand to 
examine more relevant human capital characteristics, such as specific skills and 
experience, as suggested by resource dependency theory. In addition, a number of 
studies have called for future research to examine board human capital in a more 
detailed and comprehensive way (Johnson, Schnatterly and Hill, 2012). Therefore, this 
thesis responds to this call, and goes beyond the limited characteristics identified in 
previous studies. This is achieved by examining the RMCs’ human capital based on a 
number of human capital characteristics.  
The following chapter presents the theoretical framework of this study, and 
based on theories and previous studies, six hypotheses have been developed to 
examine the relationship between the existence of RMC and firms’ management of 
risk in terms of firm performance and the likelihood of financial distress, and the 
relationship between RMC human capital and firms’ management of risk. 
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Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework and 
Hypothesis Development 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 2 provided the literature review on risk, risk management, and risk 
governance. It also illustrated the risk-related corporate governance mechanism that 
bear the responsibility of risk management, namely the board of directors, who may 
delegate the risk management responsibilities to a RMC (combined or separate). 
Human capital research regarding the board of directors and committee members was 
also reviewed.  
This chapter discusses the background of risk management and value creation 
(Section 3.2). Following this, agency theory and signalling theory are used to explain 
why firms choose to have a RMC or a separate RMC, leading to the development of 
hypotheses relating to the existence of a RMC, a separate RMC, and firms’ 
management of risk (section 3.3). Human capital theory and resource dependence 
theory are then discussed to explain the association between RMC human capital and 
firms. The hypotheses relating to the association between RMC human capital and 
firms’ management of risk are then discussed (section 3.4). Specifically, Section 3.5 
illustrates firm-specific and general RMC human capital and its association with firm 
performance and the likelihood of financial distress. Figure 3.1 provides a summary 
of all testing models and Figure 3.2 outlines the theoretical framework of this study. 
Finally, Section 3.6 presents the concluding comments of this chapter.  
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3.2 BACKGROUND – RISK MANAGEMENT AND VALUE CREATION  
Risk management literature suggests that risk management can add value to 
companies in many different facets and can also decrease the likelihood of firms’ 
financial distress (Smithson and Simkins, 2005). For instance, on the basis of the 
shareholder value maximisation hypothesis, modern financial theory indicates that a 
firm will engage in risk management, if, and only if, it enhances the firm’s value 
(Fatemi and Luft, 2002). In addition, Smith and Stulz (1985) provided the initial 
financial distress arguments in regards to risk management, arguing that risk 
management can reduce the likelihood of financial distress and increase a firm’s value 
by reducing allocative inefficiency (i.e., deadweight costs), and increasing debt 
capacity, which in turn can benefit the firm through valuable tax shields or by 
decreasing agency costs in excess free cash flow. This was supported by Graham and 
Rogers (2002), who suggested that risk management can increase firms’ market value 
by allowing firms to increase their debt capacity through reducing income volatility 
and/or reducing the probability of financial distress (Leland, 1998; Stulz, 1996), 
thereby reducing the adverse effects of financial distress on shareholders’ value. As a 
result, shareholders will demand a lower rate of return and increase firm value by 
decreasing the likelihood of financial distress (Fatemi and Luft, 2002).  
From an agency theory perspective, efficiently using risk management 
strategies, such as hedging, can align the interests between shareholders and managers 
by eliminating unsystematic risks, which reduces agency costs and increases 
shareholders’ wealth (Kaen, 2005). Additionally, risk management may solve 
underinvestment problems, because risk management can ensure that firms have 
adequate internally generated funds necessary to undertake positive net present value 
projects. Accordingly, both firm and shareholder value will increase (Fatemi and Luft, 
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2002). In particular, Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) demonstrated that risk 
management can add value to firms by ensuring sufficient internal funds are available 
to take advantage of net present value projects. Consistent with Froot, Scharfstein and 
Stein (1993), Gay and Nam (1998) provided strong evidence that the value 
enhancement of risk management comes from minimising the probability of 
underinvestment problems. Their results demonstrated that firms with enhanced 
investment opportunity sets actively engage in risk management as their internal 
generated cash level declines (Gay and Nam, 1998).  
In summary, previous theories and empirical evidence have illustrated that risk 
management has a positive impact on firms’ performance through various avenues and 
can lower firms’ likelihood of financial distress. Since RMCs and the human capital 
of RMC members play a crucial role in managing risks, this study expects that RMC 
human capital may be associated with firms’ performance and the likelihood of 
financial distress.  
3.3 HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT – RISK MANAGEMENT 
COMMITTEE EXISTENCE 
3.3.1 RMC, risk, and firm performance 
The board of directors has many risk management responsibilities (ASXCGC, 
2014; Stulz, 2008). Due to the complexity and specialist knowledge required to 
manage risk, the board has the opportunity to delegate these responsibilities to a RMC 
or separate RMC (Cth, 2001, S190). Agency theory suggests that a RMC, as a 
monitoring mechanism, may reduce agency costs and control for managers’ 
opportunistic behaviours, in terms of risk taking and risk management, leading to 
better firm performance (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Similarly, according to 
signalling theory, firms may voluntarily form a RMC or separate RMC to flag their 
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commitment to risk management practices to the market and indicate to external 
investors their efforts in effectively managing risk, which minimises any potential risk 
of investors’ devaluation of the firm, resulting in an increase in firm performance. 
However, this study does not posit a direct relationship between the existence of a 
RMC and/or a separate RMC due to reverse causality and self-selection bias problems. 
The existence of a RMC may affect firm performance, and firm performance, in turn, 
can affect the formation of a RMC. In addition, because RMC formation is not 
mandatory in Australia, firms can voluntarily choose to establish a RMC. As a result, 
high performing firms may be more likely to establish either a combined or separate 
RMC, creating self-selection bias. A number of studies have empirically examined the 
relationship between enterprise risk management (ERM) 12  and firm performance 
(Hoyt and Liebenberg, 2011), and the results have been mixed. For example, Hoyt and 
Liebenberg (2011) found a positive relationship between firm value and the use of 
ERM. Pagach and Warr (2010) found little impact of ERM adoption on firms’ 
outcomes. Gordon, Loeb and Tseng (2009) found the relationship between firm 
performance and ERM to be contingent on the match between risk management and 
firm characteristics.  
In addition, Hines and Peters (2015) investigated the association between RMC 
existence and firm performance. They found that in the US, RMC formation is not 
significantly associated with profitability and short-term risk outcomes, such as the 
level of loan charge-offs and the presence of a Chief Risk Officer. These mixed results 
may suggest that there is no direct relationship between the existence of a RMC or 
ERM and firm performance. Therefore, the relationship between a RMC and firm 
                                                 
 
12 ERM is a strategic business discipline that enables companies to manage their risks in an integrated 
and consistent way (Hoyt and Liebenberg, 2011). 
 Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework and Hypothesis Development 59 
performance should be examined through intervening or moderating variables. A 
RMC is important because it is a monitoring mechanism that brings advantages to 
firms by effectively managing risks, including managers’ risk awareness. Therefore, 
this study examines the role a RMC plays in moderating the association between risk 
and firm performance.  
Finance theory suggests that there is a positive association between risk and 
returns, as investors receive a risk premium for accepting a high level of risk (Myers, 
1984). However, the risk may have a negative association with returns (Bowman, 
1980). Specifically, high-performing firms may avoid high-risk investments due to the 
failure in investment and this may significantly affect their reputation, whereas poor 
performing firms may be more likely to choose a high-risk investment because the 
success of a high-risk investment may reverse their poor performance (Bowman, 
1980). Consequently, this study suggests that firms with high risk need to have a RMC 
or separate RMC to specifically address their risks, avoid excess risk taking 
behaviours, monitor risk averse managers, and ensure that investments provide a 
positive return. Therefore, there is a positive association between risk and performance 
for firms with a separate RMC or a RMC, leading to the following hypotheses. 
H1 (a): There is a positive association between risk and performance for firms 
that have a risk management committee. 
H1 (b): There is a positive association between risk and performance for firms 
that have a separate risk management committee. 
3.3.2 RMC, risk, and the likelihood of financial distress 
Prior research has highlighted the link between firms’ corporate governance and 
bankruptcy and suggests that corporate governance characteristics are significantly 
associated with firms’ bankruptcy (Fich and Slezak, 2008). For example, Donker, 
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Santen and Zahir (2009) suggested that bankrupt firms tend to have lower levels of 
managerial shareholdings. Lajili and Zéghal (2010) suggested that firms that went 
bankrupt tended to have higher director turnover and shorter outside director tenure.   
More recently, research has investigated the role of governance when there is a 
global collapse. Many researchers have agreed that poor governance practices were a 
contributing factor to the global financial crisis. The journal, Corporate Governance: 
An International Review devoted an entire edition to the topic following a conference 
dedicated to corporate governance and the 2008-2009 financial crisis (Conyon, Judge 
and Useem, 2011). In their editorial comment, Conyon, Judge and Useem (2011) 
suggested that boards were unable to prevent risky and short-term decisions that 
eventually led to the global meltdown. The failure and weakness in corporate 
governance arrangements largely contributed to the financial crisis and corporate 
collapses (Kirkpatrick, 2009). 
A number of studies have suggested that firms following recommended good 
corporate governance practice are more likely to survive and perform better during a 
global financial crisis (Ellul and Yerramilli, 2011). Specifically, Cornett, McNutt and 
Tehranian (2010) found that better corporate governance, such as a more independent 
board, a higher pay-for-performance sensitivity, and insider ownership, are positively 
associated with performance. Ellul and Yerramilli (2011) suggested that companies 
with a strong and independent risk management function13 can decrease risk exposures 
and enhance value, especially during a crisis period. Aebi, Sabato and Schmid (2012) 
documented that firms with a Chief Risk Officer, who reports directly to the board of 
directors and not to the CEO, performed significantly better during the global financial 
                                                 
 
13 These authors develop a risk management index to measure the strength and independence of the 
risk management function based on six risk management variables. 
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crisis period. Minton, Taillard and Williamson (2010) provided evidence that larger 
and more independent boards are related to a lower level of risk taking, suggesting a 
lower likelihood of financial distress.  
Research has primarily examined the relationship between board composition, 
board ownership, and the probability of financial distress (Fich and Slezak, 2008). To 
date, no research could be found that empirically tests whether a RMC has any 
association with the probability of firm’s financial distress. Consistent with the first 
hypothesis, this study does not posit a direct relationship between the existence of a 
RMC or a separate RMC and firms’ likelihood of financial distress. This study 
examines the role a RMC plays in moderating the relationship between risk and firm 
performance.  
Previous literature has suggested that excessive risk taking behaviours contribute 
to firms’ bankruptcy in a global financial crisis, and that firms engage in high-risk 
practice (high risky projects) without proper assessment of risks (Kaen, 2005; Rosen, 
2003). Therefore, this study proposes that firms with high risk need to have a RMC or 
separate RMC to ensure risks are managed under their risk appetite and excess risk 
taking behaviours have been properly monitored, leading to a decrease in the 
likelihood of a firm experiencing financial distress. This study thus proposes that there 
is a negative association between risk and the likelihood of financial distress for firms 
with a separate RMC or a RMC, leading to the following hypotheses. 
H2 (a): There is a negative association between risk and the likelihood of 
financial distress for firms that have a risk management committee. 
H2 (b): There is a negative association between risk and the likelihood of 
financial distress for firms that have a separate risk management committee. 
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As mentioned previously, this study does not expect a direct relationship 
between the existence of a RMC or separate RMC on firms’ management of risk, as 
the existence of a RMC may not be sufficient to explain its efficacy. In the next section, 
the study turns to human capital theory to develop the hypotheses in relation to RMC 
human capital and firms’ management of risk in terms of firm performance and the 
likelihood of financial distress.  
3.4 HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT – RISK MANAGEMENT 
COMMITTEE HUMAN CAPITAL 
3.4.1 Risk management human capital and firm performance 
Agency theory suggests there are conflicts of interest between managers and 
shareholders because managers have an ability to act in their best interest instead of 
that of shareholders (Carter, D'Souza, Simkins and Simpson, 2010). Evidence of this 
self-interested managerial behaviour includes avoidance of optimal risk decisions. As 
explained previously, managers tend to be more risk-averse than shareholders. This is 
due to the fact that managers have a substantial proportion of their earnings tied up in 
the one firm, whereas shareholders are assumed to hold a diversified portfolio of 
investments (Kaen, 2005). In other words, managers are more likely to reject profitable 
(but riskier) investments that shareholders would prefer managers invest in. The asset 
pricing models suggests that investors are only rewarded by taking the risk that arises 
from exposure to general market movements (i.e., systematic risk) rather than taking 
an unsystematic risk. In this sense, investors are only compensated based on the beta 
– the riskiness of their investment profile (Tao and Hutchinson, 2013). Therefore, 
shareholders can only maximise their wealth through risk taking, which means the 
action of risk-averse managers rejecting profitable investments are contrary to 
investors’ interests; thus, investors would be more likely to discount the price they are 
willing to pay for the firm’s shares, consequently leading to low firm value (Kaen, 
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2005). As a result, it is important for firms to oversee managers’ risk averse 
behaviours.  
In this study, it is proposed that RMC human capital level can be recognised as 
a determinant of the efficiency and effectiveness of the RMC. This notion is in line 
with resource dependence theory, which suggests that firms require parties who have 
greater capacity to manage company’s risk activities, so that they can provide crucial 
risk management resources to firms and ensure firms’ strength in monitoring risks 
(Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Hillman, Withers and Collins, 2009; Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978). Following this trend, RMC members with a high level of human capital may 
bring enhanced knowledge to firms for managing risk efficiently and strengthen risk 
monitoring mechanisms, with an outcome of enhancing the firm’s value.   
Empirically, previous studies have only examined the relationship between some 
human capital factors of board and firm performance. Specifically, studies have 
documented that directors’ educational background has no association or positive 
relationship with a firm’s value (Daily and Dalton, 1994; Kim and Lim, 2010; Rose, 
2007). As for previous experiences, Fahlenbrach, Low, and Stulz (2010) found that 
there is a positive stock market reaction when firms appoint CEOs as directors, 
indicating the benefit of directors with CEO experience. A number of studies have 
indicated that audit committee human capital is positively related to firm performance. 
For instance, DeFond, Hann, and Hu (2005) found that the market reacts positively 
when accounting financial experts are assigned to audit committees and has no reaction 
when non-accounting financial experts are assigned, which suggests the importance of 
financial accounting experience. Chan and Li (2008) showed that audit committees 
with the majority of members who are top executives of other publicly traded firms 
(i.e., the expert-independent director has relevant expertise) resulted in a positive firm 
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value. Moreover, a board comprising of more than 50% of expert-independent 
directors has a significantly positive relationship with firm value. Since both audit 
committees and RMCs are used as monitoring mechanisms within firms, the 
characteristics of audit committees can thus be applied to RMCs (Ng, Chong and 
Ismail, 2012). As such, it is expected that a RMC with a high level of human capital 
can increase firm performance. Tao and Hutchinson (2013) also provided insight that 
RMC composition is very important regarding lower information asymmetry and 
increasing firm performance. Therefore, the following hypothesis was developed:  
H3: There is a positive association between risk management committee human 
capital and firm performance. 
3.4.2 RMC human capital and the likelihood of financial distress 
A body of research has highlighted the importance of corporate governance and 
the likelihood of financial distress or bankruptcy (Donker, Santen and Zahir, 2009; 
Fich and Slezak, 2008; Lajila and Zeghal, 2010). Previous research has primarily 
examined some characteristics of board composition, board ownership, and leadership 
factors, such as board size, independence, board share ownership, and CEO duality, as 
mitigating or exacerbating the probability of financial distress. For example, Fich and 
Slezak (2008) found that small firms with independent boards and large executive 
director shareholdings are less likely to be financially distressed. Platt and Platt (2012) 
documented that the average age of directors is negatively related to bankruptcy, 
suggesting older directors have valuable experience. They also found that directors 
with CEO experience are negatively associated with bankruptcy, signifying the benefit 
of CEO experience of directors. Rasjad Abdel-khalik (2014) find that high risk averse 
CEO take less risk on investing in R&D. However, there is a lack of empirical research 
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that has examined whether risk management human capital has any association with 
the probability of a firm’s financial distress. 
RMCs have been regarded as an important platform to specifically address risk 
management issues within firms. As a result, the level of RMC human capital may 
influence a firms’ bankruptcy (Ng, Chong and Ismail, 2012). Resource dependence 
theory suggests that the resources obtained by board members may influence a firm’s 
likelihood of bankruptcy (Daily, 1996; Hillman, Withers and Collins, 2009). Research 
has highlighted that firms’ likelihood of financial distress is closely related to 
directors’ resources (Cameron, Kim and Whetten, 1987). Specifically, Daily (1995, 
1996) showed that a high proportion of outside directors help firms to re-emerge from 
bankruptcy, and firms with a high proportion of outside and affiliated directors have a 
reduced chance of bankruptcy. Arthaud-Day, Certo, Dalton, and Dalton (2006) also 
suggested that when firms face crises, changing directors with crucial resources has 
been considered an initial step to decrease the severity of the crises. Therefore, the 
crucial resources obtained by the board of directors may decrease firms’ chances of 
bankruptcy.   
Empirically, Ng, Chong and Ismail (2012) found RMC size and independence 
to be negatively associated with underwriting risk14, suggesting a larger RMC size 
leads to more objective and rational decision making. Their results also showed that 
an independent RMC provides more effective supervision over risk issues and 
therefore reduces excessive risk taking.15  This highlights the importance of RMC 
human capital, because it may relate to bankruptcy risk. The results are consistent with 
                                                 
 
14 Underwriting risk was measured as the proportion of loss incurred to premise earned (underwriting 
risk difference around the expected value) 
15 If the dispersion of underwriting risk around the expected value is positive, that means firms are 
engaged in excessive risk taking, otherwise this is negative.  
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resource dependence theory, which suggests that firms require external parties who 
have a greater capacity to manage a company’s activities, and to bring crucial 
resources and strength to a firm (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Hillman, Withers and 
Collins, 2009; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Thus, RMC members with a high level of 
human capital can provide enhanced knowledge for firms to manage risk and maintain 
their risk appetite.  
Some studies have suggested that when firms are faced with a high level of 
bankruptcy, members are less likely to invest in human capital (Berk, Stanton and 
Zechner, 2010; Jaggia and Thakor, 1994). Specifically, Jaggia and Thakor (1994) 
suggested that firms’ human capital may affect debt usage, which consequently affects 
a firms’ probability of bankruptcy. In addition, Dimov and Shepherd (2005) provided 
evidence that top management teams with a high proportion of MBA and law degrees 
were negatively associated with the proportion of portfolio companies that went 
bankrupt, and that science and humanities education were positively associated with 
the proportion of profile companies that went public (IPO).  
Since the human capital of a RMC may influence their level of risk aversion and 
their methods for managing and interpreting risks, it could be argued that a RMC with 
a high level of human capital tends to have a deeper understanding of risks, and more 
capacity to analyse the risk taking level and ensure firms do not engage in excessive 
risk taking behaviours; in turn, leading to a low likelihood of financial distress. 
Similarly, signalling theory also suggests that it is beneficial for firms to disclose a 
high level of RMC human capital, as this can signal to the market that managers are 
aware of the risk their firm is exposed to and they have the capability to manage these 
risks; thus, indicating a low chance of financial distress (Cotter, Lokman and Najah, 
2011), leading to the forth hypothesis: 
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H4: There is a negative association between the probability of financial distress 
and risk management committee human capital. 
3.5 GENERAL AND FIRM-SPECIFIC HUMAN CAPITAL  
3.5.1 Firm-specific, general human capital, and firm performance 
As firm-specific human capital is expertise derived from the skills and 
knowledge gained in a position that is specific to the firm (Wulf and Singh, 2011), 
RMC members with a high level of firm-specific human capital may have better 
knowledge about the firm’s operations. This resource is valuable, unique and difficult 
to imitate, which can provide a competitive advantage for firms and add value to 
companies (Amit and Schoemarker, 1993; Hitt, Biermant, Shimizu and Kochhar, 
2001). As a result, these advantages may produce positive returns for companies and 
outperform competitors who are lacking such resources (Crook, Todd, Combs, Woehr 
and Ketchen, 2011; Peteraf, 1993). This is consistent with agency theory and 
organisational cycle theory, which tend to suggest that members with a high level of 
firm-specific human capital are beneficial to firm performance, as such skills may be 
entrenched and necessary to be obtained by firms to manage firms. Similarly, resource-
based views reveal that losing firm-specific human capital may decrease firm 
performance, as such human capital represents a crucial source of competitive 
advantage (Le, Kroll and Walters, 2013). Empirically, Carpenter and Westphal (2001) 
found that if companies have a board member with specific expertise that allows them 
to better understand the inner knowledge of the firm, the monitoring of the board can 
be enhanced, which consequently leads to decreases in agency costs and increases in 
firm performance. By conducting a meta-analysis of 66 previous studies, Crook, Todd, 
Combs, Woehr and Ketchen (2011) found that firm-specific human capital is valuable 
in enhancing firm performance. Consequently, a positive association between firm 
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performance and firm-specific human capital is anticipated to align with resource 
dependence theory, leading to the following hypothesis: 
H5 (a): Firm performance is positively associated with risk management 
committee firm-specific human capital. 
A RMC with high levels of general human capital may have the incentive to 
protect their reputation. This is because that reputation may help them gain an 
advantage at the time they need to transfer their general skills to other firms (Fich and 
Shivdasani, 2007). Therefore, in order to build and protect their reputation, they may 
behave conservatively, which generates lower returns (Hirshleifer and Thakor, 1994), 
leading to the following hypothesis: 
H5 (b): Firm performance is negatively associated with risk management 
committee general human capital.  
3.5.2 Firm-specific, general human capital, and the likelihood of financial 
distress  
A number of studies have suggested that when firms are faced with a high level 
of bankruptcy, members are less likely to invest in firm-specific human capital (Berk, 
Stanton and Zechner, 2010; Jaggia and Thakor, 1994). Specifically, Dimov and 
Shepherd (2005) indicated that firm-specific human capital was negatively associated 
with firms’ bankruptcy. Jaggia and Thakor (1994) indicated that debt usage, as a factor 
that affects the probability of bankruptcy, may be influenced by firms’ human capital. 
RMC members with a high level of firm-specific human capital instead of general 
human capital are less likely to engage in high risk investments that increase a firm’s 
debt level. This is due to the fact that firm-specific human capital reduces 
employability and may also encounter large losses for the RMC members, leaving 
them with few employment choices and huge financial losses if their firm has a high 
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likelihood of bankruptcy (Berk, Stanton and Zechner, 2010). Therefore, because firm-
specific human capital is only appreciated within the firms, rather than by all potential 
employers, RMC members with high firm-specific human capital reduce their 
marketability. They are less likely to get another job or may have to take another job 
at substantially lower pay if the firm goes bankrupt (Berk, Stanton and Zechner, 2010). 
In this sense, RMC members with high firm-specific human capital are more likely to 
limit their debt and reduce the firm’s bankruptcy likelihood to ensure they are not at 
risk of loss of employment and financial loss, leading to the following hypothesis:  
H6 (a): The probability of bankruptcy is negatively associated with risk 
management committee firm-specific human capital.  
RMC members with a high level of general human capital are more likely to get 
another job at an equal wage or even higher salary once they are unemployed. This is 
due to the fact that their skill set is highly transferable and perfectly marketable. As a 
result, they may be more likely to engage in high risky investment which may generate 
substantive income for them, but also contains excessive risks. In this sense, a RMC 
member with a high level of general human capital is more likely to engage in 
excessive risk projects, as they will not be negatively affected if the companies go 
bankrupt, leading to the following hypothesis:  
H6 (b): The probability of bankruptcy is positively associated with risk 
management committee general human capital.  
3.6 SUMMARY 
Using human capital and resource dependence theory as a basis, this chapter 
developed a theoretical framework for RMC human capital. Using this theoretical 
framework and previous studies, this study developed six hypotheses. The testing 
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models are summarised in Figure 3.1 and the theoretical framework is presented in 
Figure 3.2. The following chapter describes the research models used to test these 
hypotheses.  
 
 
Figure 3.1: Testing Models 
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Figure 3.2: Theoretical framework  
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Chapter 4: Research Design 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter developed hypotheses concerning the existence of a RMC 
and the human capital of a RMC. This chapter describes the sample selection and data 
source for this study. The research models used for testing the research question and 
the subsequent hypotheses are also presented, along with the definition of the variables 
used in the models.  
4.2 SAMPLE SELECTION AND DATA SOURCE 
The focus of this study is to examine whether the human capital of a RMC is 
associated with firms’ management of risk. To test the research question, this study 
tested the six hypotheses developed in Chapter 3, which are listed below:  
 H1 (a): There is a positive association between risk and firm performance 
for firms with a risk management committee. 
 H1 (b): There is a positive association between risk and firm performance 
for firms with a separate risk management committee. 
 H2 (a): There is a negative association between the probability of financial 
distress and risk for firms with a risk management committee. 
 H2 (b): There is a negative association between the probability of financial 
distress and risk for firms with a separate risk management committee. 
 H3: there is a positive association between RMC human capital and firm 
performance. 
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 H4: There is a negative association between the probability of financial 
distress and RMC human capital. 
 H5 (a): Firm performance is positively associated with RMC firm-specific 
human capital. 
 H5 (b): Firm performance is negatively associated with RMC general 
human capital.  
 H6 (a): The probability of bankruptcy is negatively associated with RMC 
firm-specific human capital.  
 H6 (b): The probability of bankruptcy is positively associated with RMC 
general human capital.  
The sample selected comprised the top 300 ASX listed companies, measured by 
market capitalisation as at 30 June 2007 to 2014. These companies were selected for 
this study based on the expectation that this corporate group could provide an overall 
representation of the risk management practices of ASX listed companies (Van der 
Laan and Dean, 2010). Specifically, the top 300 ASX companies covered large, 
middle, and small-cap components of all ASX listed companies, which occupied 
approximately 81% of Australian equity market capitalisation (ASX, 2014). In 
addition, the market capitalisation of the sample companies ranged from 4,847,293 to 
24.4 billion, suggesting there was enough variation in the sample to be representative 
of all listed firms. It was also assumed that larger firms had more resources to have a 
separate RMC, a higher level of RMC human capital, and a greater need, as they are 
under great public scrutiny and higher litigation risk (Miihkinen, 2012). Top 300 ASX 
companies face stricter structure and greater disclosure requirements (ASXCGC, 
2014). Therefore, they are more likely to establish risk management practices and 
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disclose their risk management information to the public, which would decrease the 
number of companies with missing data in this study. It was also expected that if there 
were significant associations using the sample of the top 300 ASX companies, then the 
relationships would be more significant than when the sample included all Australian 
firms (Azizkhani, Monroe and Shailer, 2010). 
The data on the RMCs was hand collected from the companies’ annual reports 
from 2007 to 2014 from the Connect 4 Australian database. Annual reports are still 
considered important and fundamental public documents that are heavily relied upon 
by outsiders (Linsley and Shrives, 2005). The financial data was collected from 
Thomson Returns and the Morningstar database.  
The time frame of the years 2007 to 2014 was chosen to perform a longitudinal 
analysis of RMC human capital in Australia. In 2007, the CGPR was revised 
(ASXCGC, 2007). Therefore, 2007 was a starting point for when Australian 
companies began to comply with the revised edition of ASX CGPR (ASXCGC, 2007). 
In addition, this study also accounted for the effect of the 2007-2008 global financial 
crisis, Probohudono, Tower and Rusmin (2013) provided evidence that there were low 
levels of risk management practice compliance in Australia during the global financial 
crisis (2007-2009 financial years). Therefore, it was appropriate to choose 2007 as the 
first year in this study to capture whether there has been a growing emphasis on risk 
management in firms. The final year 2014 was selected because this was the latest date 
risk management data was available for this study.  
The sample consisted of 2,400 firm-year observations. However, due to the 
missing RMC data, the final sample decreased to 2,330 firm-year observations of 597 
firms. Therefore, it provides an unbalanced panel dataset of 597 firms. The sample 
profile by industry sector code is presented in Table 4.1. The material sector provided 
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the highest proportion of the sampled companies, with 23%, followed by the financial 
industry at 20.6%, whereas telecommunication services occupied the lowest 
proportion, with 2.3%.  
 
Table 4.1: Sample profile (2330 firm-year observations, 597 firms)  
Industry (GICS) sector No. of companies Percentage 
Materials 137 23% 
Financials 123 20.6% 
Consumer Discretionary 83 13.9% 
Industrials 76 12.7% 
Energy 60 10% 
Health Care 33 5.5% 
Consumer Staples 27 4.5% 
Utilities 24 4% 
Information Technology 21 3.5% 
Telecommunication Services 13 2.3% 
Total No. 597 100% 
 
Among all samples, 1,374 firm-year observations of 371 firms (59%) had 
established a RMC. The distribution of these firms amongst the industry codes is 
presented in Table 4.2. Among the 1,374 firms with a RMC, 82 (22%) were financial 
firms, followed by materials (15.5%) and industrials (15.5%), whereas only 3% of the 
firms (12 firms) were in telecommunication services or information technology 
industry.  
Table 4.2: Firms with a RMC (1374 firm-year observations, 371 firms)  
Industry (GICS) sector No. of companies Percentage 
Financials 82 22% 
Materials 57 15.5% 
Industrials 57 15.5% 
Consumer Discretionary 53 14% 
Energy 35 10% 
Consumer Staples 22 6% 
Utilities 22 6% 
Health Care 19 5% 
Telecommunication Services 12 3% 
Information Technology 12 3% 
Total No. 371 100% 
 76 Chapter 4: Research Design 
4.3 RESEARCH MODELS AND MEASURES  
In order to answer the research question, regression analyses were utilised to test 
the association between RMC human capital and firms’ management of risk. This was 
done by firstly testing whether the existence of the RMC was associated with firm 
performance and/or the likelihood of financial distress. Secondly, the association 
between RMC human capital and firm performance, and/or the likelihood of financial 
distress was tested. It was assumed in this study that a firm with appropriate risk 
management was likely to have better firm performance and less likelihood of financial 
distress.  
As hypothesised, the following describes the dependent variables, independent 
variables, and the control variables used in this study to test the association between 
the RMC human capital, firm performance, and the likelihood of financial distress.  
4.3.1 Definition of dependent variables, independent variables, and control 
variables.  
Definition of dependent variables 
Firm performance: This study used two measures of firm performance: 
accounting-based and market-based performance.  
Accounting performance, return on assets (ROA), measured as net income plus 
interest expense multiplied by (1-corporate tax rate) divided by [total assets - outside 
equity interests] (e.g. Huson, Malatesta and Parrino, 2004). ROA is a profitability ratio, 
which indicates how profitable a company’s assets are in generating income. 
Specifically, ROA is an indication of the ability of the firm to produce accounting-
based revenues in excess of actual expenses from a given portfolio of assets measured 
as amortised historical costs (Carter, D'Souza Simkins, and Simpson, 2010). It is used 
as an accounting based measurement of firm performance (Carter, D'Souza, Simkins 
and Simpson, 2010). 
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Market performance, was assessed using Tobin’s Q, which was measured as the 
market value of the firm divided by placement value of assets (as adopted by Agrawal 
and Knoeber, 1996). Tobin’s Q measures the market value of shareholder and creditor 
investment, it encompasses a market assessment of the investment opportunity set and 
further cash flows of the firm (Hutchinson, Mack and Plastow, 2015). Therefore, 
Tobin’s Q is a market-based measurement of firm performance, as it is based on the 
market value of shareholder and creditor investments. 
Financial Distress Risk 
To determine whether RMC human capital reduces the likelihood of financial 
distress, a proxy was needed to measure the probability of financial distress. Early 
indicators of financial distress include losses in multiple consecutive years, cash flows 
drying up, declining sales, etc. This study used two measurements to capture firms’ 
likelihood of financial distress.  
Altman Z-Score - accounting measurement of the likelihood of financial distress.  
First, the most popular measure of financial distress risk is the Altman Z-Score 
model16, which uses discriminant analysis (DA) to combine five accounting ratios into 
a score that represents the financial distress risk inherent in a firm (Altman, 1968). 
Although the model was introduced in the late 1960s, it is still relevant and used for 
                                                 
 
16
Altman (1968) derived a "cut-off" point, or optimum Z value, by observing firms that were misclassified by the 
DA model in the initial sample (p. 606). He concluded that all firms with a Z-Score of greater than 2.99 clearly fall 
into the "non-bankrupt" sector, while those firms with a Z below 1.81 are bankrupt. Consequently, firms are 
classified as firms with a small Z-Score (≤ 1.81) recognised as a high probability of financial distress and with a 
high Z-Score (≥ 2.99) recognised as a low probability of financial distress. 
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financial research to proxy for financial distress and default risk (Aslan and Kumar, 
2012; Becker and Stromberg, 2012).  
The Altman Z-Score is based on five accounting ratios calculated as follows: Z-
Score = 1.2A + 1.4B + 3.3C + 0.6D + 1.0E, where:  
A = Working Capital/Total Assets: WC = (Current assets - cash) - (current 
liabilities – short term debt) 
B = Retained Earnings/Total Assets 
C = Earnings Before Interest and Tax/Total Assets 
D = Market Value of Equity/Total Liabilities 
E = Sales/Total Assets 
Altman (1968) suggested that the predictive model is useful for screening out 
undesirable investments, because investors tend to underestimate the extent of 
financial difficulties of the firms that eventually go bankrupt. Specifically, a high Z-
Score indicates lower financial distress, whereas a low Z-Score indicates greater 
financial distress. As a result, Z-Score has an inverted relationship with the likelihood 
of financial distress. In order to facilitate the interpretation of the results, this study 
used PBANK as –Z-Score. As a result, PBANK is positively related to the likelihood 
of financial distress. 
Naïve model – market measurement of the likelihood of financial distress  
Second, this study used the Naïve model developed by Bharath and Shumway 
(2004) as an additional measurement of the likelihood of financial distress. Unlike 
Altman’s Z-Score, which focuses on accounting ratios, the Naïve model is based on 
the KMV-Merton default forecasting model, which is a market-based measurement.  
A number of studies, such as Kealhofer and Kurbat (2001), and Duffie and Wang 
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(2004), indicate that the KMV-Merton model is appropriate to measure the likelihood 
of financial distress, as it captures all of the information in traditional agency rating 
and well-known accounting default probability variables.  
Additionally, Bharath and Shumway (2004) suggested that based on the KMV-
Merton default forecasting model, the Naïve model has significant predictive power 
and performs well in capturing firms’ financial distress probability. Specifically, the 
Naïve model generates the distance to default rate for each firm (Naïve DD), to predict 
firms’ probability of experiencing financial distress. The distance to default rate is 
calculated using a formula, which includes the firms’ total volatility (Naïve σV), stock 
return over the previous year (rit−1), the volatility of each firm’s debt (Naïve σD), face 
value of the firm’s debt (F), and the market value of the firm’s equity (E). The formula 
is shown below.  
 
The components involved in the Naïve model can be calculated using formulas 
1 to 4. Firstly, the market value of each firms’ debt is calculated with the face value of 
its debt, using formula 1. Secondly, the volatility of each firm’s debt is computed using 
formula 2, which involves the firms’ equity risk (the standard deviation of each firm’s 
stock price). Next, the total volatility of a firm is calculated using formula 3. Formula 
4 is used to calculate the expected return on a firm’s assets, which is equal to the firm’s 
stock return over the previous year.  
 
                                                                                                                   (1) 
                                                                                                (2) 
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   (3)                          
                                                                                                                 (4) 
 
Definition of independent variables  
The independent variable in this study is RMC human capital. Specifically, 
according to previous literature, this study has identified five types of human capital 
that have frequently been examined in previous research: board tenure, RMC tenure, 
experiences, education, and share ownership. These five types of human capital have 
been widely investigated in the previous literature, indicating their importance. In 
addition, firms often disclose these five risk management variables to the public, 
rendering them available to examine in this study.   
Firm-specific human capital (board tenure, RMC tenure, and RMC share 
ownership) 
a) Tenure (board tenure and RMC tenure) 
Tenure is the number of years that a director has held a particular position (Laing 
and Weir, 1999). It represents the extent of company-specific skills or experience that 
a board obtains to perform the task (Bilimoria and Piderit, 1994; Hogan and 
McPheters, 1980; Wulf and Singh, 2011). According to expertise hypothesis, long-
board tenure directors are associated with a high level of experience, commitment, and 
competence about the firm and the firm’s business environment (Vafeas, 2003). With 
directors spending more and more time serving on boards, they face a variety of issues 
that may enhance their familiarly with specific governance issues and problems of the 
company (Kesner, 1988). Long-board tenure directors gain a high level of job-specific 
knowledge and experience, and they may be more committed to their duties over time 
(Fiedler, 1970; Salancik, 1977; Sun, Lan and Liu, 2014). Directors with long tenure 
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tend to have better knowledge of the management team and directing companies’ 
strategy. Thus, they are better prepared for oversight responsibilities and monitoring 
managers (Bilimoria and Piderit, 1994). Previous studies have examined the impact of 
board tenure on firms’ outcomes. For example, Kor and Sundaramurthy (2009) found 
average director tenure was negatively related to annual sales growth. Hillman, 
Shropshire, Certo, Dalton and Dalton (2011) documented that shareholders are 
discontented with the monitoring of long-tenured directors. This is consistent with 
Chan, Liu, and Sun (2013), who found the proportion of long board tenure audit 
committee members was negatively related to audit fees, indicating audit committee 
members’ long board tenure results in lower audit effort. On the other hand, some 
studies have documented a positive impact of board tenure on firms. For example, 
Dhaliwal, Naiker and Navissi (2010) provided evidence that there is a positive 
association between audit committee members’ board tenure and financial reporting 
quality, while other studies found no association between board tenure and firms’ 
outcomes (e.g. Johnson, Hoskisson and Hitt, 1993; Nugroho and Eko, 2012; 
Sundaramurthy, 1996). These inconclusive results may be due to tenure having a non-
linear effect. In fact, Musteen, Datta and Kemmerer (2010) found there was an inverted 
U-relationship between board tenure and firm outcomes.  
In this study, board tenure was measured as the average number of years the 
RMC members served as board members of a firm. Similarly, RMC tenure was 
measured as the average number of years the RMC members served as a RMC member 
of a firm in this study. Long tenure represents a high level of experience, commitment, 
and competence about the firm and the business environment that the firm operates in 
(Vafeas, 2003), as a result, long-tenured directors are better prepared for oversight 
responsibilities. Following this trend, the long length of tenure of RMC members can 
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be beneficial in effective oversight risk management activities and carrying out risk 
management strategies. Therefore, board tenure (the length of time sitting on the 
board) and RMC tenure (the length of time sitting on the RMC) are crucial to 
determining the efficiency of risk management. It is expected that board tenure and 
RMC tenure would increase firm performance and decrease the likelihood of financial 
distress.  
b) Share ownership  
Share ownership can be treated as an internal mechanism that reduces the 
possibility of managerial opportunism and for the interest of large stockholders 
(Edwards and Nibler, 2000). A high level of share ownership suggests a high level of 
monitoring and controls from investors over firms’ decisions, this is because large 
stockholders have the incentive to safeguard their investments (Bredart, 2014; Burkart, 
Gromb and Panunzi, 1997; Edwards and Nibler, 2000; Lange and Sharpe, 1995; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). Large stockholders are more likely to pay attention to the 
strategic and risk management decisions of firms (Edwards and Nibler, 2000), and 
make sure companies are managing their risk properly and firms are not taking 
excessive risks, thus, safeguarding investors’ investments. As a result, directors’ share 
of ownership affects firms’ outcomes. 
A number of studies have indicated that dispersion creates free-riding problems 
and decreases monitoring levels. Therefore, a positive relationship between ownership 
and firm performance is expected (Rose, 2007). Consistent with this argument, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) showed that shareholder ownership is positively associated 
with the price of firm shares. In addition, previous literature has indicated that 
ownership structures can influence corporate risk taking (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
John, Litov and Yeung, 2008). Empirically, Shehzad, De Haan, and Scholtens (2010) 
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found ownership concentration reduces bank riskiness at low levels of shareholder 
protection rights and supervisory control. A higher ownership concentration is 
associated with better loan quality, lower asset risk, and lower insolvency risk in the 
banking industry (Iannotta, Nocera and Sironi, 2007).  These results suggest that there 
is an association between share ownership and risk management.  
Directors’ share of ownership can be treated as an internal mechanism that 
reduces the possibility of managerial opportunism and the interest of large 
stockholders (Edwards and Nibler, 2000). A high level of share ownership – ownership 
concentration17 – suggests a high level of monitoring and control from investors over 
firms’ decisions. As a result, this study expects that the share of ownership by RMC 
members is positively related to firm performance and negatively related to the 
likelihood of financial distress.  
General human capital (qualifications and experiences) 
a) Qualification  
In this study, education refers to the qualifications held by board members – 
Diploma, Bachelor, Masters, Ph.D. degree, MBA and professional qualifications of 
CA/CPA (Aldamen, Duncan, Kelly, McNamara and Nagel, 2012). Previous literature 
has documented that education level may affect directors’ cognitive and decision-
making (Johnson, Schnatterly, and Hill, 2012), which potentially affects firms’ 
outcomes. Kim and Lim (2010) provided evidence that the educational background of 
directors was positively related to firm performance in Korea. However, Rose (2007) 
found that education was not significantly related to firm performance in Denmark. As 
for innovation performance, Wincent, Anokhin and Ortqvist (2010) showed the 
                                                 
 
17 Ownership concentration has been recognised if individual investors or block-holders hold more 
than 5% of the companies’ shares (Holderness, 2009). 
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number of qualifications held by the board is positively associated with innovation 
performance. The variety of findings in the education area may be due to educational 
backgrounds presenting many different underlying constructs, such as social status or 
friendship ties (Johnson, Schnatterly, and Hill, 2012). For example, D’Aveni and 
Kesner (1993) suggested that people who go to university often develop and maintain 
social networks that can be valuable to increasing knowledge and experience. In 
addition, Christy, Matolcsy, Wright, and Wyatt (2010) demonstrated that a negative 
relationship exists between board qualifications and market risk of equity, suggesting 
that education level may be associated with a firm’s risk level. Similarly, Dionne, 
Maalaoui Chun and Triki (2013) showed that the education level of the board of 
directors affects the hedging level, and further provided evidence that highly educated 
directors encourage risk management. These results demonstrate that there is an 
association between education level and firms’ risk management.  
The qualifications gained by RMC members are essential to risk management 
efficiency, as they provide the members with the necessary professional knowledge. 
Therefore, it is expected that the number of qualifications held by RMC members may 
enhance risk management efficiency; thus, leading to an increase in firm performance 
and decrease in the likelihood of financial distress. 
b) Experience 
It is generally agreed that experience with performing a certain task leads to 
improved expertise in that task (Tian, Haleblian, and Rajagopalan, 2011).  Therefore, 
individuals with a high level of task expertise can make better decisions regarding that 
task and have better judgment of the qualification of others to perform similar tasks 
(Bandura, 1997). This is because individuals with experience in an area have already 
developed knowledge and expertise (Day and Lord, 1992). The board bears the major 
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monitoring and decision-making role. Therefore, the experience of the board of 
directors is crucial in order for them to effectively discharge their duties.  
Prior studies have examined the amount of directors’ experience, with an 
emphasis on financial experience (Dionne, Maalaoui Chun and Triki, 2013). 
Specifically, the financial experience of the board can impact on a number of firm 
issues, such as debt strategies and earnings management (An and Jin, 2004; Mizruchi 
and Stearns, 1994). Xie, Davidson and DaDalt (2003) documented that board and audit 
committee members with financial experience decreased discretionary current 
accruals, indicating that the financial experience of directors may influence the level 
of earnings management. Guner, Malmendier, and Tate (2008) reported a positive 
relationship between the banking experience of the board and the firms’ debt level, 
indicating that the financial experience of the board enables the firm to contract more 
debt, thus, decreasing the firms’ likelihood of bankruptcy. In addition, Rosenstein and 
Wyatt (1990) showed a positive abnormal return when appointing an outside director 
who has financial experience. Similarly, DeFond, Hann, and Hu (2005) and Davidson, 
Xie and Wu (2004) documented a positive market response when appointing a 
financial expert to the audit committee. These results show that the market acts 
positively when boards have financial experience. Some literature has reported that the 
absence of financial experience in an audit committee may lead to severe 
consequences. For example, Agrawal and Chadha (2005) provided evidence that the 
probability of earnings restatement is higher in firms whose directors do not have 
financial or accounting experience. In addition, the absence of a financial expert on 
the audit committee increases the probability of financial restatement and financial 
fraud (Abbott, Parker and Peters, 2004). This previous literature highlights the 
importance of the financial experience of the board.  
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Industry familiarity also influences how directors process information and make 
board decisions, and may help firms to access crucial resources (Johnson, Schnatterly, 
and Hill, 2012). For example, Day and Lord (1992) revealed that individuals without 
knowledge and skills developed in a similar setting may need more time to reach 
effective outcomes. Similarly, Kroll, Walters, and Wright (2008) suggested industry 
experience enables the board to make acquisition decisions that are positively received 
by external investors. In addition, industry experience provides firms with tacit 
knowledge of the opportunities, threats, and regulations specific to that industry (Kor, 
2003). As a result, the knowledge of prior industry conditions can help firms to 
understand the industry’s current dynamics and detect potential opportunities in the 
industry, while also helping directors to evaluate managers’ proposals for growth 
(Arthur, 1994; Castanias and Helfat, 2001). Specifically, Kor and Sundaramurthy 
(2009) determined industry experience to be positively related to sales growth. Walter, 
Kroll and Wright (2008) and Tian, Haleblian, and Rajagopalan (2011) documented 
that industry experience affects stock market reaction and CEO successions. Similarly, 
boards that have other types of experience may create benefits for firms. For example, 
DeZoort and Salterio (2001) suggested that audit committee members with greater 
audit experience are more likely to have a high level of audit quality.  
Directors with experience in a certain field can develop their knowledge and 
expertise in that area. As a result, RMC members with experience performing risk 
management activities will have developed relevant risk management knowledge and 
expertise. Therefore, it can be argued that RMC members with experience related to 
risk management may be better at managing risks. This study identified five types of 
experience related to risk management matters: financial, industry, management, 
auditing, and tax experience. As risk management activities are involved in a firm’s 
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financial activities, such as sophisticated financial tools, RMC members with financial 
experience are highly desirable to oversee risk management matters and monitor risk 
management systems (Dionne, Maalaoui Chun and Triki, 2013; Kaen, 2005). Industry 
familiarity also influences how directors process risk management information and 
make decisions. Specifically, Kor and Sundaramurthy (2009) demonstrated that 
industry experience is positively related to sales growth and stock market reaction. 
Therefore, the industry experience of the RMC has an effect on firms’ risk 
management. Similarly, RMC members who have management, accounting, auditing, 
and tax experience may have a particular advantage in managing risks due to their 
previous experience.  
This study recognised that a RMC member had financial experience if he/she 
currently or previously held any position related to finance, such as CFO, treasurer, 
and banker. This study recognised that a RMC member had management experience 
if he/she currently or previously held any position related to management, such as 
general manager and CEO. A RMC member was said to have an accounting experience 
if he/she was a CA/CPA or had any education, work experience or activity related to 
accounting. A RMC member was said to have industry experiences if she/he 
previously worked in the same industry as categorised by GICS industry sector. It was 
expected that an RMC member with more types of experience would be more likely 
to provide effective risk management, thus leading to an increase in firm performance 
and a decrease in the likelihood of financial distress.  
c) Control variables 
This study controlled for firm factors that were likely to be related to RMC 
human capital, firm performance, and the likelihood of bankruptcy, such as industry, 
leverage, and past performance. 
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Including lagged performance (ROAt-1) as an independent variable allowed for 
performance persistence and feedback from past to current performance (Bohren and 
Strom, 2010; Wooldridge, 2002). Lagged market performance (Tobin’s Q-1) and 
lagged Z-Score (Z-Scoret-1) were included as control variables because they could have 
impacts on the dependent variables. In addition, the inclusion of the lag of the 
dependent variable was likely to mitigate concerns over reverse causality and omitted 
variables. To the extent that omitted correlated variables are relatively stable, their 
effects can be captured by lagged values of the dependent variable. 
This study controlled for growth opportunities, measured as the market to book 
ratio (MTB). Growth opportunities capture changes in economic conditions that could 
be exploited by a distressed firm. If there is a change in the market demand for a 
product that improves a firm’s growth options, then that firm will be less likely to 
become bankrupt (Fich and Slezak, 2008). Higher growth opportunities provide 
incentives to invest sub-optimally, or to accept risky projects that expropriate wealth 
from debt-holders. This raises the cost of borrowing; and thus, a firm’s growth tends 
to use internal resources or equity capital rather than debt. Consequently, growth 
opportunity influences the likelihood of financial distress (Deesomsak, Paudyal and 
Pescetto, 2004).  
Leverage (LEV) was included in this study as it is likely to be associated with 
firm performance, because higher leverage is associated with greater risk of financial 
failure. Year dummies were also included to demonstrate the effects of year 
differences. This study also controlled for firm size (lnMKTCAP), because large 
companies are less likely to be in financial stress (Huang and Zhao, 2008), while firm 
size is likely to lead to greater performance and be negatively associated with firm risk 
(Pathan, 2009). Market performance (Tobin’s Q) is more likely to be driven by market 
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capitalisation, indicating multicollinearity issues; therefore, following previous 
studies, this study used total assets (lnTA) as the measurement of firm size in all 
Tobin’s Q regressions (Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell, 2009; Gugler and Yurtoglu, 
2003). Industry (INDUS) was controlled for because different industries have quite 
different debt ratios and other different characteristics that could potentially affect the 
results (Huang and Zhao, 2008). This study also controlled for board independence 
(INDEP), board size (BRDSIZE), and CEO duality (CEODUAL), which are standard 
corporate governance control variables that could affect the dependent variables 
(Bhagat and Bolton, 2008; Core, Guay and Rusticus 2006; Platt and Platt, 2012).  
4.3.2 Regression models 
Fixed effects and random effects estimations are two typical principle 
approaches used when examining panel or longitudinal data. In the random effects 
approach, time-invariant unobservables are treated as disturbances, and it is assumed 
that the correlation between them and independent variables equals zero. In contrast, 
the fixed effects approach assumes that time-invariant unobservables for each 
observable are correlated with independent variables. If the fixed effects assumption 
holds, then the fixed effects approach is more efficient than the random effects 
approach. Otherwise, it will generate inconsistent and biased estimates.   
After observing the testing variables – RMC human capital variables – this study 
found that they were mostly constant over time. This required that random effects 
models should be adopted to capture the variations among different variables.  Even 
though fixed effects models may generate more robust coefficients in cases where the 
time invariant omitted variables are correlated with independent variables, it does not 
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allow for adequate testing of the variables if there is little variation over time.18 As a 
result, random effects models were adopted to test the developed hypotheses. The 
chosen approach was then adopted, along with robust estimation to test the hypotheses 
in this study. The robust estimation ensured the regressions did not suffer from 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (Huber, 1967; White, 1980; 1982). As the 
dataset was panel data, which involved repeated observations of sample firms, errors 
in the regression model were correlated with each other over the testing period because 
the unobservable factors varied from each case (Allison, 2009). Failure to address the 
serial correlation issue would have led to underestimation of standard errors and 
confidence interval (Allison, 2009). Similarly, heteroscedasticity rises when the 
standard error terms do not have constant variance, which may occur due to model 
misspecification or other interaction effects. When heteroscedasticity is presented, the 
standard errors are biased, which leads to bias in test statistics and p-value (Allison, 
2009). Therefore, this study adopted robust estimates analysis in order to overcome 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation issues, producing unbiased results. Clustered 
standard errors at the firm level were used to adjust the standard errors. Clustered 
standard errors accounted for the dependence in the panel data and generating unbiased 
results (Petersen, 2009).  
First, the association between a RMC and firm performance (H1) was tested 
using models 1 to 4. 
ROAi,t= a +b1RMCi,t+b2 Riski,t+ b3RMCi,t*Riski,t+ b4Controlsi,t +ɛi,t             (1) –H1(a) 
ROAi,t= a +b1SRMCi,t+b2 Riski,t+ b3SRMCi,t*Riski,t+ b4Controlsi,t +ɛi,t      (2)– H1(a) 
                                                 
 
18 This study adopted the fixed effect regression model in the robustness test.  
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Tobin’s Qi,t= a +b1RMCi,t+b2 Riski,t+ b3RMCi,t*Riski,t+ b4Controlsi,t +ɛi,t        (3)– H1(b) 
Tobin’s Qi,t= a + b1SRMCi,t +b2 Riski,t+ b3SRMCi,t*Riski,t+ b4Controlsi,t +ɛi,t    (4)–H1(b) 
Second, the association between a RMC and the likelihood of financial distress 
(H2) was tested using models a-d.  
Z-Scorei,t= a +b1RMCi,t+b2 Riski,t+ b3RMCi,t*Riski,t+ b4Controlsi,t +ɛi,t              (a)– H2(a) 
Z-Scorei,t= a +b1SRMCi,t+b2 Riski,t+ b3SRMCi,t*Riski,t+ b4Controlsi,t +ɛi,t          (b)–H2(a) 
Naïvei,t= a +b1RMCi,t+b2 Riski,t+ b3RMCi,t*Riski,t+ b4Controlsi,t +ɛi,t                    (c)– H2(b) 
Naïvei,t= a + b1SRMCi,t +b2 Riski,t+ b3SRMCi,t*Riski,t+ b4Controlsi,t +ɛi,t          (d)–H2(b) 
Table 4.3 presents a detailed description of all of the variable definitions used to 
answer H1 and H2.  
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Table 4.3. Variable definitions – the existence of RMC 
Variables  
Dependent variables Explanations  
Firm performance (ROA) Firm profitability, measured by return on asset ratio, ROA 
Bankruptcy likelihood (lnZ-
Score) 
Altman Z-Score; PBANK = (-lnZ-Score) 
Tobin’s Q (lnTobin’s Qt) The market value of equity of equity and debt divided by 
The book value of total assets in year t 
Naïve  The probability of bankruptcy using the Naïve model 
developed by Bharath and Shumway, (2004) 
Predictors  
SRMC Dummy variable, taking a rate of 1 when firms with a 
separate RMC, 0 otherwise.  
RMC  Dummy variable, taking a rate of 1 when firms with a RMC 
(combined and separate), 0 otherwise. 
RMC*risk Moderating variable of RMC and risk 
SRMC*risk Moderating variable of separate RMC and risk 
Controls  
Leverage (LEV) The financial leverage of the firm, computed as total 
liabilities to total assets 
Growth opportunity (MTB) Market to book ratio. The ratio of year-end market 
capitalisation to total common equity. 
Firm size (lnMKTCAP) The natural logarithm of market capitalisation as at 30 June 
Risk (STDDEV) Total risk calculated as the standard deviation of firm daily 
stock  
Returns for each fiscal year 
CEO duality (CEODUAL) A dummy variable, taking a rate of 1 if the CEO is also the 
chair,  0 otherwise 
Board size (BRDSIZE) Number of board members 
Prior firm year performance 
(ROA-1) 
Measured by return to asset ratio of the prior year 
Prior year Tobin’s Q 
(lnTobin’s Qt-1) 
Tobin’s Q of previous year  
Prior year Z-Score(lnZ-
Scoret-1) 
Altman Z-Score of previous year; PBANK t-1 = (-Z-Score t-1) 
Board independence (INDEP) The percentage of aboard member who is independent 
calculated as the independent board total/ total number of 
board 
Industry (INDUS) Coded based on the GICS (Global Industry Classification 
Standard) 
Year Year dummy variable 
 
 
This study used two research models to examine the association between RMC 
human capital and firms’ management of risk in terms of firm performance and the 
likelihood of financial distress. The first research model was principle component 
analysis, which captured the overall human capital of risk management deriving from 
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a number of RMC human capital characteristics. The second model used individual 
RMC human capital characteristics to examine the relationship between RMC human 
capital and firms’ management of risk.  
Model 1 - principle components analysis 
Due to a lack of prior research indicating which characteristic is the most 
important for risk management and the likelihood that the characteristics are likely to 
be interrelated, a factor score was developed for RMC. A principle components 
analysis (PCA) was conducted using the RMC human capital characteristics described 
above. Except for RMC tenure and board tenure, the rest of the RM human capital 
characteristics were all on the scale between 0 and 1, therefore, this study added all of 
these variables together and combined them into a variable named “rescaling”. The 
principle component factor analysis was then conducted based on “rescaling”, RMC 
tenure, and board tenure. One benefit of conducting PCA is that it can reduce a set of 
factors and extract as much variance with the least number of factors (Jolliffe, 2002). 
The PCA approach also alleviates multicollinearity issues, as well as issues related to 
a lack of theoretical underpinning. After the latent RM human capital score (RMCHC) 
was identified from the PCA, it was then used in the following regression models.  
ROAi,t = a +b1RMCi,t+ b2RMCHCi,t +b3Controlsi,t +ɛi,t  (model 1a)– H3 
Tobin’s Qi, t= a +b1RMCi,t+ b2RMCHCi,t +b3Controlsi,t +ɛi,t  (model 1b)– H3 
Z-Scorei,t = a +b1RMCi,t + b2RMCHCi,t +b4Controlsi,t +ɛi,t  (model 1c)– H4 
Naïvei,t = a +b1RMCi,t+ b2RMCHCi,t +b4Controlsi,t +ɛi,t  (model 1d)– H4 
Model 2 - Individual RMC human capital (general and firm-specific) 
characteristics  
In the second research model, this study used risk management tenure, board 
tenure, average number of qualifications, average amount of experience, and RMC 
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share ownership as independent variables, in order to examine the individual RM 
human capital characteristics. The following regression analyses were used: 
ROAi,t= a +b1 RMCi,t+ b2 Tenurei,t + b3 RMC Tenurei,t + b4 Expi,t + b5 Qualii,t + b6 
SHAREi,t + b7 Controlsi,t + ɛi,t   (model 2a) - H5 
Tobin’s Qi,t= a +b1RMCi,t+ b2Tenurei,t + b3RMC Tenurei,t + b4 Expi,t + b5 Qualii,t + b6 
SHAREi,t + b7 Controlsi,t + ɛi,t   (model 2b) - H5 
Z-Scorei,t= a + b1 RMCi,t + b2 Tenurei,t + b3 RMC Tenurei,t + b4 Expi,t + b5 Qualii,t + b6 
SHAREi,t + b7 Controlsi,t + ɛi,t  (model 2c) - H6 
Naïvei,t= a + b1 RMCi,t + b2 Tenurei,t + b3 RMC Tenurei,t + b4 Expi,t + b5 Qualii,t + b6 
SHAREi,t + b7 Controlsi,t + ɛi,t   (model 2d) - H6 
Table 4.4 presents a detailed description of all of the variable definitions to 
answer the association between RMC human capital and firms’ management of risks.  
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Table 4.4: Variable definitions – RMC human capital 
Variables  
Dependent variables Explanations  
Firm performance (ROA) Firm profitability, measured by return on asset ratio, 
ROA. 
Tobin’s Q Market measure of wealth, measured by market value of 
firm + debt / book value of total assets 
Likelihood of financial distress 
(Z-Score) 
Altman Z-Score; PBANK=(-lnZ-Score). 
Naïve  The probability of bankruptcy using the Naïve model 
developed by Bharath and Shumway, (2004). 
Predictors  
RMC Dummy variable, taking a rate of 1 when firms had a 
separate RMC, 0 when firms had a combined RMC.  
Firm-specific HC:   Tenure  Average number of years as a board member of a firm. 
RMC Tenure  Average number of years as a member of RMC.  
RMC share ownership 
(SHARE) 
The average percentage of RMC members’ shareholding. 
General HC:       
Experience (Exp)                     
 
The average amount of experience (industry, financial, 
management, governance, accounting, auditing, and tax 
experience) obtained by RMC members. 
Qualification (Quali) The average number of qualifications (diploma, bachelor, 
masters, PhD, MBA, CA/CPA) held by RMC members. 
RMCHC The major factor extracted from principle component 
analysis based on rescaling, RMC tenure, and tenure.  
Rescaling  Sum of a number of factors of RMC members (including 
the proportion of industry, RM, financial, management, 
governance, accounting, auditing and tax experience; the 
proportion of MBA, CA, CPA, diploma, bachelor, 
masters, Ph.D. qualifications; average percentage of 
RMC members shareholding).  
Controls  
Leverage (LEV) The financial leverage of the firm, computed as total 
liabilities to total assets 
Growth opportunity (MTB) Market to book ratio. The ratio of year-end market 
capitalisation to total common equity. 
Market capitalisation 
(lnMKTCAP) 
The natural logarithm of market capitalisation as at 30 
June. 
Risk (STDDEV) Total risk calculated as the standard deviation of firm 
daily stock returns for each fiscal year. 
CEO duality (CEODUAL) A dummy variable, taking a rate of 1 if the CEO was also 
the chair, 0 otherwise. 
Board size (BRDSIZE) Number of board members. 
Prior firm year performance 
(ROAt-1) 
Measured by return to asset ratio of the prior year. 
Prior year Tobin’s Q Measured by Tobin’s Q ratio of the prior year. 
Prior year Z-Score (Z-Score t-1) Measured by Altman Z-Score of the prior year; PBANK t-
1 = (-Z-Score t-1). 
Board independence (INDEP) The percentage of board members who were independent 
calculated as the independent board total/total number of 
board. 
Industry (INDUS) Coded based on the GICS (Global Industry Classification 
Standard). 
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4.4 SUMMARY 
This chapter presented the research design of this study, specifically the selection 
of the sample and data resources. Regression models were also developed to test the 
hypotheses described in Chapter 3. Hypotheses 1 and 2 investigated the relationship 
between the existence of a RMC or a separate RMC and firms’ management of risk in 
terms of firm performance and the likelihood of financial distress. The remaining 
hypotheses focussed on RMC human capital and its association with firms’ 
management of risk. The independent variables and dependent variables of each model 
were specified and described in this chapter.   
The next chapter details the descriptive results of RMC and separate RMC 
establishment. The regression results of all six hypotheses of this study are also 
presented in the following chapter.  
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Chapter 5: Results 
5.1 INTRODUCTION  
This chapter presents the results of testing all six hypotheses of the sampled firms. First, 
an analysis of the existence of a RMC and a separate RMC is provided. The first and second 
hypothesis were tested to examine the relationship between a separate RMC, the existence of 
a RMC, and firms’ management of risk, in terms of firm performance and the likelihood of 
financial distress. The second section of the chapter then provides the results of RMC human 
capital, specifically, the relationship between RMC human capital and firm performance, and 
likelihood of financial distress, which examines hypotheses 3 to 6.  Hypotheses 3 and 4 
examined the overall RMC human capital, whereas hypotheses 5 and 6 focused on firm-
specific and general RMC human capital. Following this, additional tests and robustness tests 
are presented. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the results of the six hypotheses.  
5.2 RMC EXISTENCE 
In order to examine the relationship between RMC human capital and firms’ management 
of risks, this study first examines whether there is any association between the existence of a 
RMC, a separate RMC, and firm performance, and the likelihood of a firm’s financial distress. 
5.2.1 Descriptive statistics - RMC and SRMC 
Table 5.1 describes the formation of the RMC for the sampled companies during the 
period 2007 to 2014. Overall, the number of companies that established a separate RMC over 
the eight years remained constant, starting with 24 companies who had a separate RMC in 
2007, and this number remained stable during 2008 and 2013, with a range of 23 to 25 firms; 
the figure then jumped to 30 (10%) companies in 2014. There was an increasing trend of 
combined RMC formation of sampled companies, with the number of companies being 121 
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(40.3%) in 2007 and then 186 (62%) in 2014. The number of companies that did not have a 
RMC dropped during the same time span, with almost half of the sample companies (155) not 
having a RMC in 2007 and only 84 companies (28%) having no RMC in 2014.  
Figure 5.1 shows the overall trend of sample firms with a combined RMC and the firms 
with a separate RMC between 2007 and 2014. It clearly indicates that the number of firms with 
a separate RMC remained stable. There was an increase in firms with a combined RMC during 
the testing period and a decreasing trend for firms without a RMC. This finding indicates that 
only a few firms were willing to establish a separate RMC, whereas more and more firms chose 
to form a combined RMC. In addition, the increasing trend of a firm establishing a RMC 
between 2007 and 2014 may have been due to the increasing emphasis on risk management by 
the ASX CGPR Principle 7, which specifically recommends that Australian firms establish a 
RMC (ASXCGC, 2014). These results demonstrate that most top 300 ASX companies 
complied with the CGPR recommendation to form a RMC (ASXCGC, 2014); however, only 
around 10% of firms had a separate RMC, while 28% of firms (84 firms) did not have a RMC 
in 2014.  
Among the total sampled firms, 318 firms had a combined RMC. Firms with a combined 
RMC had integrated the risk management responsibilities with other committees. Specifically, 
Table 5.2 shows that the sample companies had 11 types of combined RMCs. Most of the 
companies with a combined RMC (74.8%) had combined the risk management responsibilities 
with their audit committee, forming an audit and risk committee. Some companies had 
established audit, risk, and compliance committees (15.1%). Only a few companies had 
combined risk management with reputation, governance, and sustainability committees. This 
result is interesting, as firms may establish different types of RMC due to different industry or 
specific risk requirements. For example, the three firms that established the environment, 
safety, and risk committees were all in the material industry. Thus, their main risks therefore 
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arise from environmental damage or workers’ safety. As a result, these three firms chose to 
integrate their risk management responsibilities into the environment and safety committee, 
forming an environment, safety, and risk committee. 
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Table 5.1: Committee types 
Committee 
TYPE 
2007  
% 
2008  
% 
2009  
% 
2010  
% 
2011  
% 
2012  
% 
2013  
% 
2014  
     % 
SRMC 24 8% 25 8.3% 24 8% 23 7.6% 27 9% 23 7.6% 23 7.6% 30 10% 
 
Combined RMC 
 
121 
 
40.3% 
 
120 
 
40% 
 
127 
 
42% 
 
140 
 
46.7% 
 
147 
 
49% 
 
160 
 
53.3% 
 
184 
 
61.3% 
 
186 
 
62% 
 
No RMC 
 
155 
 
51.7% 
 
155 
 
51.7% 
 
149 
 
50% 
 
137 
 
45.7% 
 
126 
 
42% 
 
117 
 
39.1% 
 
93 
 
31.1% 
 
84 
 
28% 
 
Total 
 
300 
 
100% 
 
300 
 
100% 
 
300 
 
100% 
 
300 
 
100% 
 
300 
 
100% 
 
300 
 
100% 
 
300 
 
100% 
 
300 
 
100% 
 
 
 
Table 5.2: Types of Combined RMC 
Types Audit and 
Risk 
Committee 
Audit 
Compliance 
and Risk 
Management 
Committee 
Risk and 
Compliance 
Committee 
 
Audit,  
Finance, 
and Risk  
Committee 
The 
Environment, 
Safety and 
Risk 
Committee 
Risk and 
Governance 
Committee 
 
Audit, Risk, 
and 
Nomination 
Committee 
Audit, Risk 
Management, 
and Safety 
Committee 
Finance and 
Risk 
Management 
Committee 
 
Risk and 
Reputation 
Committee 
Risk, 
Compliance, 
and 
Sustainability 
Committee 
Total 
No. 
firms 
238 48 18 4 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 318 
% 74.8% 15.1% 5.7% 1.3% 0.9% 0.7% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 100% 
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Figure 5.1 RMC formation  
 
The sample used to examine the relationship between the existence of a RMC, a separate 
RMC, and firms’ management of risk described in Chapter 3 contained 2,330 firm-year 
observations from 597 firm between 2007 and 2014. The analysis in this section used a panel 
data approach, and the descriptive statistics for the pooled data are reported in Panel A of Table 
5.3. It reports the summary of descriptive statistics for the variables relating to risk, the 
probability of bankruptcy, the percentage of board independence, board size, leverage, growth 
opportunity, and firms’ market performance and accounting performance.  
The results show that the sampled companies had an average leverage of 0.45. The mean 
of total risk (STDDEV) was 10.11, with a maximum of 43.1 and a minimum of 0. On average, 
firms had 2.74 of growth opportunities (MTB), with Tobin’s Q exhibiting a mean of 1.79. The 
average board size was 7.84, ranging from 3 to 25 members and on average 62% of the board 
directors were independent from management. The average Z-Score was 9.08. There was a 
considerable variation in firm size, as indicated by total assets and market capitalisation. The 
mean of the market capitalisation was 0.5 billion, with a range of 0.005 to 24.4 billion, whereas 
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the mean of the total assets was about 1.44 billion, ranging from 0.003 to 88.3 billion. This 
suggests that sample firms were comprised of both large and small firms.  
Of the control variables, zero skewness log transformations were performed on Z-Score, 
Tobin’s Q and firm size, as those variables were not normally distributed and involved outliers. 
As a result, those variables were transformed to reduce skewness.  
Panel B of Table 5.3 presents the frequency statistics relating to CEO duality, number of 
observations with a separate RMC, and with a combined RMC. The results show that only 
approximately 5% of the sample firms delegated the CEO as the chairperson of the board. In 
addition, there were 1,384 firm-year observations with a combined RMC, in contrast to only 
199 firm-year observations with a separate RMC, which also suggests a low level of firms with 
a separate RMC.  
Table 5.3: Descriptive statistics – the existence of RMC  
(N = 2330 observations - 597 firms) 
Panel A      
Variable N MEAN STD.DEV MIN MAX 
STDDEV 2328 10.11 6.92 0 43.1 
INDEP 2330 0.62 0.20 0 1 
LEV 2328 0.45 0.24 0.00 1.62 
MTB 2323 2.74 3.71 -29.55 53.63 
MKTCAP ($B) 2330 0.50 1.69 0.005 24.4 
TA($B) 2330 1.44 7.66 0.003 88.3 
BRDSIZE 2330 7.84 2.44 3 25 
Z-Scoret 2097 9.08 30.66 -11.52 378.06 
ROAt 2330 0.06 0.13 -2.73 0.97 
Tobin’s Qt 2328 1.79 2.28 0.07 23.52 
Naïve  2330 0.05 0.14 0 1 
Panel B Frequency 
Variable    TOTAL  Percentage 
CEODUAL  109 4.68% 
SRMC  199 8.54% 
RMC   1384 59.4% 
 
 
Note: STDDEV: total risk calculated as the standard deviation of a firm’s daily stock returns for each fiscal year; INDEP: the percentage 
of board members who were independent calculated as the independent board total/total number of board; LEV: the financial leverage of 
the firm, computed as total liabilities to total assets; MTB: market to book ratio. The ratio of year-end market capitalisation to total common 
equity; lnMKTCAP: the natural logarithm of market capitalisation; CEODUAL: dummy variable, taking a rate of 1 if the CEO was also the 
chair, 0 otherwise; BRDSIZE: number of board members; Z-Score: probability of bankruptcy in year t calculated using Altman Z-Score; 
Z-Score t-1: probability of bankruptcy of previous year calculated using Altman Z-Score; ROA: current year return on assets; ROA t-1: prior 
year return on assets; Tobin’s Q: the market value of equity of equity and debt divided by the book value of total assets in year t; Tobin’s 
Qt-1: prior year Tobin’s Q; RMC: dummy variable, where firms with a RMC (combined and separate) coded 1, 0 otherwise. SRMC: 
dummy variable, where firms with a separate RMC were coded 1, 0 otherwise; Naïve: the probability of bankruptcy using the Naïve model 
developed by Bharath and Shumway, (2004).  
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5.2.2 Univariate tests 
Preliminary examinations of the relationships between a RMC, a separate RMC, and 
firms’ management of risk were undertaken using independent T-test.  
Independent samples T-test – the existence of a RMC 
Table 5.4 reports the results of testing whether there were significant differences between 
firms that had a RMC and firms without one. Preliminary tests showed that firms with a RMC 
were significantly different to the companies without a RMC for firms’ accounting 
performance (ROAt), market performance (Tobin’s Qt, Tobin’s Qt-1), and likelihood of 
financial distress (Z-Scoret, Z-Scoret-1). Specifically, firms with a RMC had a significantly 
higher accounting performance (ROA) than firms that did not have a RMC (p<0.01). However, 
contrary to expectation, firms with a RMC had a significantly lower level of market 
performance (Tobin’s Q) and lower Z-Score, suggesting a higher level of the likelihood of 
financial distress. There was no significant difference between firms with a RMC and firms 
without one in relation to the Naïve measurement of the likelihood of financial distress. In 
addition, compared to companies without a RMC, companies that had a RMC tended to have 
a low level of total risk (STDDEV) (p<0.01), large board size (BRDSIZE) (p<0.01), large firm 
size (MKTCAP) (p<0.01), high level of board independence (INDEP) (p<0.01), and low level 
of CEO duality (CEODUAL) (p<0.01).  In contrast, firms with a RMC tended to have lower 
growth opportunity (MTB) (p<0.05).  
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Table 5.4: Comparison of means for companies with a RMC and without a RMC 
(N = 2330 observations - 597 firms) 
 RMC N Mean t Sig. (2 
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
ROA 1 1384 0.069 -3.626 0.000 0.019 
0 946 0.050 
Tobin’s Q 1 1384 1.594 5.133 0.000 0.445 
 0 945 2.039    
Z-Score 1 1366 5.721 6.357 0.000 9.339 
0 945 14.568 
Naïve  1 1384 0.049 0.918 0.359 0.005 
0 946 0.055 
LEV 1 1384 0.469 -12.650 0.000 -0.122 
0 946 0.374 
STDDEV 1 1384 10.313 6.586 0.000 2.141 
0 946 12.454 
BRDSIZE 1 1384 8.129 -7.018 0.000 
 
-0.725 
 0 946 7.413 
INDEP 1 1384 0.636 -5.911 0.000 
 
0.051 
0 946 0.586 
CEODUAL 1 1384 0.021 7.217 0.000 0.064 
0 946 0.085 
MKTCAP 
(AUS $b) 
1 1382 0.586 -2.922 0.004 -0.209 
0 939 0.377 
MTB 1 1379 2.584 2.411 0.016 0.378 
0 944 2.962    
Note: STDDEV: total risk calculated as the standard deviation of firm’s daily stock returns for each fiscal year; INDEP: the 
percentage of board members who were independent, calculated as the independent board total/total number of board; LEV: 
the financial leverage of the firm, computed as total liabilities to total assets; MTB: market to book ratio. The ratio of year-end 
market capitalisation to total common equity; MKTCAP: market capitalisation;  CEODUAL: dummy variable, taking a rate of 
1 if the CEO was also the chair, 0 otherwise; BRDSIZE: number of board members; Z-Score: probability of bankruptcy in year 
t calculated using Altman Z-Score; Z-Score t-1: probability of bankruptcy of previous year calculated using Altman Z-Score; 
ROA: current year return on assets; ROA t-1: prior year return on assets; Tobin’s Q: the market value of equity and debt divided 
by the book value of total assets in year t; Tobin’s Qt-1:prior year Tobin’s Q; Naïve: the probability of bankruptcy using the 
Naïve model developed by Bharath and Shumway, (2004). 
 
Correlation  
This study used correlation as a second method to examine the preliminary relationship 
between the existence of a RMC, a separate RMC, and firms’ management of risks in terms of 
firm performance and the likelihood of financial distress.  
The results of Pearson correlation matrices relating to a RMC and a separate RMC 
existence are shown in Tables 5.5 and 5.6. Specifically, Table 5.5 shows the correlation 
between a RMC, a separate RMC, and firm performance (ROA and Tobin’s Q).  
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The results show that RMC existence was negatively related to ROA and to Tobin’s Q at 
the significance level of 0.05. SRMC was not significantly related to ROA and Tobin’s Q. 
Additionally, there was a significant association between the existence of a RMC and the 
existence of a separate RMC.  Board size (BRDSIZE) and board independence (INDEP) were 
both positively associated with the existence of a RMC and SRMC, whereas risk (STTDEV) 
was negatively related to RMC and SRMC.  
As for the likelihood of financial distress, Table 5.6 suggests that RMC existence was 
negatively related to Naïve at the significance level of 0.05, whereas there was no significant 
relationship between SRMC and Naïve. RMC and SRMC were negatively related to Z-Score. 
Similar to the correlation results of RMC, SRMC, and firm performance, board size 
(BRDSIZE) and board independence (INDEP) were both positively associated with the 
existence of RMC and SRMC; whereas risk (STTDEV) was negatively related to RMC and 
SRMC.  
Correlation analysis provided a preliminary relationship among all the variables. A more 
robust analysis, regression analysis, was then undertaken to provide more rigorous results 
regarding the hypotheses. Given that some of the correlation coefficients among the 
independent variables were quite high, variance inflation factors (VIF) were conducted in the 
regression analysis to ensure multicollinearity did not impact the results of the regression 
models.  
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Table 5.5: Correlation statistics – RMC and separate RMC existence and firm performance 
Variables  RMC SRMC ROAt ROAt-1 Tobins’ Qt Tobin’s Qt-1 MKTCAP GRTH BRDSIZE LEV STDDEV INDEP 
RMC 1 
SRMC 0.252** 1 
ROAt -0.046* -0.013 1 
ROAt-1 -0.047* -0.014 0.986** 1 
Tobins’ Qt -0.049* -0.028 0.108** 0.107** 1 
Tobin’s Qt-1 -0.013 -0.049* 0.003   0.009 0.596** 1 
MKTCAP -0.032 -0.013 0.924** 0.880** 0.089** -0.001 1 
GRTH -0.054** -0.033 0.070** 0.071** 0.757** 0.471** -0.055** 1 
BRDSIZE 0.148** 0.164** -0.101** -0.135** -0.223** -0.162** -0.143** -0.165** 1 
LEV -0.030 -0.013 0.888** 0.889** 0.073** -0.010 0.937** 0.053* -0.137** 1 
STDDEV -0.162** -0.080** -0.050* -0.047* 0.177** 0.191** -0.055** 0.070** -0.194** -0.049* 1 
 
INDEP 0.0126** 0.096** -0.132** -0.127** -0.162** -0.102** -0.136** -0.091** 0.035 -0.129** -0.130** 1 
                      Two-tailed test significant at: ** p<0.01; *p<0.05 
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Table 5.6: Correlation statistics – RMC and separate RMC existence and the likelihood of financial distress  
Variables  RMC SRMC Z-Scoret Z-Scoret-1 Naïve MKTCAP GRTH BRDSIZE LEV STDDEV INDEP 
RMC 1 
SRMC 0.252** 1 
Z-Scoret -0.131** -0.043** 1 
Z-Scoret-1 -0.126** -0.043* 0.482** 1 
Naïve -0.046* -0.022 -0.028 -0.039 1 
MKTCAP -0.032 -0.013 -0.013 -0.116** 0.338** 1 
GRTH -0.054** -0.033 0.334** 0.220** 0.001 -0.055** 1 
BRDSIZE 0.148** 0.164** -0.154** -0.136** -0.029 -0.143** -0.165** 1 
LEV -0.030 -0.013 -0.012 -0.281** 0.218** 0.937** 0.053* -0.137** 1 
STDDEV -0.162** -0.080** 0.263** 0.249** 0.031 -0.055** 0.070** -0.194** -0.049* 1 
INDEP 0.0126** 0.096** -0.129** -0.111** -0.072** -0.136** -0.091** 0.035 -0.129** -0.130** 1 
                      Two-tailed test significant at: ** p<0.01; *p<0.05 
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5.2.3 Hypotheses testing - multivariable tests 
Following the preliminary univariate tests, multiple regressions were used to determine 
the association among the existence of a separate RMC and a RMC, risk, and the firms’ 
management of risk in terms of firm performance and the probability of financial distress by 
testing the first and second hypotheses. Before testing the moderating relationship, this study 
first examined the association between the existence of a RMC and a separate RMC in relation 
to firm performance and the likelihood of financial distress. 
Regression analysis was used in the panel data. As RMC human capital variables, the 
testing variables, were mostly constant over time, this required that random effects models be 
adopted to capture the variations among different variables. Even though fixed effects models 
may generate more robust coefficients in the cases where the time invariant omitted variables 
are correlated with independent variables, it does permit adequate testing of the variables when 
there is little variation over time.19 As a result, random effects models were adopted to test the 
developed hypotheses. Specifically, Tables 5.7 and 5.8 report the results of testing the first and 
second hypotheses using random effects models with robust estimation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
19 This study subsequently adopted a fixed effects regression model in the robustness test.  
  
Chapter 5: Results 109 
 
Table 5.7: Random effects with robust estimation. The existence of a RMC and firm performance 
  Two-tailed tests significant at p<0.01***; p<0.05**; p≤ 0.10* 
 
 
 
 
 
 ROA 
Coef.(z) 
 
 
lnTobin’s Q 
Coef.(z) 
 
 RMC                      SRMC RMC       SRMC  
RMC 0.012 
(2.14)** 
-0.019 
(-2.00)** 
- - 0.002 
(1.13) 
0.005 
(1.55) 
- - 
SRMC - - 0.011 -0.026 - - 0.004 0.002 
   (1.39) (-1.60)   (1.41) (0.32) 
RMC* 
STDDEV 
- 0.003 - - - -0.000 - - 
 (4.16)***    (-1.09)   
SRMC* 
STDDEV 
- 
 
- - 0.004 
(2.75)*** 
- - - 0.0002 
(0.49) 
ROAt-1 0.237 
(16.07) *** 
0.237 
(16.10) *** 
0.24 
(16.02)*** 
0.237 
(16.05)*** 
- - - - 
lnTobin’s Qt-1 - - - - 0.093 
(7.16)*** 
0.093 
(7.14)*** 
0.093 
(7.21)*** 
0.094 
(7.17)*** 
lnMKTCAP 0.063 
(2.50)** 
0.058 
(2.32)** 
0.064 
(2.54)** 
0.068 
(2.68)*** 
-  -  -  - 
lnTA -  -  -  - -0.092 -0.092 -0.092 -0.092 
     (-8.13)*** (-8.09)*** (-8.13)*** (-8.10)*** 
STDDEV -0.002 
(-5.47)*** 
-0.004 
(-6.77)*** 
-0.002 
(-5.50)*** 
-0.002 
(-5.73)*** 
-0.000 
(-0.61) 
-0.000 
(-0.22) 
-0.000 
(-0.64) 
-0.000 
(-0.69) 
INDEP 0.014 
(1.00) 
0.012 
(0.84) 
0.014 
(1.01) 
0.015 
(1.07) 
0.005 
(0.29) 
0.004 
(0.99) 
0.004 
(0.94) 
0.004 
(0.32) 
CEODUAL 0.027 
(1.98)** 
0.028 
(2.05)** 
0.025 
(1.83)* 
0.025 
(1.81)* 
-0.001 
(-0.28) 
-0.001 
(-0.29) 
-0.002 
(-0.36) 
-0.002 
(-0.37) 
BRDSIZE -0.022 
(-0.43) 
-0.013 
(-0.26) 
-0.023 
(-0.45) 
-0.018 
(-0.35) 
0.005 
(0.29) 
0.004 
(0.24) 
0.005 
(0.30) 
0.005 
(0.32) 
LEV -0.119 
(-7.69)*** 
-0.117 
(-7.66)*** 
-0.118 
(-7.63)*** 
-0.118 
(-7.59)*** 
-0.086 
(-15.35)*** 
-0.086 
(-15.37)*** 
-0.086 
(-15.38)*** 
-0.086 
(-15.38)*** 
MTB 0.077 
(4.36)*** 
0.083 
(4.71)*** 
0.077 
(4.37)*** 
0.076 
(4.31)*** 
0.388 
(65.47)*** 
0.388 
(65.42)*** 
0.388 
(65.48)*** 
0.388 
(65.46)*** 
CONS -0.110 
(-1.04) 
-0.096 
(-0.91) 
-0.101 
(-0.95) 
-0.115 
(-1.08) 
1.463 
(26.88)*** 
1.462 
(26.87)*** 
1.462 
(26.87)*** 
1.462 
(26.86)*** 
Year fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed 
effects          
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 
No. of firms 
2312 
583 
2312 
583 
2312 
583 
2312 
583 
2310 
583 
2310 
583 
2310 
583 
2310 
583 
Wald chi2 532.76 563.56 527.60 535.45 8756.49 8760.09 8767.72 8764.02 
Adjusted R2 
Highest VIF 
0.30 
8.90 
0.30 
8.94 
0.30 
8.90 
0.30 
8.91 
0.81 
8.96 
0.81 
8.98 
0.81 
8.94 
0.81 
8.94 
Lowest VIF 1.09 1.09 1.08 1.08 1.09 1.09 1.09 1.09 
 
Note: STDDEV: total risk calculated as the standard deviation of firm’s daily stock returns for each fiscal year; INDEP: the percentage of board members 
who were independent calculated as the independent board total/total number of board; LEV: The financial leverage of the firm, computed as total liabilities 
to total assets; lnMKTCAP: the natural logarithm of market capitalisation; lnTA: the natural logarithm of total assets; MTB: market to book ratio. The ratio 
of year-end market capitalisation to total common equity; BRDSIZE: number of board members; RMC*risk: interaction variables of RMC and risk; 
SRMC*risk: interaction variables of separate RMC and risk; ROAt: current year return on assets; ROAt-1: prior year return on assets; Tobin’s Q:  Market 
measure of wealth, measured by market value of firm + debt/book value of total assets; Tobin’s Qt-1: Tobin’s Q of previous year; CEODUAL: dummy 
variable, taking a rate of 1 if the CEO was also the chair, 0 otherwise;  SRMC: dummy variable, taking a rate of 1 when firms had a separate RMC, 0 
otherwise;  RMC: dummy variable, taking a rate of 1 when firms had a RMC, 0 otherwise. 
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RMC, SRMC, and ROA, Tobin’s Q (H1) 
Before testing the moderating relationship (H1 and H2), this study investigated the 
relationship between the existence of a RMC, a separate RMC and a firms’ management of risk 
in terms of firm performance and the likelihood of financial distress. The results are presented 
in Table 5.8. The results provide no evidence of a significant relationship between the existence 
of a separate RMC and firms’ accounting performance. However, a positive and significant 
relationship was found between the existence of a RMC and ROA (p<0.05). In addition, 
Tobin’s Q was not significantly related to the existence of a RMC or a separate RMC. These 
results show no evidence that the existence of a RMC or a separate RMC had any significant 
relationship with firm performance, with the exception of a positive relationship between a 
RMC and ROA. 
The results of regression models 1 to 4 were used to test H1 and the results are presented 
in Table 5.8. H1 predicted that the association between firm risk and performance would be 
moderated by RMC or SRMC. Firstly, the relationship between firm risk and performance was 
examined by excluding the interaction term. The results show there was a negative association 
between firm risk (STDDEV) and firm’s accounting performance (ROA) (B = -0.003; p<0.01). 
After including the interaction term, the results show the association between risk (STDDEV) 
and accounting performance (ROA) was moderated by firms with a RMC, as STDDEV*RMC 
was positively associated with firms’ financial performance ROA (B = 0.003; p<0.01), and the 
association between risk (STDDEV) and accounting performance (ROA) was moderated by 
firms with a SRMC, as STDDEV*SRMC was positively associated with firms’ financial 
performance ROA (B = 0.005; p<0.01). This result indicates that at higher risk, firms with a 
RMC or a separate RMC are more likely to have a higher level of accounting performance. Put 
another way, the negative association between risk and firm accounting performance is 
weakened for firms with a RMC and firms with a separate RMC. Thus, it indicates that RMC 
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and separate RMC existence are associated with better risk management and firm performance. 
This result supports H1 when using ROA as the measurement of firm performance. 
Alternatively, using Tobin’s Q as a measurement of firm value showed no significant results 
with the existence of separate RMC and RMC.  
In addition, the results show that ROA was positively related to the prior year’s 
performance (ROAt-1), suggesting it is necessary to include ROAt-1 as a control variable as it 
was significantly related to ROAt. In addition, ROA was positively related to firm size 
(lnMKTCAP), growth opportunity (MTB), and negatively related to firm leverage (LEV). With 
respect to Tobin’s Q, the results show that Tobin’s Q was positively related to growth 
opportunity (MTB), Tobin’s Qt-1 and negatively related to firm leverage (LEV) and firm size 
(lnTA), which is consistent with previous results (such as Bhagat and Bolton, 2008; 
Hutchinson, Mack and Plastow, 2015). The explanatory power of the ROA model was 
approximately 0.3, whereas the adjusted R-square of the Tobin’s Q model was 0.81. In terms 
of multicollinearity, the results show that all of the VIF values were smaller than 10 for the 
regression models, suggesting multicollinearity is not an issue in the analysis (Belsley, Kuh 
and Welsch, 1980). 
RMC, SRMC, and likelihood of financial distress  
The results of regression models a to d used the test of the second hypotheses using 
random effects models with robust estimation, which were described in Chapter 4, are reported 
in Table 5.8. Since a high score of Z-Score indicates lower financial distress and a low score 
of Z-Score indicates greater financial distress, this study used PBANK as –Z-Score in order to 
facilitate the interpretation of the results. As a result, PBANK is positively related to the 
likelihood of financial distress.  
The results show that there were no significant results between the existence of a RMC, 
a separate RMC, and the likelihood of financial distress. Additionally, the results show that the 
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relationship between risk and the likelihood of financial distress was not moderated by the 
existence of a RMC or a separate RMC, thus, not supporting H2, which predicted that there 
would be a negative relationship between risk and the likelihood of financial distress for firms 
with a RMC or separate RMC. Furthermore, the results show that PBANKt-1 was positively 
related to PBANK, indicating that firms with a high likelihood of financial distress in the prior 
year were more likely to suffer financial distress in the following year. Firm leverage (LEV) 
was positively associated with the PBANK and Naïve. This suggests that high leveraged firms 
were more likely to be financially distressed. In addition, the MTB was negatively associated 
with PBANK and Naïve, suggesting that low growth firms were more likely to be financially 
distressed. These results are consistent with previous studies (Bhagat, Bolton and Romano, 
2008; Reynolds and Francis, 2000). The explanatory power of the PBANK model was high, 
with an adjusted R-square of 0.66; whereas the adjusted R-square of the ROA model was 
approximately 0.12. In terms of multicollinearity, the results show that all of the VIF values 
were smaller than 10 for the regression models, suggesting multicollinearity is not an issue in 
the analysis (Belsley, Kuh and Welsch, 1980). 
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Table 5.8: Random effects with robust estimation. The existence of a RMC and the 
likelihood of financial distress 
Two tailed tests significant at p<0.01***; p<0.05**; p≤ 0.10* 
 
The next section presents the results of testing H3 to H6 in relation to RMC human 
capital. 
 
 PBANK 
Coef.(z) 
Naïve 
 RMC SRMC RMC SRMC 
RMC -0.010 
(-1.43) 
-0.022 
(-2.02)** 
- - -0.000 
(-0.04) 
-0.008 
(-0.66) 
- - 
SRMC  
- 
- 
 
-0.015 
(-1.64) 
-0.018 
(-1.00) 
- 
 
- 
 
-0.019 
(-1.69)* 
-0.029 
(-1.35) 
RMC* 
STDDEV 
 
- 
 0.001 
(1.29) 
- - - 0.001 
(0.80) 
- - 
SRMC* 
STDDEV 
 
- 
- - 0.000 
(0.20) 
- - - 0.001 
(-0.54) 
PBANK-1 0.089 
(8.58)*** 
0.089 
(8.55)*** 
0.089 
(8.61)*** 
0.089 
(8.61)*** 
- - - - 
lnMKTCAP -0.001 
(-0.03) 
-0.002 
(-0.06) 
-0.000 
(-0.01) 
-0.000 
(-0.00) 
-0.000 
(-0.01) 
-0.001 
(-0.03) 
-0.004 
(-0.13) 
-0.005 
(-0.15) 
STDDEV 0.001 
(1.96)** 
0.000 
(1.96)** 
0.001 
(1.96)** 
0.001 
(1.96)** 
0.000 
(1.21) 
0.001 
(0.23) 
0.000 
(1.23) 
0.000 
(1.17) 
INDEP -0.002 
(-0.12) 
-0.003 
(-0.19) 
-0.002 
(-0.14) 
-0.002 
(-0.14) 
-0.032 
(-1.68)* 
-0.032 
(-1.71)* 
-0.031 
(-1.68)* 
-0.031 
(-1.67)* 
CEODUAL -0.004 
(-0.28) 
-0.004 
(-0.26) 
-0.002 
(-0.14) 
-0.002 
(-0.15) 
-0.01 
(-0.56) 
-0.010 
(-0.54) 
-0.047 
(-0.69) 
-0.009 
(-0.49) 
BRDSIZE -0.038 
(-0.67) 
-0.035 
(-0.62) 
-0.037 
(-0.65) 
-0.036 
(-0.64) 
0.052 
(0.76) 
0.054 
(0.78) 
0.047 
(0.69) 
0.049 
(0.71) 
LEV 0.615 
(32.56)*** 
0.616 
(32.59)*** 
0.614 
(32.58)*** 
0.614 
(32.57)*** 
0.151 
(7.10)*** 
0.151 
(7.09)*** 
0.153 
(7.21)*** 
0.153 
(7.21)*** 
MTB -0.500 
(-24.77)*** 
-0.497 
(-24.66)*** 
-0.500 
(-24.81)*** 
-0.500 
(-24.81)*** 
-0.192 
(-7.96)*** 
-0.191 
(-7.88)*** 
-0.193 
(-8.01)*** 
-0.193 
(-8.02)*** 
CONS -0.845 
(-6.98)*** 
-0.841 
(-6.94)*** 
-0.855 
(-7.06)*** 
-0.856 
(-7.06)*** 
0.158 
(1.10) 
0.162 
(1.13) 
0.157 
(1.10) 
0.153 
(1.07) 
Year fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry 
fixed effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 
No. of firms 
2235 
571 
2235 
571 
2235 
571 
2235 
571 
2312 
583 
2312 
583 
2312 
583 
2312 
583 
Wald chi2 2744.74 2745.64 2750.40 2749.72 306.50 307.10 309.63 309.81 
Adjusted R2 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 
Highest VIF 9.53 9.53 9.50 9.50 8.86 8.86 8.87 8.87 
Lowest VIF 1.09 1.09 1.09 1.09 1.09 1.09 1.09 1.09 
 
Note: STDDEV: total risk calculated as the standard deviation of a firm’s daily stock returns for each fiscal year; INDEP: the percentage of board 
members who were independent calculated as the independent board total/total number of board; LEV: The financial leverage of the firm, computed as 
total liabilities to total assets; MTB: market to book ratio. The ratio of year-end market capitalisation to total common equity; BRDSIZE: number of 
board members; Z-Score: probability of bankruptcy calculated using Altman Z-Score; Z-Scoret-1: Altman Z-Score of previous year; Naïve: the 
probability of bankruptcy using the Naïve model developed by Bharath and Shumway, (2004); lnMKTCAP: the natural logarithm of market 
capitalisation; lnTA: the natural logarithm of total assets; CEODUAL: dummy variable, taking a rate of 1 if the CEO was also the chair,  0 otherwise; 
SRMC: dummy variable, taking a rate of 1 when firms had a separate RMC, 0 otherwise;  RMC: dummy variable, taking a rate of 1 when firms had a 
RMC, 0 otherwise; Year:  year dummy variable 
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5.3 RISK MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE HUMAN CAPITAL 
The sample used to examine the relationship between RMC human capital and firms’ 
management of risk was described in Chapter 3. Among the total sample firms, 371 firms of 
the 1,374 firm-year observations formed a RMC (including a combined RMC and a separate 
RMC). The analysis in this section uses a panel data approach, and the descriptive statistics for 
the pooled data are reported in Table 5.9. Specifically, it provides a summary of the descriptive 
statistics of the variables relating to individual RMC human capital characteristics and RMC 
human capital factor scores derived from the principle component factor analysis. 
5.3.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 5.9 presents the descriptive statistics for the pooled data. For the sample firms with 
a RMC, the average leverage was 0.5. The mean score for total risk (STDDEV) was 10.33, 
with a minimum of 0.00 and a maximum of 36.4. On average, firms had 2.56 of growth 
opportunities (MTB), with Tobin’s Q exhibiting a mean of 1.6. Additionally, the board size 
had a mean of 8.14, ranging from 3 to 16 members and on average 64 percent of the board 
directors were independent from management.  
In relation to RMC human capital data, RMC members had an average board tenure of 
5.41 years, ranging from 0 to 24.67 and an average of 3.2 years for RMC tenure. The average 
number of qualifications held by the members was quite low, with a mean of 1.39, a maximum 
of 4 and a minimum of 0. Similarly, the average amount of experience held by the members 
was also low, with a mean of 2.77, a maximum of 4.89 and a minimum of 0. This result 
demonstrates that the human capital level of RMC is quite low in Australian firms, and there 
are companies with RMC members that have no qualifications or previous experience.  
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Table 5.9: Descriptive statistics – RMC human capital  
(N = 1,374 observations - 371 firms) 
Variable N MEAN STD.DEV MIN MAX 
STDDEV 1374 10.33 7.96 0 36.4 
INDEP 1374 0.64 0.19 0 1 
LEV 1374 0.50 0.23 0 1.62 
MTB 1369 2.56 2.89 -7.49 25.01 
BRDSIZE 1374 8.14 2.23 3 16 
Z-Scoret 1268 4.82 12 -3.95 90.39 
ROAt 1374 0.07 0.08 -0.73 0.47 
Tobins’ Qt 1374 1.60 1.77 0 21.62 
Rescaling 1372 3.80 1.63 0.33 15 
lnMKTCAP 1374 2.32 2.89 1.47 2.72 
SHARE 1374 0.01 0.03 0 0.55 
RMC Tenure 1374 3.20 1.80 0 11 
Tenure 1374 5.41 3.04 0 24.67 
Quali 1374 1.39 0.73 0 4.00 
Exp 1374 2.77 2.59 0 4.89 
Naïve 1372 0.14 0.32 0 1 
 
Note: STDDEV: total risk calculated as the standard deviation of a firm’s daily stock returns for each fiscal year; INDEP: 
the percentage of board members who were independent calculated as the independent board total/total number of board; 
LEV: The financial leverage of the firm, computed as total liabilities to total assets; MTB: market to book ratio. The ratio 
of year-end market capitalisation to total common equity; lnMKTCAP: the natural logarithm of market capitalisation; lnTA: 
the natural logarithm of total assets;  BRDSIZE: number of board members; Z-Score: probability of financial distress calculated 
using Altman Z-Score; Z-Scoret-1: Altman Z-Score of previous year; ROA: current year return on assets; ROA-1: prior year 
return on assets; Tobin’s Q:  market measure of wealth, measured by market value of firm + debt / book value of total 
assets; Tobin’s Qt-1: Tobin’s Q of previous year; Naïve: the probability of bankruptcy using the Naïve model developed by 
Bharath and Shumway, (2004); lnMKTCAP: the natural logarithm of market capitalisation; CEODUAL: dummy variable, 
taking a rate of 1 if the CEO was also the chair, 0 otherwise; SHARE: the average percentage of RMC members 
shareholding; Tenure: Average number of years as a board member of a firm; RMC Tenure: average years of risk 
management experience of RMC members; Quali: the average number of qualifications held by RMC members; Exp: the 
average amount of experience of RMC members. 
 
In order to determine the association between RMC human capital and firm performance, 
as well as the relationship between RMC human capital and the probability of bankruptcy, this 
study used two models to examine the relationship. First, an overall RMC human capital score 
was developed, which was derived from all of the identified RMC human capital characteristics 
by using principle component analysis techniques to test hypothesis 3 and 4. In model 2, this 
study investigated individual RMC human capital characteristics to examine firm-specific 
human capital and general human capital, and to test their association with firms’ management 
of risk in relation to H5 and H6.  
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The following section presents the results of the principle component analysis of all 
identified RMC human capital characteristics.  
5.3.2 Model 1 
Principal component analysis - RMC human capital factor score (RMCHC) 
Principal component factor analysis was applied to three individual measures of RMC 
human capital: rescaling, board tenure, and RMC tenure, in order to derive an overall factor 
score (RMCHC) to represent overall RMC human capital characteristics. When conducting 
principal component analysis, it is necessary to determine the optimal number of each 
component. The common criteria suggested by previous research to determine the appropriate 
number of components is based on eigenvalues, inspection of the scree plot, and whether the 
components “make sense” (Abdi and Williams, 2010; Eng and Mak, 2003).  
Table 5.10 displays the associated eigenvalues, showing how much each principal 
component explained the variance in the data. According to Table 5.11, the principal 
component analysis only extracted one component with an eigenvalue over 1 and it accounted 
for 67% of the variance of the individual measures. This suggests that 1 may be the appropriate 
component number. This study further investigated the scree plot, presented in Figure 5.2, 
which shows that the first component factor explained most of the human capital data and the 
eigenvalue had a significant drop after the first component. Therefore, since the first component 
was the only component greater than 1, this study only retained the first factor (Girden, 2001) 
and used it as the measurement of RMC human capital in the following analysis. In addition, 
Table 5.11 presents the factor loading of each indicator and the results show that the three RMC 
human capital components (i.e., rescaling, board tenure, and RMC tenure) were all highly 
correlated with the RMC human capital factor score, suggesting the RMC human capital factor 
score can be used as an overall measurement of RMC human capital, as it makes theoretical 
sense. This study also adopted Cronbach’s alpha and Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin test to determine the 
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internal consistency and sampling adequacy of the three components. The results show that the 
value of Cronbach’s alpha was 0.6, suggesting the internal consistency of the components was 
moderate 20  (Hair, Black, Babin and Anderson, 2010). The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin test of 
sampling adequacy was moderate, with a value of 0.7 (Field, 2005; Kaiser, 1974). Bartlett’s 
test of sphericity was used in this study to determine whether the observed correlation matric 
diverged significantly from the identity matrix. The result was highly significant (P<0.000), 
suggesting that principal component analysis was appropriate (Field, 2005).   
 
Table 5.10: Eigenvalues – principal components analysis – RMC human capital 
(RMCHC) 
Eigenvalues of the principal components analysis 
Component  Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Comp1 2.02 1.49 0.67 0.67 
Comp2 0.52 0.06 0.17 0.84 
Comp3 0.46 - 0.15 1.00 
 
 
Table 5.11: Principal components analysis (PCA) 
Factor Component Loading Standard Error 
Comp1   
     RMC tenure  0.576 0.015 
     Tenure 0.587 0.014 
     Rescaling  0.570 0.015 
Comp2   
     RMC tenure  -0.615 0.130 
     Tenure -0.147 0.192 
     Rescaling  0.775 0.067 
Comp3   
     RMC tenure  0.538 0.149 
     Tenure -0.796 0.037 
     Rescaling  0.276 0.187 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
20The low Cronbach’s alpha may be due to the fact that this study only had three components, previous studies 
have proceeded with Cronbach’s alpha of less than 0.6 (e.g. Larcker, Richardson and Tuna, 2007). 
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Figure 5.2 PCA scree plot 
Univariate test  
Before running regressions to test the hypotheses of this study, some preliminary 
univariate tests were conducted (i.e., correlation) in order to gain a better understanding of the 
data and to provide preliminary results regarding the association between the RMC human 
capital factor score and firms’ management of risk in terms of firm performance and likelihood 
of financial distress. 
Correlation  
The results of Pearson correlations matrices relating to RMC human capital are shown in 
Tables 5.12 and 5.13. Specifically, Table 5.12 shows the correlation between the RMC human 
capital factor score and firm performance (ROA and Tobin’s Q).  
H3 predicted a positive association between RMC human capital and firm performance. 
Table 5.12 shows a statistically significant and positive correlation between the RMC human 
capital factor score and ROA (p<0.01), indicating firms’ RMC human capital factor score was 
positively related to firms’ accounting performance, which provided initial support for H3 
when using ROA as the measurement of firm performance. The results also show that RMC 
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human capital was positively related with ROAt-1 (p<0.01), indicating firms’ accounting 
performance in the previous year was highly correlated with accounting performance in the 
following year.  
Additionally, the results show that RMC human capital factor had no significant 
relationship with firms’ market performance (Tobin’s Q). However, the results show RMC 
human capital was positively associated with Tobin’s Qt-1 (p < 0.01), indicating the RMC 
human capital factor score was positively related to firms’ previous market performance. 
Growth opportunity and firm risk were positively correlated with Tobin’s Q (p < 0.01).  
H4 predicted a negative association between RMC human capital and the likelihood of 
financial distress, and this relationship is shown in Table 5.13. The results show that there was 
a significant negative relationship between RMC human capital factor score and Naïve 
(p<0.05), suggesting RMC human capital was negatively related to the likelihood of financial 
distress, which provides initial support for H4 when using Naïve as the measurement of the 
likelihood of financial distress. In addition, firm size and growth opportunity were negatively 
correlated with Naïve, whereas firm risk was positively related to Naïve (p < 0.01). 
Z-Score was positively related to RMC human capital factor score (p<0.05), suggesting 
that RMC human capital factor score was negatively related to the likelihood of financial 
distress. This supports H4 when using Z-Score as the measurement of the likelihood of 
financial distress. Additionally, the RMC human capital factor score was positively related to 
firm size and negatively related to firm leverage and firm risk (p < 0.01). 
Some of the significant correlations and predicted signs provided initial support for 
hypotheses 3 and 4. These results then required further investigation in the multiple regressions. 
Given that some of the correlation coefficients among the independent variables were quite 
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high, variance inflation factors (VIF) were conducted to ensure multicollinearity did not impact 
the results of the regression models. 
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Table 5.12: Correlation statistics – firm performance and RM human capital (PCA) 
Variables  ROA ROAt-1 Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Qt-1 MKTCAP GRTH BRDSIZE LEV STDDEV INDEP RMCHC 
ROA 1 
ROAt-1 0.279** 1 
Tobin’s Q -0.035 0.001 1 
Tobin’s Qt-1 0.136** 0.216** 0.040 1 
MKTCAP 0.267** 0.760** 0.032 0.226** 1 
GRTH -0.042 0.011 0.742** 0.043 0.081** 1 
BRDSIZE 0.016 0.019 0.009 -0.051 -0.224** 0.008 1 
LEV -0.005 -0.020 -0.006 0.118** -0.365** -0.009 0.528** 1 
STDDEV -0.058* -0.044  0.333** -0.012 -0.018 0.557** 0.004 -0.005 1 
INDEP -0.002 0.005 0.031 0.039 0.006 0.064* -0.129** -0.008 0.116** 1 
RMCHC 0.453** 0.557** -0.017 0.328** 0.532** -0.013 0.000 -0.082** -0.071** 0.047 1 
                     Two-tailed test significant at: ** p<0.01; *p<0.05 
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Table 5.13: Correlation statistics – the likelihood of financial distress and RM human capital (PCA) 
Variables  Z-Score Z-Scoret-1 Naïve MKTCAP GRTH BRDSIZE LEV STDDEV INDEP RMCHC 
Z-Score 1 
Z-Scoret-1 0.035 1 
Naïve  0.015 -0.158** 1 
MKTCAP -0.363** 0.181** -0.058* 1 
GRTH -0.009 0.028 0.053* 0.081** 1 
BRDSIZE 0.528** -0.043 0.042 -0.224** 0.008 1 
LEV 1.000** 0.057* 0.015 -0.365** -0.009 0.528** 1 
STDDEV -0.005 -0.012 0.127** -0.018 0.557** 0.004 -0.005 1 
INDEP -0.008 0.054 0.043 0.006 0.064* -0.129** -0.008 0.116** 1 
 
RMCHC 0.055* 0.262** -0.058* 0.532** -0.013 0.000 -0.082** -0.071** 0.047 1 
Two-tailed test significant at: ** p<0.01; *p<0.05 
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Multiple regressions 
Following the preliminary univariate tests, multiple regressions were used to determine 
the association between RMC human capital and firms’ management of risk in terms of firm 
performance and the probability of financial distress by testing the third and fourth hypotheses. 
Regression analysis was used in the panel data. The results of testing the third hypothesis using 
random effects models with robust estimation are reported in Tables 5.14 and 5.15. This study 
also tested the moderating relationship between risk, RMC human capital, and firms’ 
management of risk. The details of the results are discussed below.  
RMC human capital score and firm performance 
The results of testing H3, using regression model (1a) and (1b) developed in Chapter 4 
are presented in Table 5.14, which indicates that RMC human capital was significantly and 
positively related to firm accounting performance (ROA) (B = 0.02; p<0.01). RMC human 
capital factor score was also significantly and positively related to firms’ market performance 
(Tobin’s Q) (B = 0.003; p<0.05). Therefore, the results support H3, which shows that there 
was a positive relationship between RMC human capital and firm performance (using ROA 
and Tobin’s Q). The economic significance of these results is that if firms increase their RMC 
human capital by one score, ROA will increase by 0.063%, and their Tobin’s Q will increase 
by 1.90%. These results reveal that firms need to increase their RMC human capital if they 
want to increase their firm value, and that the market places greater value on firms with a higher 
level of RMC human capital. The explanatory power of the ROA model was approximately 
0.37, whereas the adjusted R-square of the Tobin’s Q model was 0.57.   
After including the interaction term of RMC human capital*risk (RMCHC*STDDEV), 
the results suggest that RMC human capital did not significantly moderate the relationship 
between risk and firm performance, as RMCHC*STDDEV was not strongly associated with 
ROA (p<0.1) and Tobin’s Q (p>0.1). In addition, firm size (lnMKTCAP), growth opportunity 
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(MTB), and prior year’s ROA (ROAt-1) were found to be significantly and positively related to 
accounting performance (ROA), whereas firm risk (STDDEV) was significantly and 
negatively related to accounting performance (ROA). As for Tobin’s Q, the results show that 
firm risk (STDDEV) and firm size (lnTA) were significantly and negatively related to market 
performance (Tobin’s Q), whereas board size (BRDSIZE) and prior year’s Tobin’s Q were 
significantly and positively related to market performance (Tobin’s Q).  
In terms of multicollinearity, the results show that all of the VIF values were smaller than 
10 for the regression models, suggesting multicollinearity is not an issue in the analysis 
(Belsley, Kuh and Welsch, 1980). 
RMC human capital score and the likelihood of financial distress 
The results of the fourth hypotheses, using regression models (1c) and (1d) developed in 
Chapter 4, are reported in Table 5.15. H4 predicted that there would be a negative relationship 
between RMC human capital and the likelihood of financial distress. The results in Table 5.16 
reveal that RMC human capital factor score was negatively related to Naïve (B = -1.97; 
p<0.05), suggesting there was a negative relationship between RMC human capital factor score 
and the likelihood of financial distress. The economic significance of this result is that if firms 
increase their RMC human capital by one score, Naïve will decrease by 9.01%. This result 
suggests that firms need to obtain a high level of RMC human capital if they want to lower 
their likelihood of financial distress. However, the results did not show a significant 
relationship between the RMC human capital factor score and the likelihood of financial 
distress when using Z-Score as the measurement. Therefore, the results support H4 when Naïve 
measurement is used. Most importantly, after including the interaction term of RMC human 
capital*risk (RMCHC*STDDEV), the results show that the association between risk 
(STDDEV) and the likelihood of financial distress (Naïve) was moderated by the firms’ RMC 
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human capital, as STDDEV*RMCHC was negatively associated with the firms’ likelihood of 
financial distress (Naïve) (B = -0.05; p<0.05).  
These results regarding the interaction suggest that at higher risk, firms increasing the 
level of RMC human capital will decrease their levels in regards to the likelihood of financial 
distress. In other words, the positive relationship between risk and the likelihood of financial 
distress was weakened for firms with a high level of human capital in a RMC. This result 
indicates that RMC human capital is related to better risk management and a lower likelihood 
of financial distress.  
In addition, the result shows that growth opportunity (MTB) and firm size (lnMKTCAP) 
were negatively related to the likelihood of financial distress (PBANK). Leverage (LEV) and 
the previous year’s likelihood of financial distress (PBANKt-1) were positively related to the 
firms’ probability of going bankrupt (PBANK). 
The explanatory power of the PBANK model was high, with an adjusted R-square of 
0.55, whereas the adjusted R-square of the Naïve model was approximately 0.13. In terms of 
multicollinearity, the results show that all of the VIF values were smaller than 10 for the 
regression models, suggesting multicollinearity is not an issue in the analysis (Belsley, Kuh 
and Welsch, 1980). 
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Table 5.14: Random effects regressions with robust estimation – RMC human capital and 
firm performance  
Two-tailed tests significant at p<0.01***; p<0.05**; p≤ 0.10* 
 
 ROA 
Coef.(z) 
Model 1a 
ROA 
Coef.(z) 
Model 1b 
ROA 
Coef.(z) 
Model 2 
lnTobin’s Q 
Coef.(z) 
Model 1a 
lnTobin’s Q 
Coef.(z) 
Model 1b 
lnTobin’s Q 
Coef.(z) 
Model 2 
RMCHC 0.016 0.022 - 0.003 0.003 - 
 (2.61)*** (3.10)***  (2.47)** (2.10)**  
RMCHC* 
STDDEV 
- 0.000 - - -0.000 - 
 (1.75)*   (-0.32)  
ROA t-1 
 
0.182 
(16.01)*** 
0.180 
(15.69)*** 
0.179 
(14.91)*** 
- - - 
Tobin’s Q t-1 
 
- - - 0.108 
(4.00)*** 
0.109 
(4.00)*** 
0.103 
(3.59)*** 
lnMKTCAP 0.080 
(3.20)*** 
0.080 
(3.17)*** 
0.839 
(3.09)*** 
- - - 
lnTA - - - -0.157 
(-5.74)*** 
-0.157 
(-5.71)*** 
-0.146 
(-5.00)*** 
STDDEV -0.002 
(-4.14)*** 
-0.001 
(-3.47)*** 
-0.002 
(-3.78)*** 
-0.001 
(-3.07)*** 
-0.001 
(-1.28)*** 
-0.001 
(-3.95)*** 
RMC -0.004 
(-0.50) 
-0.004 
(-0.52) 
0.005 
(0.58) 
0.006 
(0.96) 
0.006 
(0.96) 
0.008 
(1.22) 
INDEP -0.018 
(-1.62) 
-0.019 
(-1.71)* 
-0.015 
(-1.15) 
-0.009 
(-1.00) 
-0.009 
(-0.99) 
-0.011 
(-1.05) 
CEODUAL 0.012 
(0.85) 
0.011 
(0.76) 
0.015 
(1.03) 
0.013 
(1.15) 
0.013 
(1.14) 
0.010 
(0.89) 
BRDSIZE 0.033 
(1.46) 
0.034 
(1.49) 
0.041 
(1.57) 
0.047 
(2.46)** 
0.047 
(2.47)** 
0.055 
(2.56)*** 
LEV -0.010 
(-0.83) 
-0.011 
(-0.95) 
-0.014 
(-1.08) 
-0.090 
(-8.08)** 
-0.090 
(-8.08)*** 
-0.091 
(-7.78)*** 
MTB 0.005 
(6.10)*** 
0.005 
(6.21)*** 
0.004 
(4.82)*** 
0.015 
(24.90)*** 
0.015 
(24.89)*** 
0.015 
(23.19)*** 
Tenure - - 0.0002 - - -0.034 
   (0.01)   (-2.50)** 
RMC tenure - - 0.0001 - - -0.000 
   (0.08)   (-0.04) 
Exp - - 0.002 - - 0.000 
   (2.67)***   (-0.14) 
Quali - - 0.003 - - 0.004 
   (0.88)   (1.16) 
SHARE - - 0.167 - - 0.031 
   (1.96)**   (0.41) 
CONS -0.188 
(-2.70)*** 
-0.193 
(-2.78)*** 
-0.202 
(-2.55)** 
1.889 
(17.01)*** 
1.887 
(16.95)*** 
1.913 
(15.76)*** 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed 
effects          
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 
No. of firms 
1361 
367 
1361 
367 
1361 
348 
1359 
365 
1359 
365 
1359 
345 
Wald chi2 444.47 448.64 417.81 1541.27 1540.07 1336.66 
Adjusted R2 0.37 0.38 0.38 0.57 0.57 0.56 
Highest VIF 9.33  8.81 8.40  8.78 
Lowest VIF 1.09  1.12 1.10  1.10 
 
Notes:  STDDEV: total risk calculated as the standard deviation of a firm’s daily stock returns for each fiscal year; INDEP: the percentage 
of board members who were independent calculated as the independent board total/total number of board; LEV: the financial leverage of 
the firm, computed as total liabilities to total assets; MTB: market to book ratio. The ratio of year-end market capitalisation to total common 
equity; CEODUAL: dummy variable, taking a rate of 1 if the CEO was also the chair, 0 otherwise; BRDSIZE: number of board members; 
ROA: current year return on assets; ROAt-1 : prior year return on assets; Tobin’s Q:  market measure of wealth, measured by market value 
of firm + debt/book value of total assets; Tobin’s Qt-1: Tobin’s Q of previous year; lnMKTCAP: the natural logarithm of market 
capitalisation;  lnTA: the natural logarithm of total assets;  SHARE: the average percentage of RMC members shareholding; Tenure: average 
number of years as a board member of a firm; RMC Tenure: average years of risk management experience of RMC members; Total Quali: 
the average number of qualifications held by RMC members; Exp: the average amount of experience of RMC members; RMC: dummy 
variable, taking a rate of 1 when firms had a separate RMC, 0 when firms had a combined RMC 
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Table 5.15: Random effects regressions with robust estimation – RMC human capital 
and the likelihood of financial distress  
   Two-tailed tests significant at p<0.01***; p<0.05**; p≤ 0.10* 
 
 PBANK 
Coef.(z) 
Model 1a 
PBANK 
Coef.(z) 
Model 1b 
PBANK 
Coef.(z) 
Model 2 
Naïve 
Coef.(z) 
Model 1a 
Naïve 
Coef.(z) 
Model 1b 
Naïve 
Coef.(z) 
Model 2 
RMCHC 0.013 0.020 - -1.219 -2.103 - 
 (0.88) (1.19)  (-2.00)** (-2.97)***  
RMCHC* 
STDDEV 
- 0.001 - - -0.034 - 
 (0.97)   (-2.45)**  
PBANKt-1 0.039 0.039 0.032 - - - 
 (3.24)*** (3.26)*** (2.62)***    
lnMKTCAP -0.452 
(-6.73)*** 
-0.450 
(-6.67)*** 
-0.474 
(-7.08)*** 
-2.403 
(-1.38) 
-2.370 
(-1.36) 
-1.995 
(-1.07) 
STDDEV 0.001 
(0.40) 
0.001 
(0.70) 
0.001 
(0.96) 
0.058 
(1.70)* 
0.040 
(1.12) 
0.072 
(1.94)* 
RMC -0.008 
(-0.41) 
-0.009 
(-0.45) 
-0.015 
(-0.74) 
-0.367 
(-0.67) 
-0.335 
(-0.62) 
-0.409 
(-0.71) 
INDEP 0.029 
(1.02) 
0.028 
(0.99) 
0.048 
(1.65)* 
0.484 
(0.51) 
0.566 
(0.59) 
-0.203 
(-0.19) 
CEODUAL -0.033 
(-0.96) 
-0.034 
(-1.00) 
-0.028 
(-0.86) 
-2.100 
(-1.77)* 
-1.816 
(-1.54) 
-1.776 
(-1.42) 
BRDSIZE -0.200 
(-3.54)*** 
-0.202 
(-3.57)*** 
-0.225 
(-3.78)*** 
0.227 
(0.11) 
0.417 
(0.21) 
0.231 
(0.11) 
LEV 1.022 
(32.06)*** 
1.023 
(31.86)*** 
1.038 
(33.29)*** 
3.367 
(3.75)*** 
3.436 
(3.83)*** 
3.534 
(3.70)*** 
MTB -0.030 
(-16.99)*** 
-0.030 
(-16.84)*** 
-0.029 
(-16.50)*** 
-0.153 
(-2.46)** 
-0.164 
(-2.64)*** 
-0.148 
(-2.24)** 
Tenure - - 0.036 - - 0.815 
   (0.94)   (0.65) 
RMC Tenure - - 0.008 - - 0.602 
   (0.26)   (0.57) 
Exp - - -0.000 - - -0.086 
   (-0.23)   (-1.23) 
Quali - - -0.009 - - 0.332 
   (-1.08)   (1.22) 
SHARE - - -0.314 - - -3.759 
   (-1.54)   (-0.56) 
CONS 0.083 
(0.45) 
0.071 
(0.38) 
0.089 
 (0.46) 
-5.249 
(-1.00) 
-4.478 
(-0.85) 
-9.315 
(-1.58) 
Year fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed 
effects          
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 
No. of firms 
1305 
355 
1305 
355 
1158 
336 
1362 
365 
1362 
365 
1211 
345 
Wald chi2 1716.90 1713.06 1809.49 190.92 197.69 165.28 
Adjusted R2 0.55 0.55 0.61 0.13 0.13 0.13 
Highest VIF 9.17  8.23 9.15  8.82 
Lowest VIF 1.08  1.09 1.12  1.11 
 
Notes:  STDDEV: total risk calculated as the standard deviation of a firm’s daily stock returns for each fiscal year; INDEP: the 
percentage of board members who were independent calculated as the independent board total/total number of board; LEV: the financial 
leverage of the firm, computed as total liabilities to total assets; MTB: market to book ratio. The ratio of year-end market capitalisation 
to total common equity;  CEODUAL: dummy variable, taking a rate of 1 if the CEO was also the chair, 0 otherwise; BRDSIZE: number 
of board members; PBANK(-Z-Score): probability of financial distress calculated using Altman Z-Score; PBANKt-1(-Z-Score t-1): 
Altman Z-Score of previous year; Naïve: the probability of bankruptcy using the Naïve model developed by Bharath and Shumway, 
(2004);  lnMKTCAP: the natural logarithm of market capitalisation;  lnTA: the natural logarithm of total assets;  SHARE: the average 
percentage of RMC members shareholding; Tenure: average number of years as a board member of a firm; RMC Tenure: average years 
of risk management experience of RMC members; Quali: the average number of qualifications held by RMC members; Exp: the average 
amount of experience of RMC members; RMC: dummy variable, taking a rate of 1 when firms had a separate RMC, 0 when firms had 
a combined RMC. 
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5.3.3 Model 2 
This study used RMC tenure, board tenure, average number of qualifications (diploma, 
bachelor, masters, PhD, MBA, CA/CPA), average amount of experience (industry, financial, 
management, governance, accounting, auditing, and tax experience), and RMC share 
ownership as independent RMC human capital variables to examine the relationship between 
those five RMC human capital characteristics and firms’ management of risk in terms of firm 
performance and likelihood of financial distress to test hypotheses 5 and 6. Specifically, board 
tenure, RMC tenure, and RMC’s share ownership were recognised as firm-specific human 
capital, since they were deemed to be the expertise derived from the skills and knowledge 
gained in a position specific to the firm, whereas the number of qualifications and amount of 
experience were identified as general human capital, because they could be valued by all 
potential employers and produce value in different firm settings. 
Univariate test  
Before running regressions to test the hypothesis of this study, some preliminary 
univariate tests were conducted (i.e., correlation) in order to gain a better understanding of the 
data and to provide preliminary results regarding the association between these five individual 
RMC human capital characteristics, firm performance, and the likelihood of financial distress.  
Correlation  
The results of correlations relating to the individual RMC human capital characteristics 
are shown in Tables 5.16 and 5.17. Specifically, Table 5.16 provides the correlation between 
individual RMC human capital characteristics and firm performance.  
The results show that RMC tenure and board tenure were significantly and positively 
related to ROA (p <0.01), whereas the average number of qualifications (Quali), amount of 
experience (Exp), and share ownership of RMC members (SHARE) were negatively associated 
with ROA.  
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In terms of Tobin’s Q, the results were contrary to expectation. The results reveal that 
Tobin’s Q was positively related to the average amount of experiences (Exp), qualifications 
(Quali) (p<0.01), and share ownership of RMC members (SHARE), and negatively correlated 
with RMC tenure. There was no significant relationship between tenure and Tobin’s Q.  
Table 5.17 indicates the correlation between individual RMC human capital 
characteristic and the likelihood of financial distress. The results show that there was a negative 
relationship between RMC tenure and Naïve (p<0.01). However, there was no significant 
relationship between Naïve and board tenure (Tenure). Moreover, the average number of 
qualifications and amount of experience did not show significant relationships with Naïve. In 
addition, firm risk was positively related to the likelihood of financial distress (Naïve) 
(p<0.01), whereas firm size was negatively related to the likelihood of financial distress 
(Naïve) (p<0.05). 
In terms of Z-Score, RMC members’ share ownership (p<0.01) and tenure (p<0.01) were 
significantly and negatively related to Z-Score. RMC tenure, RMC members’ average amount 
of experience, and number of qualifications were not significantly related to Z-Score.  
These results required further investigation in the multiple regressions. Given that some 
of the correlation coefficients among the independent variables were quite high, variance 
inflation factors (VIF) were conducted to ensure multicollinearity did not impact the results of 
the regression models.  
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Table 5.16: Correlation statistics – firm performance and RMC human capital (individual) 
Variables  ROA ROAt-1 Tobin’s 
Q 
Tobin’s 
Qt-1 
MKTCAP GRTH BRDSIZE LEV STDDEV INDEP SHARE Tenure RMC 
Tenure 
Quali Exp 
ROA 1 
ROAt-1 0.279** 1 
Tobin’s Q -0.035 0.001 1 
Tobin’s Qt-1 0.136** 0.216** 0.040 1 
MKTCAP 0.267** 0.760** 0.032 0.226** 1 
GRTH -0.042 0.011 0.742** 0.043 0.081** 1 
BRDSIZE 0.016 0.019 0.009 -0.051 -0.224** 0.008 1 
LEV -0.005 -0.020 -0.006 0.118** -0.365** -0.009 0.528** 1 
STDDEV -0.058* -0.044 0.333** -0.012 -0.018 0.557** 0.004 -0.005 1 
INDEP -0.002 0.005 0.031 0.039 0.006 0.064* -0.129** -0.008 0.116** 1 
SHARE -0.127** -0.080** 0.249** -0.022    -0.040 0.311** -0.103** -0.085** 0.458** 0.272** 1 
Tenure 0.094** 0.050 -0.005 0.014 0.028 -0.041 0.419** -0.118** -0.066* -0.056* -0.056* 1 
RMC Tenure 0.486** 0.047 -0.107** 0.060* 0.068* -0.171** 0.010 -0.021 -0.304** -0.041 -0.264** 0.127** 1 
Quali -0.068* 0.022 0.175** -0.030 0.062* 0.205** 0.040 -0.044 0.154** 0.003 -0.195** -0.008 -0.162** 1 
 
Exp -0.069* 0.019 0.142** -0.023 0.044 0.209** -0.044 -0.016 0.342** -0.001 0.088** -0.084** -0.116** -0.057* 1 
 Two-tailed test significant at: ** p<0.01; *p<0.05 
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Table 5.17: Correlation statistics – the likelihood of financial distress (NAÏVE) and RM human capital (individual) 
Variables  Z-Score Z-Scoret-1 Naïve MKTCAP GRTH BRDSIZE LEV STDDEV INDEP SHARE Tenure RMC 
Tenure 
Quali Exp 
Z-Score 1 
Z-Scoret-1 0.035 1 
Naïve 0.015 -0.158** 1 
MKTCAP -0.363** 0.181** -0.058* 1 
GRTH -0.009 0.028 0.053* 0.081** 1 
BRDSIZE 0.528** -0.043 0.042 -0.224** 0.008 1 
LEV 1.000** 0.057* 0.015 -0.365** -0.009 0.528** 1 
STDDEV -0.005** -0.012 0.127** -0.018 0.557** 0.004 -0.005 1 
INDEP -0.008 0.054 0.043 0.006 0.064* -0.129** -0.008 0.116** 1 
SHARE -0.085** -0.052 0.037 -0.040 0.311** -0.103** -0.085** 0.458** 0.272** 1 
Tenure -0.118** -0.013 0.013 0.028 -0.041 0.419** -0.118** -0.066* -0.056* -0.056* 1 
RMC Tenure -0.021 0.179** -0.105** 0.068* -0.171** 0.010 -0.021 -0.304** -0.041 -0.264** 0.127** 1 
Quali -0.044 -0.007 0.001 0.062* 0.205** 0.040 -0.044 0.154** 0.003 -0.195** -0.008 -0.162** 1 
 
Exp -0.016 -0.017 0.061* 0.044 0.209** -0.044 -0.016 0.342** -0.001 0.088** -0.084** -0.116** -0.057* 1 
Two-tailed test significant at: ** p<0.01; *p<0.05 
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Multiple regressions 
Following the preliminary univariate tests, multiple regressions were used to determine 
the association between the individual RMC human capital characteristics and firms’ 
management of risk in terms of firm performance and probability of bankruptcy by testing the 
fifth and sixth hypotheses. Regression analysis was used in the panel data. The results of testing 
the fifth and sixth hypotheses using random effects models are reported in Tables 5.14 and 
5.15. The details of the results are discussed below.  
Human capital variables  
Firm-specific human capital – RMC tenure, board tenure, and RMC share ownership 
RMC members’ board tenure was significantly and negatively related to firms’ market 
performance (Tobin’s Q) only, in contrast to H6 (a). Board tenure was not significantly related 
to accounting performance (ROA) and the likelihood of financial distress (Z-Score and Naïve), 
which is consistent with previous studies (e.g. Wulf and Singh, 2011). RMC share ownership 
was significantly and positively related to accounting performance (ROA), indicating that firms 
that increase the proportion of shares held by the RMC would increase the firms’ accounting 
performance. However, RMC share ownership was not significantly associated with market 
performance (Tobin’s Q) and the likelihood of financial distress (Z-Score and Naïve). In 
addition, RMC tenure did not show any significant relationship with firm performance (ROA 
and Tobin’s Q) and the likelihood of financial distress (Z-Score and Naïve).  
General human capital – qualifications and experience 
In terms of general human capital, the results show that average experience (Exp) was 
significantly and positively associated with firms’ accounting performance (ROA) (p<0.01), 
suggesting that RMC members with more experience increased firms’ accounting 
performance, in contrast to H6 (b). However, average experience (Exp) was not significantly 
related to market performance (Tobin’s Q) and the likelihood of financial distress (Z-Score and 
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Naïve). In addition, the average number of qualifications (Quali) had no significant relationship 
with firm performance (ROA and Tobin’s Q) and the likelihood of financial distress (Z-Score 
and Naïve).  
In conclusion, these results show that average experience, as general human capital, was 
positively related to firms’ accounting performance. Board tenure, as a type of firm-specific 
human capital, was negatively associated with firms’ market performance, which disproved 
H5. The results show firm-specific and general human capital did not have any significant 
association with the likelihood of financial distress, which also refuted H6. 
Other variables 
The results show that leverage was negatively related to market-based firm performance 
(Tobin’s Q) and positively related to the likelihood of financial distress (Z-Score). Firm risk 
was negatively related to both accounting and market performance. Prior years’ accounting 
performance (ROAt-1) was positively related to the accounting performance in the current year 
(ROA). Similarly, firms with high past market performance in the prior year tended to have a 
high level of market performance in the following year. Firm size (MKTCAP) was positively 
related to accounting performance (ROA) and negatively related to the likelihood of financial 
distress, measured by Z-Score. Firm size (lnTA) was negatively related to market performance 
(Tobin’s Q). CEO duality (CEODUAL), and RMC members’ share ownership (SHARE) 
showed no significant relationship with firm performance (ROA and Tobin’s Q) and the 
likelihood of financial distress (Z-Score and Naïve).  
In terms of multicollinearity, the results show that all of the VIF values were smaller than 
10 for the regression models, suggesting multicollinearity is not an issue in the analysis 
(Belsley, Kuh and Welsch, 1980). 
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5.4 SUMMARY OF REGRESSION RESULTS 
Summary of relationships between RMC human capital and independent variables 
Research Hypotheses Results 
H1(a) There is a positive association between risk and 
performance for firms that have a RMC 
Not Significant 
H1(b) There is a positive association between risk and 
performance for firms that have a separate RMC 
Supported 
H2 (a) There is a negative association between risk and the 
likelihood of financial distress for firms that have a 
RMC 
Not Significant 
H2 (b) There is a negative association between risk and the 
likelihood of financial distress for firms that have a 
separate RMC 
Not Significant 
H3 There is a positive association between RMC human 
capital and firm performance 
Supported 
H4 There is a negative association between the probability 
of financial distress and RMC human capital. 
Supported  
H5 (a) Firm performance is positively associated with RMC 
firm-specific human capital. 
Not supported 
H5 (b) Firm performance is negatively associated with RMC 
general human capital.  
Not supported 
H6 (a) The probability of bankruptcy is negatively associated 
with RMC firm-specific human capital.  
Not Significant 
H6 (b) The probability of bankruptcy is positively associated 
with RMC general human capital.  
Not Significant 
 
 
5.5 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
5.5.1 Sub-sample testing, excluding financials and utilities  
For firms within regulated industries – financial and utilities firms, their risk governance 
is likely to be significantly influenced by regulatory oversight, and risk compliance and risk 
reporting (Amran, Bin and Hassan, 2009; Jia, Munro and Buckby, 2016). As a result, it was 
necessary to re-run the regression analysis by excluding those firms from the sample. 
The results of regressions using sample firms excluding financials and utilities are 
presented in Tables 5.18 and 5.19, which demonstrate the results of testing the relationship 
between the existence of RMC and firms’ management of risk, in terms of firm performance 
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and the likelihood of financial distress. Tables 5.20 and 5.21 show the results of testing the 
association between RMC human capital and firms’ management of risk.  
Consistent with the full sample results, the results suggest that the existence of a separate 
RMC moderated the relationship between risk and firms’ accounting performance. RMC 
human capital was significantly and positively related to accounting and market performance 
(p<0.01), and significantly and negatively related to the likelihood of financial distress (Naïve). 
Moreover, after including the interaction term of RMC human capital*risk 
(RMCHC*STDDEV), the results show the association between risk (STDDEV) and the 
likelihood of financial distress (Naïve) was moderated by firms’ RMC human capital, as 
STDDEV*RMCHC was negatively associated with a firms’ likelihood of financial distress 
(Naïve) (B = -0.05; p<0.05). In terms of individual RMC human capital characteristics, the 
results consistently show that share ownership of RMC members (SHARE) and the average 
amount of experience (EXP) of RMC members were positively associated with firm’s 
accounting performance (p<0.05).  
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Table 5.18: Random effects with robust estimation. The existence of RMC and firm 
performance – excluding financials and utilities  
  Two-tailed tests significant at p<0.01***; p<0.05**; p≤ 0.10* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ROA 
Coef.(z) 
 
 
lnTobin’s Q 
Coef.(z) 
 
 RMC                      SRMC RMC       SRMC  
RMC 0.013 
(1.81)* 
-0.035 
(-2.69)*** 
- - 0.000 
(0.09) 
0.001 
(0.08) 
- - 
SRMC - - 0.011 -0.011 - - 0.002 0.001 
   (1.53) (-0.76)   (0.95) (0.19) 
RMC* 
STDDEV 
- 0.003 
(4.53)*** 
- - - -0.000 
(-0.13) 
- - 
SRMC* 
STDDEV 
- 
 
- - 0.002 
(2.01)** 
- - - 0.000 
(0.34) 
ROAt-1 0.230 
(13.17) *** 
0.229 
(13.19)*** 
0.229 
(4.37)*** 
0.230 
(4.36)*** 
- - - - 
lnTobin’s Qt-1 - - - - 0.062 
(4.05)*** 
0.065 
(4.17)*** 
0.065 
(4.18)*** 
0.065 
(4.15)*** 
lnMKTCAP 0.091 
(2.82)*** 
0.083 
(2.60)*** 
0.090 
(2.81)** 
0.095 
(2.93)*** 
-  -  -  - 
lnTA -  -  -  - -0.071 -0.076 -0.076 -0.076 
     (-2.85)*** (-2.96)*** (-2.98)*** (-2.98)*** 
STDDEV -0.003 
(-5.12)*** 
-0.005 
(-6.81)*** 
-0.003 
(-1.77)* 
-0.003 
(-1.97)** 
-0.000 
(-0.41) 
-0.000 
(-0.24) 
-0.000 
(-0.40) 
-0.000 
(-0.41) 
INDEP 0.003 
(1.54) 
0.023 
(1.24) 
0.031 
(1.29) 
0.030 
(1.26) 
0.002 
(0.38) 
0.002 
(0.35) 
0.002 
(0.37) 
0.002 
(0.37) 
CEODUAL 0.031 
(1.92)* 
0.031 
(1.93)* 
0.029 
(2.06)** 
0.029 
(1.99)** 
-0.001 
(-0.26) 
-0.001 
(-0.26) 
-0.001 
(-0.33) 
-0.000 
(-0.33) 
BRDSIZE 0.003 
(0.04) 
0.018 
(0.27) 
0.001 
(0.16) 
0.004 
(0.03) 
0.028 
(1.70)* 
0.028 
(1.72)* 
0.028 
(1.72)* 
0.029 
(1.72)* 
LEV -0.140 
(-5.12)*** 
-0.144 
(-6.95)*** 
-0.141 
(-0.98) 
-0.140 
(-0.97) 
-0.088 
(-3.98)*** 
-0.088 
(-3.98)*** 
-0.088 
(-3.98)*** 
-0.088 
(-3.98)*** 
MTB 0.049 
(2.19)** 
0.058 
(2.59)*** 
0.051 
(1.61) 
0.050 
(1.50) 
0.412 
(26.31)*** 
0.412 
(26.40)*** 
0.412 
(26.23)*** 
0.412 
(26.21)*** 
CONS -0.163 
(-1.18) 
-0.144 
(-1.05) 
-0.155 
(-2.02)** 
-0.161 
(-0.60) 
1.441 
(19.33)*** 
1.441 
(19.30)*** 
1.441 
(19.31)*** 
1.441 
(19.30)*** 
Year fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed 
effects          
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 
No. of firms 
1705 
466 
1705 
466 
1705 
466 
1705 
466 
1703 
466 
1703 
466 
1703 
466 
1703 
466 
Wald chi2 395.88 426.26 179.05 183.33 3939.00 3947.08 3976.54 3977.01 
Adjusted R2 
Highest VIF 
0.30 
8.90 
0.30 
8.94 
0.30 
8.90 
0.30 
8.91 
0.88 
8.96 
0.88 
8.98 
0.88 
8.94 
0.88 
8.94 
Lowest VIF 1.09 1.09 1.08 1.08 1.09 1.09 1.09 1.09 
 
Note: STDDEV: total risk calculated as the standard deviation of a firm’s daily stock returns for each fiscal year; INDEP: the percentage 
of board members who were independent calculated as the independent board total/total number of board; LEV: the financial leverage 
of the firm, computed as total liabilities to total assets; lnMKTCAP: the natural logarithm of market capitalisation;  lnTA: the natural 
logarithm of total assets; MTB: market to book ratio. The ratio of year-end market capitalisation to total common equity; BRDSIZE: 
number of board members; RMC*risk: interaction variables of RMC and risk; SRMC*risk: interaction variables of separate RMC and 
risk; ROAt: current year return on assets; ROAt-1 : prior year return on assets; Tobin’s Q:  market measure of wealth, measured by 
market value of firm + debt/book value of total assets; Tobin’s Qt-1: Tobin’s Q of previous year; CEODUAL: dummy variable, taking 
a rate of 1 if the CEO was also the chair, 0 otherwise;  SRMC: dummy variable, taking a rate of 1 when firms had a separate RMC, 0 
otherwise;  RMC: dummy variable, taking a rate of 1 when firms had a RMC, 0 otherwise. 
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Table 5.19: Random effects with robust estimation. The existence of a RMC and the likelihood of 
financial distress – excluding financials and utilities 
  Two tailed tests significant at p<0.01***; p<0.05**; p≤ 0.10* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 PBANK 
Coef.(z) 
Naïve 
 RMC SRMC RMC SRMC 
RMC -0.004 
(-0.65) 
-0.007 
(-0.58)** 
- - -0.005 
(-0.56 
-0.014 
(-0.87) 
- - 
SRMC  
- 
- 
 
-0.008 
(-0.80) 
-0.011 
(-0.57) 
- 
 
- 
 
-0.014 
(-0.99) 
-0.027 
(-0.95) 
RMC* 
STDDEV 
 
- 
 0.000 
(0.26) 
- - - 0.002 
(1.45) 
- - 
SRMC* 
STDDEV 
 
- 
- - 0.000 
(0.19) 
- - - 0.001 
(0.52) 
PBANK-1 0.073 
(6.69)*** 
0.073 
(6.67)*** 
0.073 
(6.68)*** 
0.073 
(6.68)*** 
- - - - 
lnMKTCAP -0.035 
(-1.05) 
-0.036 
(-1.07) 
-0.035 
(-1.05) 
-0.035 
(-1.04) 
-0.020 
(-0.49) 
-0.024 
(-0.57) 
-0.017 
(-0.41) 
-0.016 
(-0.39) 
STDDEV 0.000 
(0.31) 
0.000 
(0.40) 
0.000 
(0.29) 
0.000 
(0.31) 
0.001 
(0.97) 
0.000 
(0.42) 
0.000 
(0.94) 
0.000 
(0.89) 
INDEP -0.001 
(-0.04) 
-0.001 
(-0.06) 
-0.001 
(-0.04) 
-0.001 
(-0.04) 
-0.012 
(-0.53) 
-0.015 
(-0.62) 
-0.012 
(-0.53) 
-0.012 
(-0.52) 
CEODUAL -0.001 
(-0.08) 
-0.001 
(-0.08) 
-0.002 
(-0.14) 
-0.002 
(-0.14) 
-0.012 
(-0.59) 
-0.012 
(-0.59) 
-0.011 
(-0.56) 
-0.011 
(-0.56) 
BRDSIZE -0.082 
(-1.37) 
-0.081 
(-1.35) 
-0.082 
(-1.37) 
-0.082 
(-1.36) 
0.045 
(0.54) 
0.051 
(0.61) 
0.040 
(0.48) 
0.042 
(0.51) 
LEV 0.700 
(32.90)*** 
0.695 
(32.84)*** 
0.670 
(32.91)*** 
0.700 
(32.90)*** 
0.158 
(6.03)*** 
0.155 
(5.92)*** 
0.159 
(6.08)*** 
0.159 
(6.09)*** 
MTB -0.493 
(-23.01)*** 
-0.492 
(-22.91)*** 
-0.493 
(-23.02)*** 
-0.493 
(-23.01)*** 
-0.136 
(-4.81)*** 
-0.133 
(-4.68)*** 
-0.137 
(-4.83)*** 
-0.137 
(-4.83)*** 
CONS -0.748 
(-5.75)*** 
-0.747 
(-5.73)*** 
-0.750 
(-5.77)*** 
-0.752 
(-5.77)*** 
0.105 
(0.61) 
0.114 
(0.66) 
0.112 
(0.65) 
0.107 
(0.62) 
Year fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry 
fixed effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 
No. of firms 
1628 
434 
1628 
434 
1628 
434 
1628 
434 
1705 
442 
1705 
442 
1705 
442 
1705 
442 
Wald chi2 2448.00 2446.88 2448.56 2446.51 145.67 147.89 146.35 146.56 
Adjusted R2 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 
Highest VIF 9.53 9.53 9.50 9.50 8.86 8.86 8.87 8.87 
Lowest VIF 1.09 1.09 1.09 1.09 1.09 1.09 1.09 1.09 
 
Note: STDDEV: total risk calculated as the standard deviation of a firm’s daily stock returns for each fiscal year; INDEP: the 
percentage of board members who were independent calculated as the independent board total/total number of board; LEV: the 
financial leverage of the firm, computed as total liabilities to total assets; MTB: market to book ratio. The ratio of year-end market 
capitalisation to total common equity; BRDSIZE: number of board members; Z-Score: probability of bankruptcy calculated using 
Altman Z-Score; Z-Scoret-1: Altman Z-Score of previous year;  Naïve: the probability of bankruptcy using the Naïve model developed 
by Bharath and Shumway, (2004); lnMKTCAP: the natural logarithm of market capitalisation;  lnTA: the natural logarithm of total assets; 
CEODUAL: dummy variable, taking a rate of 1 if the CEO was also the chair, 0 otherwise; SRMC: dummy variable, taking a rate of 
1 when firms had a separate RMC, 0 otherwise;  RMC: dummy variable, taking a rate of 1 when firms had a RMC, 0 otherwise; Year:  
Year dummy variable 
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Table 5.20: Random effects regressions with robust estimation – RMC human capital and 
firm performance – excluding financials and utilities 
  Two-tailed tests significant at p<0.01***; p<0.05**; p≤ 0.10* 
 
 ROA 
Coef.(z) 
Model 1a 
ROA 
Coef.(z) 
Model 1b 
ROA 
Coef.(z) 
Model 2 
lnTobin’s Q 
Coef.(z) 
Model 1a 
lnTobin’s Q 
Coef.(z) 
Model 1b 
lnTobin’s Q 
Coef.(z) 
Model 2 
RMCHC 0.024 0.029 - 0.003 0.003 - 
 (2.82)*** (3.05)***  (2.14)** (1.99)**  
RMCHC* 
STDDEV 
- 0.000 - - -0.000 - 
 (1.18)   (-0.01)  
ROA t-1 
 
0.180 
(13.61)*** 
0.177 
(13.32)*** 
0.175 
(12.79)*** 
- - - 
Tobin’s Q t-1 
 
- - - 0.087 
(2.57)*** 
0.086 
(2.55)** 
0.074 
(2.16)** 
lnMKTCAP 0.133 
(4.09)*** 
0.132 
(4.07)*** 
0.143 
(4.20)*** 
- - - 
lnTA - - - -0.186 
(-6.21)*** 
-0.187 
(-6.20)*** 
-0.182 
(-5.85)*** 
STDDEV -0.002 
(-3.40)*** 
-0.002 
(-2.93)*** 
-0.002 
(-2.77)*** 
-0.001 
(-3.09)*** 
-0.001 
(-1.55) 
-0.002 
(-3.95)*** 
RMC -0.002 
(-0.22) 
-0.003 
(-0.27) 
-0.003 
(-0.26) 
-0.005 
(-0.57) 
-0.004 
(-0.46) 
-0.006 
(-0.69) 
INDEP -0.012 
(-0.78) 
-0.013 
(-0.81) 
-0.010 
(-0.58) 
-0.012 
(-1.03) 
-0.013 
(-1.10) 
-0.012 
(-0.96) 
CEODUAL 0.016 
(0.98) 
0.015 
(0.92) 
0.018 
(1.12) 
0.015 
(1.35) 
0.015 
(1.36) 
0.012 
(1.02) 
BRDSIZE 0.041 
(1.36) 
0.042 
(1.37) 
0.043 
(1.31) 
0.041 
(1.80)* 
0.042 
(1.85)* 
0.046 
(1.89)* 
LEV 0.010 
(0.67) 
0.009 
(0.60) 
0.009 
(0.56) 
-0.084 
(-6.77)*** 
-0.085 
(-6.80)*** 
-0.083 
(-6.59)*** 
MTB 0.002 
(2.60)*** 
0.003 
(2.68)*** 
0.002 
(1.55) 
0.016 
(22.61)*** 
0.016 
(22.67)*** 
0.016 
(21.72)*** 
Tenure - - 0.010 - - -0.015 
   (0.47)   (-1.04) 
RMC tenure - - -0.001 - - -0.017 
   (-0.08)   (-1.32) 
Exp - - 0.002 - - -0.001 
   (2.07)**   (-1.23) 
Quali - - 0.005 - - 0.003 
   (0.97)   (0.75) 
SHARE - - 0.217 - - 0.026 
   (2.15)**   (0.35) 
CONS -0.300 
(-3.28)*** 
-0.306 
(-3.33)*** 
-0.320 
(-3.18)*** 
2.119 
(16.12)*** 
2.120 
(16.05)*** 
2.179 
(15.75)*** 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed 
effects          
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 
No. of firms 
983 
262 
983 
262 
920 
253 
945 
256 
945 
256 
925 
252 
Wald chi2 346.54 347.21 355.08 1258.84 1257.61 1163.19 
Adjusted R2 0.37 0.38 0.38 0.60 0.60 0.61 
Highest VIF 9.33  8.81 8.40  8.78 
Lowest VIF 1.09  1.12 1.10  1.10 
 
Note:  STDDEV: total risk calculated as the standard deviation of a firm’s daily stock returns for each fiscal year; INDEP: the percentage 
of board members who were independent calculated as the independent board total/total number of board; LEV: the financial leverage of 
the firm, computed as total liabilities to total assets; MTB: market to book ratio. The ratio of year-end market capitalisation to total common 
equity; CEODUAL: dummy variable, taking a rate of 1 if the CEO was also the chair, 0 otherwise; BRDSIZE: number of board members; 
ROA: current year return on assets; ROAt-1 : prior year return on assets; Tobin’s Q:  market measure of wealth, measured by market value 
of firm + debt/book value of total assets; Tobin’s Qt-1: Tobin’s Q of previous year; lnMKTCAP: the natural logarithm of market 
capitalisation;  lnTA: the natural logarithm of total assets; SHARE: the average percentage of RMC members shareholding;  Tenure: average 
number of years as a board member of a firm; RMC Tenure: average years of risk management experience of RMC members; Total Quali: 
the average number of qualifications obtained by RMC members; Exp: the average amount of experience obtained by RMC members; 
RMC: dummy variable, taking a rate of 1 when firms had a separate RMC, 0 when firms had a combined RMC 
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Table 5.21: Random effects regressions with robust estimation – RMC human capital and 
the likelihood of financial distress – excluding financials and utilities 
  Two-tailed tests significant at p<0.01***; p<0.05**; p≤ 0.10* 
 
 PBANK 
Coef.(z) 
Model 1a 
PBANK 
Coef.(z) 
Model 1b 
PBANK 
Coef.(z) 
Model 2 
Naïve 
Coef.(z) 
Model 1a 
Naïve 
Coef.(z) 
Model 1b 
Naïve 
Coef.(z) 
Model 2 
RMCHC -0.004 -0.004 - -0.902 -1.943 - 
 (-0.93) (-0.89)  (-1.24) (-2.30)**  
RMCHC* 
STDDEV 
- -0.001 - - -0.037 - 
 (-0.11)   (-2.41)**  
PBANKt-1 0.045 0.045 0.031 - - - 
 (3.10)*** (3.09)*** (2.08)**    
lnMKTCAP -0.380 
(-5.10)*** 
-0.380 
(-5.08)*** 
-0.404 
(-5.31)*** 
-3.379 
(-1.62) 
-3.446 
(-1.65)* 
-2.959 
(-1.35) 
STDDEV 0.001 
(0.28) 
0.000 
(0.04) 
0.000 
(0.22) 
0.052 
(1.30) 
0.028 
(0.67) 
0.062 
(1.46) 
RMC 0.011 
(0.48) 
0.011 
(0.48) 
0.015 
(0.65) 
-0.678 
(-1.02) 
-0.592 
(-0.89) 
-1.010 
(-1.41) 
INDEP 0.109 
(3.24)*** 
0.110 
(3.24)*** 
0.107 
(2.99)*** 
-0.448 
(-0.38) 
-0.350 
(-0.30) 
-0.877 
(-0.69) 
CEODUAL -0.033 
(-1.00) 
-0.033 
(-1.01) 
-0.026 
(-0.78) 
-2.097 
(-1.75)* 
-1.818 
(-1.52) 
-1.845 
(-1.46) 
BRDSIZE -0.168 
(-2.61)*** 
-0.168 
(-2.61)*** 
-0.212 
(-3.11)*** 
-0.741 
(-0.31) 
-0.559 
(-0.24) 
-0.721 
(-0.29) 
LEV 1.050 
(29.92)*** 
1.050 
(29.91)*** 
1.050 
(29.70)*** 
2.993 
(2.68)*** 
3.050 
(2.72)*** 
3.122 
(2.69)*** 
MTB -0.030 
(-15.47)*** 
-0.030 
(-15.45)*** 
-0.029 
(-14.30)*** 
-0.154 
(-2.15)** 
-0.167 
(-2.34)*** 
-0.133 
(-1.75)* 
Tenure - - 0.031 - - 0.451 
   (0.73)   (0.31) 
RMC Tenure - - 0.015 - - 1.400 
   (0.42)   (1.14) 
Exp - - 0.001 - - -0.107 
   (0.38)   (-1.27) 
Quali - - -0.008 - - 0.331 
   (-0.81)   (1.04) 
SHARE - - -0.193 - - -9.553 
   (-0.90)   (-1.29) 
CONS -0.318 
(-1.53) 
-0.318 
(-1.53) 
-0.263 
 (-0.17) 
1.052 
(0.17) 
2.268 
(0.36) 
-2.962 
(-0.43) 
Year fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed 
effects          
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 
No. of firms 
948 
257 
948 
257 
902 
249 
984 
261 
984 
261 
922 
252 
Wald chi2 1448.82 1447.26 1400.02 116.40 123.04 113.84 
Adjusted R2 0.60 0.57 0.59 0.11 0.12 0.12 
Highest VIF 9.17  8.23 9.15  8.82 
Lowest VIF 1.08  1.09 1.12  1.11 
 
Note:  STDDEV: total risk calculated as the standard deviation of a firm’s daily stock returns for each fiscal year; INDEP: the percentage 
of board members who were independent calculated as the independent board total/total number of board; LEV: the financial leverage of 
the firm, computed as total liabilities to total assets; MTB: market to book ratio. The ratio of year-end market capitalisation to total common 
equity;  CEODUAL: dummy variable, taking a rate of 1 if the CEO was also the chair, 0 otherwise; BRDSIZE: number of board members; 
PBANK(-Z-Score): probability of financial distress calculated using Altman Z-Score; PBANKt-1(-Z-Score t-1): Altman Z-Score of previous 
year; Naïve: the probability of bankruptcy using the Naïve model developed by Bharath and Shumway, (2004);  lnMKTCAP: the natural 
logarithm of market capitalisation;  lnTA: the natural logarithm of total assets; SHARE: the average percentage of RMC members 
shareholding;  Tenure: average number of years as a board member of a firm; RMC Tenure: average years of risk management experience 
of RMC members; Quali: the average number of qualifications obtained by RMC members; Exp: the average amount of experience of  
RMC members; RMC: dummy variable, taking a rate of 1 when firms had a separate RMC, 0 when firms had a combined RMC. 
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5.5.2 Fixed effects regression models 
This study adopted fixed effects regression models, because fixed effects models control 
for the effects of time-invariant variables with time-invariant effects and are commonly used 
to mitigate potential omitted variable bias in accounting studies. In addition, this study 
conducted the Hausman (1978) specification test, which showed that the null hypothesis was 
rejected (p=0.00) for all regression models. This provided evidence of using fixed effects 
models as an alternative robustness check method. The results of regressions using fixed effects 
models with robust estimation are presented in the following tables. Tables 5.22 and 5.23 show 
the results of testing the relationship between the existence of RMC and firms’ management of 
risk, in terms of firm performance and the likelihood of financial distress. Tables 5.24 and 5.25 
show the results of testing the association between RMC human capital and firms’ management 
of risk.  
The results remained constant when using fixed effect models. In relation to RMC 
existence and firms’ management of risk, the results show that the interaction variable 
(SRMC*STDDEV) was significantly and positively related to firms’ accounting performance.  
As for RMC human capital, consistent with random effects regression results, RMC 
human capital was positively related to firm accounting-based performance (ROA) and firms’ 
market performance (Tobin’s Q) and negatively related to Naïve, suggesting there was a 
negative relationship between the RMC human capital factor score and the likelihood of 
financial distress. The association between risk (STDDEV) and the likelihood of financial 
distress (Naïve) was moderated by firms’ RMC human capital, as STDDEV*RMCHC was 
negatively associated with firms’ likelihood of financial distress.  
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Table 5.22: Fixed effects with robust estimation. The existence of a RMC and firm performance 
Two-tailed tests significant at p<0.01***; p<0.05**; p≤ 0.10* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ROA 
Coef.(z) 
 
 
lnTobin’s Q 
Coef.(z) 
 
 RMC                      SRMC RMC       SRMC  
RMC 0.006 
(0.85) 
-0.004 
(-0.33) 
- - 0.001 
(0.71) 
0.001 
(0.42) 
- - 
SRMC - - 0.014 -0.032 - - 0.002 -0.001 
   (1.53) (-1.76)*   (0.63) (-0.24) 
RMC*STDDEV - 0.0009 - - - 0.00 - - 
  (1.08)    (0.02)   
SRMC*STDDEV - 
 
- - 0.005 
(2.98)*** 
- - - 0.0003 
(0.66) 
ROAt-1 0.098 
(5.07) *** 
0.097 
(5.01) *** 
0.099 
(5.11)*** 
0.101 
(5.22)*** 
- - - - 
lnTobin’s Qt-1 - - - - 0.074 
(5.42)*** 
0.074 
(5.42)*** 
0.074 
(5.44)*** 
0.073 
(5.39)*** 
lnMKTCAP 0.060 
(1.14) 
0.055 
(1.06) 
0.058 
(1.11) 
0.059 
(1.14) 
-  -  -  - 
lnTA     -0.173 -0.173 -0.173 -0.172 
     (-8.64)*** (-8.61)*** (-8.63)*** (-8.61)*** 
STDDEV -0.003 
(-4.76)*** 
-0.003 
(-4.34)*** 
-0.003 
(-4.79)*** 
-0.003 
(-5.01)*** 
-0.0003 
(-1.57) 
-0.0003 
(-1.24) 
-0.0003 
(-1.58) 
-0.0003 
(-1.63) 
INDEP 0.007 
(0.38) 
0.006 
(0.34) 
0.007 
(0.38) 
0.008 
(0.43) 
0.002 
(0.38) 
0.002 
(0.38) 
0.002 
(0.37) 
0.002 
(0.38) 
CEODUAL 0.046 
(2.63)*** 
0.046 
(2.62)*** 
0.046 
(2.59)** 
0.046 
(2.58)** 
-0.003 
(-0.49) 
-0.003 
(-0.49) 
-0.003 
(-0.51) 
-0.003 
(-0.51) 
BRDSIZE -0.078 
(-1.26) 
-0.07 
(-1.17) 
-0.075 
(-1.22) 
-0.06 
(-1.05) 
0.029 
(1.60) 
0.029 
(1.60) 
0.030 
(1.62) 
0.030 
(1.66)* 
LEV -0.305 
(-13.00)*** 
-0.305 
(-13.02)*** 
-0.305 
(-13.01)*** 
-0.31 
(-13.10)*** 
-0.062 
(-9.10)*** 
-0.062 
(-9.10)*** 
-0.062 
(-9.09)*** 
-0.062 
(-9.10)*** 
MTB 0.090 
(3.22)*** 
0.093 
(3.29)*** 
0.09 
(3.23)*** 
0.089 
(3.18)*** 
0.375 
(55.16)*** 
0.375 
(55.14)*** 
0.375 
(55.13)*** 
0.375 
(55.13)*** 
CONS 0.163 
(0.99) 
0.164 
(0.99) 
0.069 
(0.49) 
0.048 
(0.34) 
1.677 
(24.43)*** 
1.717 
(23.45)*** 
1.676 
(24.41)*** 
1.714 
(23.42)*** 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed 
effects          
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 
No. of firms 
2312 
583 
2312 
583 
2312 
583 
2312 
583 
2310 
583 
2310 
583 
2310 
583 
2310 
583 
Wald chi2 13.38 12.89 13.46 231.33 246.48 236.49 246.46 236.54 
Adjusted R2 
Highest VIF 
0.07 
8.90 
0.07 
8.94 
0.06 
8.90 
0.07 
8.91 
0.76 
8.96 
0.77 
8.98 
0.76 
8.94 
0.77 
8.94 
Lowest VIF 1.09 1.09 1.08 1.08 1.09 1.09 1.09 1.09 
 
Note: STDDEV: total risk calculated as the standard deviation of a firm’s daily stock returns for each fiscal year; INDEP: the percentage 
of board members who were independent calculated as the independent board total/total number of board; LEV: the financial leverage 
of the firm, computed as total liabilities to total assets; lnMKTCAP: the natural logarithm of market capitalisation;  lnTA: the natural 
logarithm of total assets; MTB: market to book ratio. The ratio of year-end market capitalisation to total common equity; BRDSIZE: number 
of board members; RMC*risk: interaction variables of RMC and risk; SRMC*risk: interaction variables of separate RMC and risk; 
ROAt: current year return on assets; ROAt-1: prior year return on assets; Tobin’s Q:  market measure of wealth, measured by market 
value of firm + debt/book value of total assets; Tobin’s Qt-1: Tobin’s Q of previous year; CEODUAL: dummy variable, taking a rate of 
1 if the CEO was also the chair, 0 otherwise;  SRMC: dummy variable, taking a rate of 1 when firms had a separate RMC, 0 otherwise;  
RMC: dummy variable, taking a rate of 1 when firms had a RMC, 0 otherwise. 
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Table 5.23: Fixed effects with robust estimation. The existence of a RMC and the likelihood of 
financial distress  
 Two tailed tests significant at p<0.01***; p<0.05**; p≤ 0.10* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 PBANK 
Coef.(z) 
Naïve  
 RMC SRMC RMC SRMC 
RMC -0.011 
(-1.43) 
-0.022 
(-1.77)* 
- - 0.001 
(0.13) 
-0.008 
(-0.53) 
- - 
SRMC  
- 
- 
 
-0.008 
(-0.79) 
0.0006 
(0.03) 
- 
 
- 
 
-0.011 
(-0.93) 
-0.01 
(-0.38) 
RMC*STDDEV  
- 
 0.001 
(1.15) 
- - - 0.0009 
(0.77) 
- - 
SRMC*STDDE
V 
 
- 
- - -0.001 
(-0.03) 
- - - -0.0002 
(-0.11) 
PBANK-1 0.055 
(4.75)*** 
0.054 
(4.76)*** 
0.055 
(4.76)*** 
0.055 
(4.76)*** 
- - - - 
lnMKTCAP -0.023 
(-0.41) 
-0.028 
(-0.49) 
-0.023 
(-0.41) 
-0.023 
(-0.41) 
0.08 
(1.07) 
0.072 
(1.00) 
0.08 
(1.09) 
0.08 
(1.09) 
STDDEV 0.003 
(3.89)*** 
0.002 
(2.32)** 
0.003 
(3.93)*** 
0.003 
(3.95)*** 
-0.001 
(-1.61) 
-0.002 
(-1.74)* 
-0.001 
(-1.60) 
-0.001 
(-1.59) 
INDEP 0.025 
(1.31) 
0.023 
(1.25) 
0.025 
(1.32) 
0.025 
(1.32) 
-0.022 
(-0.92) 
-0.022 
(-0.95) 
-0.022 
(-0.94) 
-0.02 
(-0.94) 
CEODUAL 0.01 
(0.35) 
0.007 
(0.35) 
0.007 
(0.38) 
0.007 
(0.38) 
-0.01 
(-0.41) 
-0.010 
(-0.42) 
-0.01 
(-0.40) 
-0.01 
(-0.40) 
BRDSIZE -0.09 
(-1.39) 
-0.088 
(-1.29) 
-0.09 
(-1.38) 
-0.095 
(-1.41) 
0.06 
(0.72) 
0.07 
(0.78) 
0.006 
(0.70) 
0.058 
(0.69) 
LEV 0.726 
(25.27)*** 
0.727 
(25.28)*** 
0.726 
(25.24)*** 
0.726 
(25.24)*** 
0.22 
(6.85)*** 
0.22 
(6.83)*** 
0.22 
(6.87)*** 
0.221 
(6.87)*** 
MTB -0.450 
(-14.47)*** 
-0.447 
(-14.34)*** 
-0.45 
(-14.46)*** 
-0.45 
(-14.46)*** 
-0.24 
(-6.36)*** 
-0.242 
(-6.28)*** 
-0.245 
(-6.37)*** 
-0.245 
(-6.37)*** 
CONS -0.860 
(-5.52)*** 
-0.86 
(-5.49)*** 
-0.866 
(-5.56)*** 
-0.94 
(-5.18)*** 
0.158 
(0.66) 
0.149 
(0.66) 
0.151 
(0.67) 
0.152 
(0.67) 
Year fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 
No. of firms 
2235 
571 
2235 
571 
2235 
571 
2235 
571 
2312 
583 
2312 
583 
2312 
583 
2312 
583 
Wald chi2 52.33 50.30 52.22 50.12 12.20 11.72 12.25 11.73 
Adjusted R2 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.05 0.05 0.05 0..05 
Highest VIF 9.53 9.53 9.50 9.50 8.86 8.86 8.87 8.87 
Lowest VIF 1.09 1.09 1.09 1.09 1.09 1.09 1.09 1.09 
 
Note: STDDEV: total risk calculated as the standard deviation of a firm’s daily stock returns for each fiscal year; INDEP: the 
percentage of board members who were independent calculated as the independent board total/total number of board; LEV: the 
financial leverage of the firm, computed as total liabilities to total assets; MTB: market to book ratio. The ratio of year-end market 
capitalisation to total common equity; BRDSIZE: number of board members; Z-Score: probability of bankruptcy calculated using 
Altman Z-Score; Z-Scoret-1: Altman Z-Score of previous year;  Naïve: the probability of bankruptcy using the Naïve model developed 
by Bharath and Shumway, (2004); lnMKTCAP: the natural logarithm of market capitalisation;  lnTA: the natural logarithm of total assets; 
CEODUAL: dummy variable, taking a rate of 1 if the CEO was also the chair, 0 otherwise; SRMC: dummy variable, taking a rate of 1 
when firms had a separate RMC, 0 otherwise;  RMC: dummy variable, taking a rate of 1 when firms had a RMC, 0 otherwise; Year:  
year dummy variable 
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Table 5.24: Fixed effects regressions with robust estimation – RMC human capital and 
firm performance  
   Two-tailed tests significant at p<0.01***; p<0.05**; p≤ 0.10* 
 
 
 
 
 ROA 
Coef.(z) 
Model 1a 
ROA 
Coef.(z) 
Model 1b 
ROA 
Coef.(z) 
Model 2 
lnTobin’s Q 
Coef.(z) 
Model 1a 
lnTobin’s Q 
Coef.(z) 
Model 1b 
lnTobin’s Q 
Coef.(z) 
Model 2 
RMCHC 0.02 0.009 - 0.003 -0.021 - 
 (2.24)*** (0.64)  (2.07)** (-2.06)**  
RMCHC*STDDEV - 0.0006 - - 0.001 - 
  (0.53)   (1.18)  
ROA t-1 
 
0.18 
(5.04)*** 
0.18 
(5.02)*** 
0.18 
(4.99)*** 
- - - 
Tobin’s Q t-1 
 
- - - 0.073 
(2.62)*** 
0.08 
(2.84)*** 
0.07 
(2.26)** 
lnMKTCAP 0.16 
(3.68)*** 
0.16 
(3.65)*** 
0.15 
(3.02)*** 
- - - 
lnTA - - - -0.25 
(-5.30)*** 
-0.24 
(-5.07)*** 
-0.23 
(-4.50)*** 
STDDEV -0.0016 
(-3.44)*** 
-0.002 
(-1.62) 
-0.001 
(-2.66)*** 
-0.0007 
(-2.03)** 
-0.002 
(-1.73)* 
-0.001 
(-2.83)*** 
RMC 0.018 
(1.69)* 
0.017 
(1.57) 
0.03 
(2.03)** 
0.0009 
(0.12) 
0.0009 
(0.11) 
0.006 
(0.62) 
INDEP 0.009 
(1.67)* 
-0.02 
(-1.30) 
0.01 
(1.64) 
-0.019 
(-1.84)* 
-0.02 
(-1.82)* 
-0.02 
(-1.75)* 
CEODUAL 0.003 
(0.20) 
0.004 
(0.22) 
0.005 
(0.31) 
0.013 
(1.05) 
0.01 
(1.03) 
0.015 
(1.19) 
BRDSIZE 0.007 
(0.27) 
0.004 
(0.13) 
0.02 
(0.60) 
0.06 
(2.90)*** 
0.06 
(2.95)*** 
0.077 
(3.11)*** 
LEV -0.026 
(-1.52) 
-0.03 
(-1.50) 
-0.04 
(-1.97)** 
-0.0007 
(-2.03)** 
-0.10 
(-7.76)*** 
-0.11 
(-7.37)*** 
MTB 0.003 
(3.38)*** 
0.003 
(3.33)*** 
0.003 
(2.77)*** 
0.01 
(20.31)*** 
0.014 
(20.19)*** 
0.013 
(18.41)*** 
Tenure - - 0.03 - - -0.06 
          (1.34)   (-3.33)*** 
RMC tenure - - -0.01 - - 0.02 
   (-0.62)   (1.54) 
Exp - - 0.003 - - 0.0005 
   (3.29)***   (0.63) 
Quali - - 0.008 - - 0.006 
   (1.51)   (1.48) 
SHARE - - -0.19 - - 0.035 
   (-1.41)            (0.30) 
CONS -0.30 
(-2.78)*** 
-0.28 
(-2.63)*** 
-0.3 
(-2.37)** 
2.33 
(15.32)** 
2.30 
(15.17)*** 
2.30 
(13.79)*** 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects          Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 
No. of firms 
1361 
367 
1361 
367 
1361 
348 
1359 
365 
1359 
365 
1359 
345 
F statistics 10.96 9.87 8.04 56.17 51.34 37.68 
Adjusted R2 0.22 0.22 0.19 0.48 0.49 0.48 
Highest VIF 9.33  8.81 8.40  8.78 
Lowest VIF 1.09  1.12 1.10  1.10 
 
Notes:  STDDEV: total risk calculated as the standard deviation of a firm’s daily stock returns for each fiscal year; INDEP: the percentage 
of board members who were independent calculated as the independent board total/total number of board; LEV: the financial leverage of 
the firm, computed as total liabilities to total assets; MTB: market to book ratio. The ratio of year-end market capitalisation to total common 
equity; CEODUAL: dummy variable, taking a rate of 1 if the CEO was also the chair,  0 otherwise; BRDSIZE: number of board members; 
ROA: current year return on assets; ROAt-1 : prior year return on assets; Tobin’s Q:  market measure of wealth, measured by market value 
of firm + debt/book value of total assets; Tobin’s Qt-1: Tobin’s Q of previous year; lnMKTCAP: the natural logarithm of market 
capitalisation;  lnTA: the natural logarithm of total assets; SHARE: the average percentage of RMC members shareholding;  Tenure: average 
number of years as a board member of a firm; RMC Tenure: average years of risk management experience of RMC members; Total Quali: 
the average number of qualifications obtained by RMC members; Exp: the average amount of experience obtained by RMC members; 
RMC: dummy variable, taking a rate of 1 when firms had a separate RMC, 0 when firms had a combined RMC 
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Table 5.25: Fixed effects regressions with robust estimation – RMC human capital and 
the likelihood of financial distress 
Two-tailed tests significant at p<0.01***; p<0.05**; p≤ 0.10* 
 
 PBANK 
Coef.(z) 
Model 1a 
PBANK 
Coef.(z) 
Model 1b 
PBANK 
Coef.(z) 
Model 2 
Naïve  
Coef.(z) 
Model 1a 
Naïve  
Coef.(z) 
Model 1b 
Naïve  
Coef.(z) 
Model 
2 
RMCHC 0.02 0.02 - -1.97 -2.72 - 
 (1.08) (0.65)  (-2.50)** (-3.16)***  
RMCHC*STDDEV - -0.0006 - - -0.05 - 
  (-0.25)   (-2.18)**  
PBANKt-1 0.03 0.03 0.03 - - - 
 (2.57)** (2.52)** (2.26)**    
lnMKTCAP -0.78 
(-8.12)*** 
-0.79 
(-8.14)*** 
-0.76 
(-7.78)*** 
-6.34 
(-1.28) 
-6.04 
(-1.22) 
-3.48 
(-0.69) 
STDDEV 0.002 
(1.76)* 
0.003 
(0.86) 
0.002 
(1.71)* 
-0.09 
(-1.64) 
-0.12 
(-2.17)** 
-0.09 
(-1.62) 
RMC -0.001 
(-0.05) 
-0.004 
(-0.17) 
-0.009 
(-0.33) 
-1.26 
(-1.03) 
-1.30 
(-1.06) 
-0.77 
(-0.68) 
INDEP 0.04 
(1.19) 
0.03 
(1.11) 
0.07 
(2.08)** 
-0.02 
(-0.01) 
0.005 
(0.00) 
-0.33 
(-0.17) 
CEODUAL -0.06 
(-0.83) 
-0.06 
(-1.52) 
-0.007 
(-0.32) 
2.60 
(2.29)** 
-2.10 
(-1.08) 
-2.35 
(-1.76)* 
BRDSIZE -0.14 
(-2.27)** 
-0.13 
(-2.14)** 
-0.16 
(-2.39)** 
-0.59 
(-0.18) 
-0.44 
(-0.14) 
-1.20 
(-0.30) 
LEV 1.14 
(27.79)*** 
1.14 
(27.72)*** 
1.16 
(28.01)*** 
1.46 
(0.73) 
1.64 
(0.82) 
3.13 
(1.22) 
MTB -0.024 
(-11.81)*** 
-0.02 
(-11.74)*** 
-0.023 
(-11.14)*** 
-0.11 
(-1.07) 
-0.12 
(-1.15) 
-0.09 
(-1.15) 
Tenure - - 0.014 - - -2.30 
   (0.30)   (-0.86) 
RMC Tenure - - 0.02 - - 2.56 
   (0.40)   (1.19) 
Exp - - 0.002 - - -0.19 
   (0.09)   (-1.82)* 
Quali - - 0.003 - - 0.01 
   (0.29)   (0.01) 
SHARE - - -0.04 - - -17.72 
   (-0.11)   (-1.12) 
CONS 0.52 
(2.17)** 
0.51 
(2.09)** 
0.40 
 (1.56) 
8.31 
(0.68) 
9.46 
(0.77) 
2.10 
(0.15) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed 
effects          
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 
No. of firms 
1305 
355 
1305 
355 
1158 
336 
1362 
365 
1362 
365 
1211 
345 
F statistics 62.4 61.96 51.72 8.14 8.05 5.15 
Adjusted R2 0.43 0.43 0.57 0.07 0.06 0.07 
Highest VIF 9.17  8.23 9.15  8.82 
Lowest VIF 1.08  1.09 1.12  1.11 
 
Notes:  STDDEV: total risk calculated as the standard deviation of a firm’s daily stock returns for each fiscal year; INDEP: the 
percentage of board members who were independent calculated as the independent board total/total number of board; LEV: The 
financial leverage of the firm, computed as total liabilities to total assets; MTB: market to book ratio. The ratio of year-end market 
capitalisation to total common equity;  CEODUAL: dummy variable, taking a rate of 1 if the CEO was also the chair, 0 otherwise; 
BRDSIZE: number of board members; PBANK(-Z-Score): probability of financial distress calculated using Altman Z-Score; PBANKt-
1(-Z-Score t-1): Altman Z-Score of previous year; Naïve: the probability of bankruptcy using the Naïve model developed by Bharath 
and Shumway, (2004);  lnMKTCAP: the natural logarithm of market capitalisation;  lnTA: the natural logarithm of total assets; 
SHARE: the average percentage of RMC members shareholding;  Tenure: average number of years as a board member of a firm; 
RMC Tenure: average years of risk management experience of RMC members; Quali: the average number of qualifications obtained 
by RMC members; Exp: the average amount of experience of  RMC members; RMC: dummy variable, taking a rate of 1 when firms 
had a separate RMC, 0 when firms had a combined RMC. 
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5.5.3 Heckman (1978) test – Self-selection bias (Endogenous issues) 
Self-selection may be a concern for this study, as Australian firms can choose whether 
or not to establish a RMC (ASXCGC, 2013). A firm’s choice of having a separate RMC or a 
combined RMC may introduce bias into the results, as firms with high performance are more 
likely to choose to establish a RMC or a separate RMC than firms with low performance.  In 
addition, some of the factors that are correlated with a firm’s choice of adopting a RMC may 
also be correlated with the observed firm performance and the likelihood of financial distress. 
Therefore, these non-observable factors may potentially bias results. In order to verify the 
results, this study adopted two-stage Heckman tests. The two-stage Heckman procedures were 
used to control for problems of selection bias and omitted variables. In the first stage, a probit 
regression was conducted. The dependent variable was a RMC, and similar to previous 
research, the test included board size, CEO duality, and board independence, as the previous 
studies have indicated that these three variables influence firms’ establishment of a RMC and 
separate RMC (Hines and Peters, 2015; Ling, Zain and Jaffar, 2014; Subramaniam, McManus 
and Zhang, 2009). Using the parameters from this model, the inverse Mills ratio was computed 
for all sample firms (Heckman, 1978; Johnston and DiNardo 1997). The INVMILL (Mills) 
coefficient was then used as an additional control variable to account for the omitted variable 
and self-selection bias in the stage 2 model. This method for correction of self-selection bias is 
robust. In addition, two different sets of variables make the inverse Mills methods less sensitive 
to the assumption of normality (Johnston and DiNardo, 1997). In the second stage, an OLS 
model was run and included the Mills ratio obtained from the first stage in the regression 
analysing as a control variable to control for the endogeneity of the choice of RMC.  
A firm’s choice of establishing a separate RMC may introduce bias into the results, as 
firms with high performance may be more likely to choose to establish a separate RMC than 
firms with low performance. Heckman tests were also used to control firms’ choice of 
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establishing a separate RMC. Similarly, in the first stage, a probit regression was conducted. 
The dependent variable was separate RMC (SRMC), and similar to the previous studies, the 
test included board size, CEO duality, and board independence, as these three variables 
influence firms’ establishment of a separate RMC (Subramaniam, McManus and Zhang, 2009). 
Using the parameters from this model, the inverse Mills ratio was computed for all sample 
firms (Heckman, 1978; Johnston and DiNardo 1997). The INVMILL coefficient was then used 
as an additional control variable to account for the omitted variable and self-selection bias in 
the stage 2 model. In the second stage, an OLS model was run and included the Mills ratio 
obtained from the first stage in the regression analysing as a control variable to control for the 
endogeneity of the choice of separate RMC.  
The results of Heckman tests are presented in Tables 5.26 and 5.27. In stage 1, consistent 
with Subramaniam, McManus and Zhang (2009), the results show that board size, board 
independence, and CEO duality were significantly associated with the existence of a RMC and 
the existence of a separate RMC. After controlling for selection bias and omitted variables, the 
results remained the same. The results consistently show the association between risk 
(STDDEV) and accounting performance (ROA) was moderated by firms’ with a SRMC, as 
STDDEV*SRMC was positively associated with firms’ financial performance ROA (B = 
0.005; p<0.01). The results show there was no relationship between the existence of a RMC 
and separate RMC and firm performance (ROA). Alternatively, using Tobin’s Q as a 
measurement of firm value achieved no significant results.  
Consistent with the regression results, the Heckman tests suggest that RMC and SRMC 
did not have any association with the likelihood of financial distress (PBANK). The unchanged 
results suggest that the choice of a separate RMC or a RMC did not bias the result, and the 
Heckman tests further validated the regression results.  
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Table 5.26a: Stage 1 of the Heckman Test – RMC 
 ROA Tobin’s Q PBANK Naïve 
 
RMC 
Coef(Z) 
RMC 
Coef(Z) 
RMC 
Coef(Z) 
RMC 
Coef(Z) 
BRDSIZE 
0.07 
(6.13)*** 
0.067 
(6.13)*** 
0.064 
(5.81)*** 
0.067 
(6.13)***  
INDEP 
0.70 
(5.30)*** 
0.70 
(5.30)*** 
0.70 
(5.24)*** 
0.70 
(5.30)*** 
CEODUAL 
-0.73 
 (-5.42)*** 
-0.73 
(-5.42)*** 
-0.72 
(-5.35)*** 
-0.73 
(-5.42)*** 
CONS 
-0.69 
(-5.58)*** 
-0.69 
(-5.58)*** 
-0.68 
(-5.45)*** 
-0.69 
(-5.58)*** 
No. observations 2312 2310 2235 2312 
Wald Chi 2 810.19 5160.90 2186.45 159.08 
Note: STDDEV= total risk calculated as the standard deviation of a firm’s daily stock returns for each fiscal year; BRDSIZE= number of 
board members; INDEP= the percentage of board members who were independent calculated as the independent board total/total number 
of board; CEODUAL = dummy variable 1 if the CEO was also the chair, 0 otherwise; Tobin’s Q= the market value of equity and debt 
divided by the book value of total assets 
Two-tailed tests significant at p<0.01***; p<0.05**; p≤ 0.10* 
. 
 
 
Table 5.26b: Stage 1 of the Heckman Test – separate RMC 
 ROA Tobin’s Q PBANK Naïve 
 
SRMC 
Coef(Z) 
SRMC 
Coef(Z) 
SRMC 
Coef(Z) 
SRMC 
Coef(Z) 
BRDSIZE 
0.12 
(7.77)*** 
0.12 
(7.77)*** 
0.11 
(7.16)*** 
0.93 
(4.67)*** 
INDEP 
0.93 
(4.67)*** 
0.93 
(4.67)*** 
0.86 
(4.28)*** 
0.12 
(7.77)*** 
CEODUAL 
0.32 
 (1.75)* 
0.32 
(1.75)* 
0.33 
(1.83)* 
0.32 
(1.75)* 
CONS 
-2.96 
(-15.24)*** 
-2.96 
(-15.24)*** 
-2.89 
(-14.66)*** 
-2.96 
(-15.24)*** 
No. observations 2312 2310 2235 2312 
Wald Chi 2 151.72 490.58 365.69 63.60 
 
Note: STDDEV= total risk calculated as the standard deviation of a firm’s daily stock returns for each fiscal year; BRDSIZE= number of 
board members; INDEP= the percentage of board members who were independent calculated as the independent board total/total number 
of board; CEODUAL = dummy variable 1 if the CEO was also the chair, 0 otherwise; Tobin’s Q= the market value of equity and debt 
divided by the book value of total assets. 
Two-tailed tests significant at p<0.01***; p<0.05**; p≤ 0.10* 
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Table 5.27a: Stage 2: Heckman test – RMC, separate RMC, and firm performance 
 ROA 
Coef.(z) 
lnTobin’s Q 
Coef.(z) 
 RMC       SRMC RMC SRMC 
RMC 0.006 
(0.81) 
-0.005 
(-0.48) 
- - 0.001 
(0.67) 
0.002 
(0.29) 
- - 
SRMC - 
 
- 0.015 
(1.59) 
-0.03 
(-1.74)* 
- - 0.002 
(0.56) 
-0.001 
(-0.23) 
RMC*STDDEV - 
 
0.001 
(1.24) 
- - - -0.0001 
(-0.29) 
- - 
SRMC*STDDEV - 
 
- - 0.005 
(2.99)*** 
- - - 0.0003 
(0.61) 
ROAt-1 0.10 
(5.14)*** 
0.10 
(5.07)*** 
0.10 
(5.12)*** 
0.10 
(5.24)*** 
- - - - 
lnTobin’s Qt-1 - - - - 0.08 
(5.52)*** 
0.07 
(5.51)*** 
0.07 
(5.50)*** 
0.07 
(5.45)*** 
lnMKTCAP 0.06 
(1.17) 
0.06 
(1.07) 
0.05 
(1.01) 
0.05 
(1.05) 
- - - - 
lnTA - - - - -0.18 
(-8.78)*** 
-0.17 
(-8.71)*** 
-0.17 
(-8.67)*** 
-0.17 
(-8.65)*** 
MILLS 0.02 
(0.19) 
0.02 
(0.97) 
-0.02 
(-1.84)* 
-0.02 
(-1.74)* 
0.002 
(0.30) 
0.002 
(0.29) 
0.006 
(1.41) 
0.006 
(1.44) 
STDDEV -0.003 
(-4.78)*** 
-0.004 
(-4.46)*** 
-0.003 
(4.73)*** 
-0.003 
(4.94)*** 
-0.0003 
(-1.92)* 
-0.0003 
(-1.29) 
-0.0003 
(-1.96)** 
-0.0004 
(-2.00)** 
LEV -0.31 
(-13.14)***  
-0.31 
(-13.17)*** 
-0.31 
(-13.19)*** 
-0.31 
(-13.28)*** 
-0.06 
(-9.05)***  
-0.06 
(-9.05)*** 
-0.06 
(-9.10)*** 
-0.06 
(-9.12)*** 
MTB 0.09 
(3.13)*** 
0.10 
(3.22)*** 
0.10 
(3.41)*** 
0.09 
(3.36)*** 
0.37 
(55.11)*** 
0.37 
(55.10)*** 
0.37 
(55.13)*** 
0.37 
(55.13)*** 
CONS 0.02 
(0.19) 
0.03 
(0.25) 
0.09 
(0.65) 
0.07 
(0.58) 
1.73 
(28.36)***  
1.77 
(26.92)*** 
1.72 
(28.04)*** 
1.72 
(28.04)*** 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed 
effects          
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 
No. of firms 
583 
2312 
583 
2312 
583 
2312 
583 
2312 
583 
2310 
583 
2310 
583 
2310 
583 
2310 
Wald chi2 14.19 13.64 14.43 14.26 268.25 256.45 268.60 256.85 
Adjusted R-square 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 
 
Note: STDDEV: total risk calculated as the standard deviation of a firm’s daily stock returns for each fiscal year; INDEP: the percentage of board members 
who were independent calculated as the independent board total/total number of board; LEV: the financial leverage of the firm, computed as total liabilities 
to total assets; MTB: market to book ratio. The ratio of year-end market capitalisation to total common equity; BRDSIZE: number of board members; Z-
Score: probability of bankruptcy calculated using Altman Z-Score; Z-Scoret-1: Altman Z-Score of previous year;  Naïve: the probability of bankruptcy 
using the Naïve model developed by Bharath and Shumway, (2004); lnMKTCAP: the natural logarithm of market capitalisation; lnTA: the natural 
logarithm of total assets;  CEODUAL: dummy variable, taking a rate of 1 if the CEO was also the chair, 0 otherwise; SRMC: dummy variable, taking a 
rate of 1 when firms had a separate RMC, 0 otherwise;  RMC: dummy variable, taking a rate of 1 when firms had a RMC, 0 otherwise; Year:  year dummy 
variable 
 Two-tailed tests significant at p<0.01***; p<0.05**; p≤ 0.10* 
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Table 5.27b: Stage 2: Heckman test – the existence of RMC, SRMC, and the likelihood of financial 
distress 
Two-tailed tests significant at p<0.01***; p<0.05**; p≤ 0.10* 
 
5.5.4 Two Stage Least Square regression (2SLS) - Endogeneity issue 
This study suggests that RMC human capital may influence firm performance and the 
likelihood of financial distress; however, firms’ performance and likelihood of financial 
distress may also have an impact on RMC turnover, which affects firms’ RMC human capital. 
In order to control for this reverse causality issue and address the potential endogeneity 
problem, the 2SLS method is frequently used in accounting research. The Hausman (1978) test 
has been utilised to justify whether 2SLS is more appropriate than OLS regression. 
Specifically, the Hausman test provides the formal test on whether there is a significant 
 PBANK 
Coef.(z) 
Naïve 
 RMC SRMC RMC SRMC 
RMC -0.01 
(-1.45) 
-0.02 
(-1.82)* 
- - 0.002 
(0.18) 
-0.01 
(-0.78) 
- - 
SRMC  
- 
- 
 
-0.008 
(-0.80) 
0.0005 
(0.02) 
- 
 
- 
 
-0.012 
(-0.92) 
-0.009 
(-0.36) 
RMC*STDDEV  
- 
 0.001 
(1.20) 
- - - 0.001 
(0.13) 
- - 
SRMC*STDDEV  
- 
- - -0.001 
(-0.47) 
- - - -0.0003 
(-0.13) 
PABNKt-1 0.06 
(4.80)*** 
0.056 
(4.80)*** 
0.05 
(4.77)*** 
0.05 
(4.76)*** 
- - - - 
lnMKTCAP -0.02 
(-0.37) 
-0.03 
(-0.47) 
-0.02 
(-0.39) 
-0.02 
(-0.39) 
-0.24 
(6.37)*** 
0.076 
(1.06) 
0.09 
(1.20) 
0.085 
(1.20) 
MILLS -0.02 
(-0.90) 
-0.02 
(-0.82) 
-0.02 
(-1.61) 
-0.025 
(-1.62) 
0.02 
(0.61) 
0.02 
(0.67) 
0.02 
(1.24) 
0.022 
(1.24) 
STDDEV 0.003 
(3.99)*** 
0.002 
(2.27)** 
0.003 
(4.03)*** 
0.003 
(4.05)*** 
-0.0008 
(-0.98) 
-0.002 
(-1.48) 
-0.0008 
(-0.99) 
-0.0008 
(-0.98) 
LEV 0.73 
(25.30)*** 
0.73 
(25.32)*** 
0.73 
(25.33)*** 
0.73 
(25.32)*** 
0.22 
(6.89)*** 
0.22 
(6.87)*** 
0.22 
(6.87)*** 
0.22 
(6.87)*** 
MTB -0.45 
(-14.55)*** 
-0.45 
(-14.42)*** 
-0.45 
(-14.56)*** 
-0.45 
(-14.56)*** 
-0.24 
(-6.37)*** 
-0.24 
(-6.25)*** 
-0.25 
(-6.43)*** 
-0.25 
(-6.42)*** 
CONS -0.98 
(-8.79)*** 
-0.97 
(-8.63)*** 
-0.96 
(-8.39)*** 
-0.96 
(-8.38)*** 
0.20 
(0.12) 
0.21 
(1.18) 
0.17 
(0.93) 
0.17 
(0.93) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 
No. of firms 
2235 
571 
2235 
571 
2235 
571 
2235 
571 
2312 
583 
2312 
583 
2312 
583 
2312 
583 
Wald chi2 57.01 56.73 57.04 54.54 13.13 12.59 13.24 12.63 
Adjusted R2 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
 
Note: STDDEV: total risk calculated as the standard deviation of a firm’s daily stock returns for each fiscal year; INDEP: the percentage of board members 
who were independent calculated as the independent board total/total number of board; LEV: the financial leverage of the firm, computed as total liabilities 
to total assets; MTB: market to book ratio. The ratio of year-end market capitalisation to total common equity; BRDSIZE: number of board members; Z-
Score: probability of bankruptcy calculated using Altman Z-Score; Z-Scoret-1: Altman Z-Score of previous year;  Naïve: the probability of bankruptcy 
using the Naïve model developed by Bharath and Shumway, (2004); lnMKTCAP: the natural logarithm of market capitalisation; lnTA: the natural logarithm 
of total assets;  CEODUAL: dummy variable, taking a rate of 1 if the CEO was also the chair,  0 otherwise; SRMC: dummy variable, taking a rate of 1 
when firms had a separate RMC, 0 otherwise;  RMC: dummy variable, taking a rate of 1 when firms had a RMC, 0 otherwise; Year: year dummy variable 
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difference between the IV estimator from the OLS estimator and from 2SLS. The Hausman 
results strongly rejected the null hypothesis of there being no endogeneity problem, implying 
2SLS generated more robust results than OLS. As a result, 2SLS was adopted in this study.  
In the 2SLS regressions, potential endogeneity was controlled by using instrumental 
variables. The instrument variables need to be associated with the endogenous variables but do 
not have a direct influence on the dependent variables (Kennedy, 2003). This study used the 
average of the human capital score, matched by industry and year, as the instrument variable. 
This method has been commonly adopted in previous studies (Larcker and Rusticus, 2010; Lev 
and Sougiannis, 1996). Specifically, the average RMC human capital score is not directly 
related to performance and the likelihood of financial distress or the error term in the structural 
equation, but it is generally highly correlated with firm’s RMC human capital (the original 
variable), as corporate activities are often evaluated by outsiders against industry norms, 
preventing managers from not following the norms (Larcker and Rusticus, 2010; Lev and 
Sougiannis, 1996). As a result, firms in the same industry prefer to have their RMC human 
capital converge to the average one in the industry, indicating a strong relationship between a 
firm’s RMC human capital and the average RMC human capital score matched by industry and 
year (Lev and Sougiannis, 1996).  
2SLS estimation was undertaken in two stages. In the first stage, RMC human capital 
was regressed against the instrument variable and all of the control variables in order to 
calculate the predicted value of RMC human capital. In the second stage, firm performance 
and the likelihood of financial distress were individually regressed against the fitted value of 
RMC human capital generated from the first stage regressions.  
The results of the first stage 2SLS are reported in Table 5.28. The first stage regressed 
human capital (RMCHC) on the average of human capital (HCmean – the instrument variable) 
with all other variables. The second stage was estimated using the fitted value for human capital 
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(RMCHC) from the first stage. The first stage results indicate that the endogenous variable 
(human capital variable) was significantly related to the instrument variable in all four 
regression models.  
The results of the second stage 2SLS are presented in Tables 5.29 and 5.30. They show 
that after utilising 2SLS to address the potential endogeneity problem, the results remained 
stable. RMC human capital was positively related to firm accounting-based performance 
(ROA) (B = 0.013; p<0.05). The association between risk (STDDEV) and firm performance 
(ROA) was moderated by firms’ RMC human capital, as STDDEV*RMCHC was negatively 
associated with firms’ financial performance (ROA) (B = 0.006; p<0.01), suggesting RMC 
human capital was also related to better risk management and better accounting performance 
of firms. In addition, RMC human capital was positively related to firm market-based 
performance (Tobin’s Q) (B = 0.011; p<0.01). The association between risk (STDDEV) and 
firm performance (Tobin’s Q) was marginally moderated by firms’ RMC human capital, as 
STDDEV*RMCHC was negatively associated with firms’ financial performance (Tobin’s Q) 
(B = 0.002; p<0.01), suggesting RMC human capital also related to better risk management 
and better market performance of firms. 
In terms of the likelihood of financial distress, the results of the 2SLS in Table 5.30 
suggest that the RMC human capital factor score was negatively related to Naïve (B = -0.03; 
p<0.05), suggesting there was a negative relationship between the RMC human capital factor 
score and the likelihood of financial distress. The coefficient for the interaction of risk and 
RMC human capital was negatively and significantly associated with the likelihood of financial 
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distress (Naïve) (B = -0.05; p<0.05). However, the results do not show a significant relationship 
between RMC human capital factor score and PBANK21.  
After controlling for potential endogeneity problems, the results show that within the 
sample of firms that established a separate RMC was negatively related to accounting 
performance (ROA) and positively related to market performance (Tobin’s Q).  
This result supports the argument that firms do not choose the right corporate governance 
structure and challenges the assumption that firms efficiently select themselves into the right 
governance (Barzuza, 2016). To be specific, firms that could benefit from governance 
mechanisms often do not adopt them; alternatively firms that may not necessarily benefit from 
governance mechanisms are normally the first to comply with them (Barzuza, 2016). As a 
result, firms complying with the ASX CGPR (ASXCGC, 2014) to establish a separate RMC 
may not necessarily need a separate RMC, and establishing a separate RMC may incur extra 
costs, leading to low accounting performance. Firms that could benefit from having a separate 
RMC the most are frequently not adopting this recommendation because they see it as an 
additional cost. On the other hand, establishing a separate RMC may signal to the market and 
create a favourable image for firms, thereby flagging their commitment to good risk 
management practice. As a result, there is a positive relationship between a separate RMC and 
firms’ market performance. 
 
  
                                                 
 
21 Because a high score of Z-Score indicates lower financial distress and a low score of Z-Score indicates greater 
financial distress. In order to facilitate the interpretation of the results, this study used PBANK as –Z-Score. As 
a result, PBANK is positively related to the likelihood of financial distress.  
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Table 5.28: 2SLS first stage – RMC human capital and firms’ management of risk - firm 
performance and the likelihood of financial distress  
            Two-tailed tests significant at p<0.01***; p<0.05**; p≤ 0.10* 
 
 
 
 
  
 ROA lnTobin’s Q PBANK Naïve 
 RMCHC 
Coef.(z) 
RMCHC 
Coef.(z) 
RMCHC 
Coef.(z) 
RMCHC 
Coef.(z) 
HCmean 0.938 0.997 1.000 1.019 
 (7.98)*** (13.19)*** (15.05)*** (13.89)*** 
ROA t-1 0.78 
(1.76)* 
- - - 
Tobin’s Q t-1 
 
- 1.171 
(1.53) 
- - 
PBANKt-1 - -  - 
     
lnMKTCAP 1.278 
(3.66)*** 
- - 1.058 
(3.39)*** 
lnTA - 1.022 
(2.81)*** 
- - 
STDDEV -0.010 
(-1.42) 
-0.008 
(-1.21) 
-0.004 
(-0.69) 
-0.002 
(-0.40) 
INDEP -0.228 
(-1.10) 
-0.310 
(-1.56) 
-0.341 
(-1.82)* 
-0.235 
(-1.23) 
CEODUAL 0.762 
(2.90)*** 
0.818 
(3.58)*** 
0.792 
(3.58)*** 
              0.795 
(3.50)*** 
BRDSIZE 1.459 
(3.15)*** 
1.100 
(2.37)** 
1.191 
(2.94)*** 
1.003 
(2.32)** 
LEV 0.514 
(3.01)*** 
0.424 
(2.33)** 
0.593 
(3.57)*** 
0.568 
(3.52)*** 
MTB -0.013 
(-0.91) 
-0.003 
(-0.19) 
-0.019 
(-1.62) 
-0.016 
(-1.34) 
CONS -3.883 
(-3.66)*** 
-6.804 
(-2.74)*** 
-4.431 
(-4.20)*** 
-3.539 
(-3.70)*** 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects          Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs.  1361 1359 1305 1362 
Adjusted R2 0.08 0.17 0.18 0.17 
 
Notes:  STDDEV: total risk calculated as the standard deviation of a firm’s daily stock returns for each fiscal year; INDEP: the 
percentage of board members who were independent calculated as the independent board total/total number of board; LEV: the financial 
leverage of the firm, computed as total liabilities to total assets; MTB: market to book ratio. The ratio of year-end market capitalisation 
to total common equity;  CEODUAL: dummy variable, taking a rate of 1 if the CEO was also the chair, 0 otherwise; BRDSIZE: number 
of board members; PBANK(-Z-Score): probability of financial distress calculated using Altman Z-Score; PBANKt-1(-Z-Score t-1): 
Altman Z-Score of previous year; Naïve: the probability of bankruptcy using the Naïve model developed by Bharath and Shumway, 
(2004);  lnMKTCAP: the natural logarithm of market capitalisation;  lnTA: the natural logarithm of total assets; SHARE: the average 
percentage of RMC members shareholding;  Tenure: average number of years as a board member of a firm; RMC Tenure: average years 
of risk management experience of RMC members; Quali: the average number of qualifications obtained by RMC members; Exp: the 
average amount of experience of  RMC members; RMC: dummy variable, taking a rate of 1 when firms had a separate RMC, 0 when 
firms had a combined RMC. 
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Table 5.29: 2SLS second stage – RMC human capital and firm performance  
   Two-tailed tests significant at p<0.01***; p<0.05**; p≤ 0.10* 
 
 
 
 
 ROA 
Coef.(z) 
ROA 
Coef.(z) 
lnTobin’s Q 
Coef.(z) 
lnTobin’s Q 
Coef.(z) 
RMCHC 0.013 0.019 0.011 0.01 
 (2.04)** (2.23)** (1.29)*** (3.02)*** 
RMCHC*STDDEV - 0.006 - 0.002 
  (2.57)***  (1.82)* 
ROA t-1 0.24 
(5.27)*** 
0.24 
(18.06)*** 
- - 
Tobin’s Q t-1 
 
- - 0.27 
(5.44)*** 
0.26 
(5.31)*** 
lnMKTCAP -0.005 
(-0.24) 
-0.001 
(-0.06) 
- - 
lnTA - - -0.14 
(-4.83)*** 
-0.14 
(-4.83)*** 
STDDEV -0.002 
(-4.89)*** 
-0.009 
(-3.28)*** 
-0.001 
(-2.55)*** 
-0.004 
(-2.44)** 
SRMC -0.02 
(-4.35)*** 
-0.022 
(-4.24)*** 
0.015 
(3.13)*** 
0.016 
(3.32)*** 
INDEP -0.013 
(-1.35) 
-0.02 
(-1.78)* 
0.003 
(0.31) 
0.002 
(0.16) 
CEODUAL -0.002 
(-0.12) 
0.006 
(0.44) 
0.02 
(1.52) 
              0.02 
(1.76)* 
BRDSIZE -0.003 
(-0.12) 
0.014 
(0.53) 
0.011 
(0.44) 
0.02 
(0.68) 
LEV -0.015 
(-1.23) 
-0.015 
(-1.22) 
-0.07 
(-3.38)*** 
-0.07 
(-3.36)*** 
MTB 0.007 
(5.88)*** 
0.008 
(6.05)*** 
0.02 
(12.48)*** 
0.02 
(12.55)*** 
CONS 0.09 
(1.21) 
0.07 
(0.96) 
1.50 
(11.37)*** 
1.51 
(11.27)*** 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed 
effects          
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 1361 1361 1359 1359 
Wald chi2 226.50 226.42 830.38 829.30 
Adjusted R2 0.34 0.34 0.56 0.56 
F-stat first stage 
(Prob) 
0.00 - 0.00 - 
Robust F-statistics 64.31 - 174.14 - 
Endogeneity test 
(Prob) 
0.08 - 0.06 - 
 
Notes:  STDDEV: total risk calculated as the standard deviation of a firm’s daily stock returns for each fiscal year; INDEP: the 
percentage of board members who were independent calculated as the independent board total/total number of board; LEV: the financial 
leverage of the firm, computed as total liabilities to total assets; MTB: market to book ratio. The ratio of year-end market capitalisation 
to total common equity;  CEODUAL: dummy variable, taking a rate of 1 if the CEO was also the chair, 0 otherwise; BRDSIZE: number 
of board members; PBANK(-Z-Score): probability of financial distress calculated using Altman Z-Score; PBANKt-1(-Z-Score t-1): 
Altman Z-Score of previous year; Naïve: the probability of bankruptcy using the Naïve model developed by Bharath and Shumway, 
(2004);  lnMKTCAP: the natural logarithm of market capitalisation;  lnTA: the natural logarithm of total assets; SHARE: the average 
percentage of RMC members shareholding;  Tenure: average number of years as a board member of a firm; RMC Tenure: average years 
of risk management experience of RMC members; Quali: the average number of qualifications obtained by RMC members; Exp: the 
average amount of experience of  RMC members; RMC: dummy variable, taking a rate of 1 when firms had a separate RMC, 0 when 
firms had a combined RMC. 
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   Table 5.30: 2SLS – RMC human capital and the likelihood of financial distress  
  Two-tailed tests significant at p<0.01***; p<0.05**; p≤ 0.10* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 PBANK 
Coef.(z) 
PBANK 
Coef.(z) 
Naïve 
Coef.(z) 
Naïve 
Coef.(z) 
RMCHC -0.01 -0.012 -0.03 -0.05 
 (-0.51) (-0.42) (-2.07)** (-2.14)** 
RMCHC*STDDEV - -0.0007 - -0.013 
  (-0.12)  (-2.23)** 
PBANKt-1 0.10 0.10 - - 
 (5.27)** (5.17)***   
lnMKTCAP -0.04 
(-0.67) 
-0.045 
(-0.71) 
0.06 
(0.58) 
0.05 
(0.61) 
STDDEV -0.002 
(-1.49) 
-0.0007 
(-0.10) 
0.003 
(1.79)* 
0.02 
(2.65)*** 
SRMC -0.02 
(-1.23) 
-0.02 
(-1.28) 
0.039 
(1.43) 
0.035 
(1.38) 
INDEP -0.05 
(-1.60) 
-0.05 
(-1.58) 
-0.007 
(-0.16) 
0.004 
(0.09) 
CEODUAL -0.02 
(-0.56) 
-0.02 
(-1.28) 
-0.04 
(-1.00) 
-0.05 
(-0.95) 
BRDSIZE -0.14 
(-1.88)* 
-0.14 
(-2.06)** 
0.08 
(0.74) 
0.043 
 (0.43) 
LEV 0.74 
(25.62)*** 
0.74 
(25.62)*** 
0.18 
(3.92)*** 
0.18 
(4.27)*** 
MTB -0.045 
(-22.06)*** 
-0.05 
(-21.28)*** 
-0.006 
(2.42)** 
-0.006 
(-2.10)** 
CONS -0.72 
(-3.51)*** 
-0.71 
 (-3.71)***  
-0.18 
(-0.58)*** 
-0.14 
(-0.55) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects          Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs.  1305 1357 1362 1211 
Wald chi2 1588.25 1589.37 27.43 33.53 
Adjusted R2 0.55 0.55 0.01 0.01 
F-stat first stage 
(Prob) 
0.00 - 0.00 - 
Robust F-statistics 177.27 - 193.64 - 
Endogeneity test 
(Prob) 
0.64 - 0.11 - 
 
Notes:  STDDEV: total risk calculated as the standard deviation of a firm’s daily stock returns for each fiscal year; INDEP: the 
percentage of board members who were independent calculated as the independent board total/total number of board; LEV: The 
financial leverage of the firm, computed as total liabilities to total assets; MTB: market to book ratio. The ratio of year-end market 
capitalisation to total common equity;  CEODUAL: dummy variable, taking a rate of 1 if the CEO was also the chair, 0 otherwise; 
BRDSIZE: number of board members; PBANK(-Z-Score): probability of financial distress calculated using Altman Z-Score; PBANKt-
1(-Z-Score t-1): Altman Z-Score of previous year; Naïve: the probability of bankruptcy using the Naïve model developed by Bharath 
and Shumway, (2004);  lnMKTCAP: the natural logarithm of market capitalisation;  lnTA: the natural logarithm of total assets; 
SHARE: the average percentage of RMC members shareholding; Tenure: average number of years as a board member of a firm; RMC 
Tenure: average years of risk management experience of RMC members; Quali: the average number of qualifications obtained by 
RMC members; Exp: the average amount of experience of  RMC members; RMC: dummy variable, taking a rate of 1 when firms had 
a separate RMC, 0 when firms had a combined RMC. 
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5.5.5 Generalised method of moments (GMM) - endogeneity issue 
GMM is another method used to investigate the possibility of endogeneity (Arellano and 
Boad 1991; Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998). Specifically, the GMM 
method relies on moment assumption and does not rely on the distributional assumption of 
maximum likelihood. Therefore, GMM estimators produce more robust estimation, and are 
less sensitive to parametric requirements (Rassen, Schneeweiss, Glynn, Mittleman and 
Brookhart, 2009). The results of the GMM estimations are presented in Tables 5.31 and 5.32. 
The results show that GMM estimation results were almost identical to the full 
specification of 2SLS estimates. Specifically, RMC human capital was positively related to 
firm accounting-based performance (ROA) (B = 0.013; p<0.05). The association between risk 
(STDDEV) and firm performance (ROA) was moderated by firms’ RMC human capital, as 
STDDEV*RMCHC was negatively associated with firms’ financial performance (ROA) (B = 
0.006; p<0.01), suggesting RMC human capital also related to better risk management and 
better accounting performance of firms. In addition, RMC human capital was positively related 
to firm market-based performance (Tobin’s Q) (B = 0.011; p<0.01). The association between 
risk (STDDEV) and firm performance (Tobin’s Q) was marginally moderated by firms’ RMC 
human capital, as STDDEV*RMCHC was negatively associated with firms’ financial 
performance (Tobin’s Q) (B = 0.002; p<0.01), suggesting RMC human capital also related to 
better risk management and better market performance of firms. 
In terms of the likelihood of financial distress, the GMM results show that RMC human 
capital factor score was negatively related to Naïve (B = -0.03; p<0.05). The coefficient for the 
interaction of risk and RMC human capital was negatively and significantly associated with 
the likelihood of financial distress (Naïve) (B = -0.013; p<0.05), indicating RMC human capital 
was associated with better risk management and low level of the likelihood of financial distress. 
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However, the results do not show a significant relationship between RMC human capital factor 
score and PBANK22.  
 Table 5.31: GMM with robust estimation – RMC human capital and firm performance  
  Two-tailed tests significant at p<0.01***; p<0.05**; p≤ 0.10* 
 
                                                 
 
22Since a high score of Z-Score indicates lower financial distress and a low score of Z-Score indicates greater 
financial distress. In order to facilitate the interpretation of the results, this study used PBANK as –Z-Score. As 
a result, PBANK is positively related to the likelihood of financial distress.  
 ROA 
Coef.(z) 
ROA 
Coef.(z) 
lnTobin’s Q 
Coef.(z) 
lnTobin’s Q 
Coef.(z) 
RMCHC 0.013 0.019 0.011 0.01 
 (2.04)** (2.23)** (3.33)*** (3.02)*** 
RMCHC*risk - 0.006 - 0.002 
  (2.57)***  (1.82)* 
ROA t-1 0.24 
(5.27)*** 
0.24 
(5.40)*** 
- - 
Tobin’s Q t-1 
 
- - 0.27 
(5.44)*** 
0.26 
(5.31)*** 
lnMKTCAP -0.005 
(-0.24) 
-0.001 
(-0.06) 
- - 
lnTA - - -0.14 
(-4.83)*** 
-0.14 
(-4.83)*** 
STDDEV -0.002 
(-4.89)*** 
-0.009 
(-3.28)*** 
-0.001 
(-2.55)** 
-0.004 
(-2.44)** 
SRMC -0.02 
(-4.35)*** 
-0.022 
(-4.24)*** 
0.015 
(3.13)*** 
0.016 
(3.32)*** 
INDEP -0.014 
(-1.35) 
-0.02 
(-1.78)* 
0.003 
(0.31) 
0.002 
(0.16) 
CEODUAL -0.002 
(-0.12) 
0.006 
(0.44) 
0.02 
(1.52) 
              0.02 
(1.76)* 
     
BRDSIZE -0.003 
(-0.12) 
0.014 
(0.53) 
0.011 
(0.44) 
0.02 
(0.68) 
LEV -0.015 
(-1.23) 
-0.014 
(-1.22) 
-0.07 
(-3.38)*** 
-0.07 
(-3.36)*** 
MTB 0.007 
(5.88)*** 
0.008 
(6.05)*** 
0.02 
(12.48)*** 
0.02 
(12.55)*** 
CONS 0.09 
(1.21) 
0.07 
(0.96) 
1.50 
(11.37)*** 
1.51 
(11.27)*** 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed 
effects          
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs.  1361 1361 1359 1359 
Wald chi2 226.50 226.42 830.38 829.30 
Adjusted R2 0.34 0.34 0.56 0.56 
F-stat first stage 
(Prob) 
0.00 - 0.00 - 
Robust F-statistics 64.31 - 174.14 - 
Endogeneity test 
(Prob) 
0.07 - 0.06 - 
 
Notes:  STDDEV: total risk calculated as the standard deviation of a firm’s daily stock returns for each fiscal year; INDEP: the percentage 
of board members who were independent calculated as the independent board total/total number of board; LEV: the financial leverage of 
the firm, computed as total liabilities to total assets; MTB: market to book ratio. The ratio of year-end market capitalisation to total common 
equity;  CEODUAL: dummy variable, taking a rate of 1 if the CEO was also the chair, 0 otherwise; BRDSIZE: number of board members; 
PBANK(-Z-Score): probability of financial distress calculated using Altman Z-Score; PBANKt-1(-Z-Score t-1): Altman Z-Score of previous 
year; Naïve: the probability of bankruptcy using the Naïve model developed by Bharath and Shumway, (2004);  lnMKTCAP: the natural 
logarithm of market capitalisation;  lnTA: the natural logarithm of total assets; SHARE: the average percentage of RMC members 
shareholding;  Tenure: average number of years as a board member of a firm; RMC Tenure: average years of risk management experience 
of RMC members; Quali: the average number of qualifications obtained by RMC members; Exp: the average amount of experience of  
RMC members; RMC: dummy variable, taking a rate of 1 when firms had a separate RMC, 0 when firms had a combined RMC. 
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Table 5.32: GMM with robust estimation – RMC human capital and the likelihood of 
financial distress 
 Two-tailed tests significant at p<0.01***; p<0.05**; p≤ 0.10* 
 
 
 
 
 
 PBANK 
Coef.(z) 
PBANK 
Coef.(z) 
Naïve 
Coef.(z) 
Naïve 
Coef.(z) 
RMCHC -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.05 
 (-0.51) (-0.42) (-2.07)** (-2.22)** 
RMCHC*risk - -0.0008 - -0.013 
  (-0.12)  (-2.32)** 
PBANKt-1 0.10 0.10 - - 
 (4.94)*** (4.87)***   
lnMKTCAP -0.04 
(-0.67) 
-0.045 
(-0.70) 
0.06 
(0.58) 
0.05 
(0.51) 
STDDEV -0.002 
(-1.27) 
-0.0007 
(-0.09) 
0.003 
(1.79)* 
0.02 
(2.66)*** 
SRMC -0.02 
(-1.23) 
-0.02 
(-1.29) 
0.038 
(1.43) 
0.035 
(1.32) 
INDEP -0.05 
(-1.38) 
-0.05 
(-1.35) 
-0.007 
(-0.16) 
0.004 
(0.10) 
CEODUAL -0.02 
(-0.68) 
-0.02 
(-0.76) 
-0.04 
(-1.00) 
-0.05 
(-1.39) 
BRDSIZE -0.14 
(-1.73)* 
-0.14 
(-1.86)* 
0.08 
(0.74) 
0.043 
 (0.40) 
LEV 0.74 
(16.89)*** 
0.74 
(16.90)*** 
0.18 
(3.92)*** 
0.18 
(3.91)*** 
MTB -0.045 
(-12.39)*** 
-0.05 
(-12.17)*** 
-0.006 
(2.42)** 
-0.006 
(-2.59)*** 
CONS -0.72 
(-3.39)*** 
-0.71 
 (-3.51)***  
-0.18 
(-0.58)*** 
-0.14 
(-0.45) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed 
effects          
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs.  1305 1357 1362 1211 
Wald chi2 886.07 895.31 27.43 27.54 
Adjusted R2 0.55 0.55 0.01 0.01 
F-stat first stage 
(Prob) 
0.00 - 0.00 - 
Robust F-statistics 177.27 - 193.64 - 
Endogeneity test 
(Prob) 
0.60 - 0.11 - 
 
Notes: STDDEV: total risk calculated as the standard deviation of a firm’s daily stock returns for each fiscal year; INDEP: the percentage 
of board members who were independent calculated as the independent board total/total number of board; LEV: the financial leverage 
of the firm, computed as total liabilities to total assets; MTB: market to book ratio. The ratio of year-end market capitalisation to total 
common equity;  CEODUAL: dummy variable, taking a rate of 1 if the CEO was also the chair, 0 otherwise; BRDSIZE: number of 
board members; PBANK(-Z-Score): probability of financial distress calculated using Altman Z-Score; PBANKt-1(-Z-Score t-1): Altman 
Z-Score of previous year; Naïve: the probability of bankruptcy using the Naïve model developed by Bharath and Shumway, (2004); 
lnMKTCAP: the natural logarithm of market capitalisation;  lnTA: the natural logarithm of total assets; SHARE: the average percentage 
of RMC members shareholding;  Tenure: average number of years as a board member of a firm; RMC Tenure: average years of risk 
management experience of RMC members; Quali: the average number of qualifications obtained by RMC members; Exp: the average 
amount of experience of  RMC members; RMC: dummy variable, taking a rate of 1 when firms had a separate RMC, 0 when firms had 
a combined RMC. 
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5.5.6 Testing the validity of the instrument variable 
In order to test the hypothesis that the endogenous variables were exogenous after using 
2SLS and GMM, Wooldridge’s (1995) robust score test and a robust regression-based tests 
were adopted, which is the robust version of the Durbin (1954) and Wu–Hausman (Hausman, 
1978; Wu 1974) statistics. The variable was endogenous if p <0.05 (Vieira, MacDonald and 
Damasceno, 2010). The results are presented in Tables 5.29 and 5.30.  
The results of the tests did not reject the null hypothesis that RMCHC is exogenous in 
ROA (p>0.05), Tobin’s Q (p>0.05), Z-Score (p>0.1), and Naïve (p>0.1) model. In addition, 
the results show that the first stage F statistics for all four models were above 10, suggesting 
the instrument variable used in this study was valid in all models (Staiger and Stock, 1997).  
5.5.7 Other RMC human capital characteristics - gender diversity  
This study further examined another characteristic of RMCs in relation to the likelihood 
of financial distress and gender diversity. A considerable body of work has suggested that board 
gender diversity affects board dynamics, decision making, monitoring, and in turn, affects firm 
outcomes. Specifically, Gul, Hutchinson and Lai (2013) documented that the gender diversity 
of boards may lead to more board discussion and monitoring of company issues, inducing 
managers to disclose more information on the operations, transactions, and strategy. Higgs 
(2003) and Tyson (2003) argued that gender diversity may improve board effectiveness, 
organisational value, and performance by offering new insights and perspectives. Adams and 
Ferreira (2009) documented that female directors have better attendance records than males, 
the more gender-diverse a board is, the higher the attendance of male directors. They also found 
that women directors are more likely to join monitoring committees, indicating gender-diverse 
boards allocate more effort to monitoring (Adams and Ferreira, 2009). Huang and Kisgen 
(2013) suggested that females are more risk averse than males. Specifically, they found that 
female CFOs make fewer and higher return requisitions than male CFOs (Huang and Kisgen, 
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2013). Nielsen and Huse (2010) found that gender diverse boards have less conflict and a higher 
level of strategic control and board development activities.  
On the other hand, a number of studies have examined the association between board 
gender diversity and firm performance. Carter, Simkins and Simpson (2003) found that in the 
US, there is a positive relationship between the proportion of women on the board and firm 
performance, measured by Tobin’s Q. Similarly, Erhardt and Werbel (2003) documented that 
board diversity levels were positively associated with firm performance, measured by return 
on asset. Nguyen and Faff (2006) found the same results in the Australian context, which 
indicates the presence of female directors is significantly related to firm value. Reddy, Locke, 
Scrimgeour, and Gunasekarage (2008) documented that small capitalisation New Zealand 
firms showed that female directors were associated with higher Tobin’s Q. Adams and Ferreira 
(2009) found that firms with a low percentage of females on boards tended to have more 
volatile stock prices, suggesting a higher proportion of women on the board has a positive 
impact on the stock market. In contrast, Rose (2007) found that female board representation 
was not significantly linked to firm performance in Danish firms. Scholars have offered a 
number of reasons as to why there are conflicting results, such as a low number of observations 
(Shrader, Blackburn and Iles, 1997), endogenous factors of board composition (Adams and 
Ferreira, 2009), and industry or cultural differences (Arfken, Bellar and Helms, 2004).  
Many governance reform proposals indicate that gender diversity is an important factor 
that increases corporate governance and firms’ financial performance. For example, ASX 
CGPR (ASXCGC, 2014) recommends that Australia companies should have a gender diverse 
board, which also highlights the importance of gender diversity. Therefore, since gender 
diversity can offer new insights, enhance board monitoring, and increase the knowledge base, 
a high level of gender diversity within RMC members may enhance risk management practices. 
Thus, it is expected that firms with a female on the RMC, or a high proportion of females on a 
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RMC, may have a higher level of firm performance and lower level of the likelihood of 
financial distress.  
In this study, gender diversity was measured as a dummy variable, taking a value of 1 if 
there were females on a RMC, 0 otherwise. The results are presented in Table 5.33, and indicate 
that there was a negative relationship between PBANK and females on a RMC (B = -0.02; 
p<0.05), indicating RMCs with female members were negatively associated with the likelihood 
of a firm experiencing financial distress. This is consistent with the previous argument that 
women are more risk averse and less likely to engage in excessive risk-taking behaviours 
(Carter, Simkins and Simpson, 2003; Erhardt and Werbel., 2003). However, females on a RMC 
showed no significant relationship with firm performance (ROA and Tobin’s Q) and Naïve.  
In unreported results, the percentage of females as another measurement of gender 
diversity was used, and the results showed the percentage of females on an RMC was not 
significantly associated with firm performance and the likelihood of financial distress.  
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Table 5.33: Females on a RMC and firms’ management of risk - firm performance and 
the likelihood of financial distress  
 ROA 
Coef.(z) 
Model 1 
lnTobin’S Q 
Coef.(z) 
Model 2 
PBANK 
Coef.(z) 
Model 1 
Naïve 
Coef.(z) 
Model 2 
ROA t-1 0.15 
(9.68)*** 
 - - 
lnTobin’S Q t-1 - 
 
0.07 
(2.64)*** 
- - 
PBANKt-1 - - 0.03 
(2.56)** 
- 
lnMKTCAP 0.16 
(3.71)*** 
- -0.78 
(-8.10)*** 
-6.48 
(-1.31) 
lnTA 
 
- -0.26 
(-5.35)*** 
- - 
STDDEV -0.002 
(-3.46)*** 
-0.0007 
(-2.02)** 
0.002 
(1.73)* 
-0.09 
(-1.62) 
RMC 0.02 
(1.66)* 
0.0004 
(0.06) 
-0.001 
(-0.05) 
-1.15 
(-0.94) 
INDEP -0.02 
(-1.26) 
-0.02 
(-1.85)* 
0.04 
(1.20) 
-0.03 
(-0.02) 
CEODUAL 0.0003 
(0.20) 
0.01 
(1.06) 
-0.06 
(-1.54) 
-2.23 
(-1.15) 
BRDSIZE 0.003 
(0.10) 
0.06 
(2.93)*** 
-0.14 
(-2.27)** 
-0.74 
(-0.23) 
LEV -0.03 
(-1.50) 
-0.10 
(-7.60)*** 
1.15 
(27.84)*** 
1.32 
(0.66) 
MTB 0.003 
(3.38)*** 
0.01 
(20.23)*** 
-0.02 
(-11.89)*** 
-0.10 
(-0.94) 
Gender -0.004 0.003 -0.02 -0.50 
 (-0.96) (0.92) (-1.91)** (-0.94) 
RMCHC 0.016 0.003 0.02 -1.91 
 (2.32)** (2.12)** (1.08) (-2.40)** 
CONS -0.30 
(-2.88)*** 
2.33 
(15.20)*** 
0.51 
(2.14)** 
-9.09 
(-0.75) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed 
effects          
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 
No. of firms 
1305 
355 
1357 
366 
1362 
365 
1211 
345 
F statistics 9.90 50.58 65.67 7.86 
Adjusted R2 0.21 0.49 0.43 0.07 
Highest VIF 9.32 8.46 9.17 9.15 
Lowest VIF 1.09 1.10 1.08 1.12 
 
Notes:  STDDEV: total risk calculated as the standard deviation of a firm’s daily stock returns for each fiscal year; INDEP: the percentage 
of board members who were independent calculated as the independent board total/total number of board; LEV: the financial leverage of 
the firm, computed as total liabilities to total assets; MTB: market to book ratio. The ratio of year-end market capitalisation to total 
common equity;  CEODUAL: dummy variable, taking a rate of 1 if the CEO was also the chair, 0 otherwise; BRDSIZE: number of board 
members; PBANK(-Z-Score): probability of financial distress calculated using Altman Z-Score; PBANKt-1(-Z-Score t-1): Altman Z-Score 
of previous year; Naïve: the probability of bankruptcy using the Naïve model developed by Bharath and Shumway, (2004);  lnMKTCAP: 
the natural logarithm of market capitalisation;  lnTA: the natural logarithm of total assets; SHARE: the average percentage of RMC 
members shareholding; Tenure: average number of years as a board member of a firm; RMC Tenure: average years of risk management 
experience of RMC members; Quali: the average number of qualifications obtained by RMC members; Exp: the average amount of 
experience of  RMC members; RMC: dummy variable, taking a rate of 1 when firms had a separate RMC, 0 when firms had a combined 
RMC; Gender: dummy variable, taking a rate of 1 if there were females on a RMC, 0 otherwise.  
Two-tailed tests significant at p<0.01***; p<0.05**; p≤ 0.10* 
 
  
Chapter 5: Results 165 
5.5.8 Other RMC human capital characteristics – qualification score 
This study adopted another measure for qualifications, coding qualifications 
based on a 4-point scale (1=diploma degree, 2=bachelor degree, 3=masters degree, 
4=PHD degree). After calculating all of the qualification scores for each RMC 
member, the average qualification score of each firm was computed, and the average 
qualification score was then used in the fixed effects regression models to test the 
relationship between this average qualification score, firm performance, and the 
likelihood of financial distress. The results are presented in Table 5.34. The results 
show that qualification score was not significantly related to firm performance and the 
likelihood of financial distress.  
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Table 5.34: Qualification score and firms’ management of risk - firm 
performance and the likelihood of financial distress  
 ROA 
Coef.(z) 
Model 1 
lnTobin’S Q  
Coef.(z) 
Model 2 
PBANK 
Coef.(z) 
Model 1 
Naïve 
Coef.(z) 
Model 2 
ROA t-1 0.14 
(8.73)*** 
- - - 
lnTobin’S Q t-1 - 
 
0.07 
(2.49)** 
- - 
PBANKt-1 - - 0.03 
(2.20)** 
- 
lnMKTCAP 0.15 
(3.19)*** 
- -0.76 
(-7.77)*** 
-3.52 
(-0.66) 
lnTA 
 
- -0.23 
(-4.57)*** 
- - 
STDDEV -0.04 
(-2.65)*** 
-0.001 
(-2.77)*** 
0.002 
(1.70)* 
-0.10 
(-1.59) 
RMC 0.03 
(2.02)** 
0.006 
(0.66) 
-0.01 
(-0.40) 
-0.82 
(-0.58) 
INDEP -0.02 
(-1.37) 
-0.02 
(-1.67)* 
0.07 
(2.04)** 
-0.08 
(-0.04) 
CEODUAL 0.005 
(0.28) 
0.014 
(1.16) 
-0.06 
(-1.76)* 
-2.36 
(-1.19)* 
BRDSIZE 0.02 
(0.53) 
0.075 
(3.13)*** 
-0.16 
(-2.35)** 
-1.64 
(-0.44) 
LEV -0.04 
(-1.94)* 
-0.11 
(-7.33)*** 
1.17 
(27.79)*** 
2.95 
(1.39) 
MTB 0.003 
(2.71)*** 
0.013 
(18.15)*** 
-0.023 
(-11.16)*** 
-0.08 
(-0.68) 
Tenure 0.03 -0.05 0.012 -2.20 
 (1.44) (-3.04)*** (0.24) (-0.80) 
RMC Tenure -0.01 0.02 0.02 2.48 
 (-0.70) (1.36) (0.40) (1.08) 
Exp 0.003 0.0004 0.0001 -0.19 
 (3.28)*** (0.50) (0.04) (-1.60) 
Qualiscore 0.003 0.002 -0.002 -0.09 
 (0.96) (1.00) (-0.39) (-0.27) 
SHARE -0.19 0.018 -0.03 -18.32 
 (-1.18) (0.15) (-0.10) (-1.01) 
CONS -0.3 
(-2.33)** 
2.30 
(13.62)*** 
0.41 
 (1.59) 
-1.14 
(-0.08) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed 
effects          
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 
No. of firms 
1361 
367 
1359 
365 
1305 
355 
1362 
365 
F statistics 8.30 37.35 53.71 5.38 
Adjusted R2 0.20 0.48 0.53 0.07 
Highest VIF 8.86 8.72 7.95 7.98 
Lowest VIF 1.12 1.10 1.09 1.12 
 
Notes:  STDDEV: total risk calculated as the standard deviation of a firm’s daily stock returns for each fiscal year; INDEP: 
the percentage of board members who were independent calculated as the independent board total/total number of board; 
LEV: The financial leverage of the firm, computed as total liabilities to total assets; MTB: market to book ratio. The ratio 
of year-end market capitalisation to total common equity;  CEODUAL: dummy variable, taking a rate of 1 if the CEO was 
also the chair,  0 otherwise; BRDSIZE: number of board members; PBANK(-Z-Score): probability of financial distress 
calculated using Altman Z-Score; PBANKt-1(-Z-Score t-1): Altman Z-Score of previous year; Naïve: the probability of 
bankruptcy using the Naïve model developed by Bharath and Shumway, (2004); lnMKTCAP: the natural logarithm of 
market capitalisation;  lnTA: the natural logarithm of total assets; SHARE: the average percentage of RMC members 
shareholding;  Tenure: average number of years as a board member of a firm; RMC Tenure: average years of risk 
management experience of RMC members; Quali: the average number of qualifications obtained by RMC members; Exp: 
the average amount of experience of  RMC members; RMC: dummy variable, taking a rate of 1 when firms had a separate 
RMC, 0 when firms had a combined RMC. 
Two-tailed tests significant at p<0.01***; p<0.05**; p≤ 0.10* 
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5.5.9 Non-linear relationship-risk and firm performance 
This study examined whether there was a curvilinear relationship between risk 
and firm performance, and the likelihood of financial distress. A quadratic regression 
was adopted by including the square of risk as an additional regressor in this study. 
The main advantage of the quadratic regression is that the turning point is determined 
endogenously (S. S. Chen, Ho, Lee and Shrestha, 2004). Table 5.35 shows the results, 
which suggest that there is a significant positive relationship between ROA and 
STDDEV; STDDEV2 was significantly and negatively related to ROA, suggesting that 
there is a non-linear relationship between firm risks and accounting performance. As 
firm risk increases, firm performance increases until it reaches the peak point, after 
that, as firms take more risk, firm performance starts to decrease. This study calculated 
the peak point using the derivation method. The results suggest that STDDEV<8.33, 
ROA increases as STDDEV increases. However, STDDEV > 8.33, ROA decreases as 
STDDEV increases, indicating a curvilinear relationship between risk (STDDEV) and 
firms’ accounting performance (ROA). However, this study did not find a non-linear 
relationship between risk and the likelihood of financial distress.  
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Table 5.35: Non-linear results – risk and firm performance 
 
 
5.6 DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS 
5.6.1 RMC existence, firm performance, and the likelihood of financial distress  
H1 (a): there is a positive relationship between risk and firm performance for 
firms with a risk management committee. 
H1 (b): there is a positive relationship between risk and firm performance for 
firms with a separate risk management committee. 
According to agency theory, previous studies have consistently suggested that a 
RMC, as a monitoring mechanism, leads to higher firm performance relative to a firm 
 ROA 
Coef.(z) 
ROAt-1 0.09 
(4.44)*** 
lnMKTCAP 0.05 
(0.93) 
STDDEV 0.005 
(3.01)*** 
STDDEV2 -0.0003 
(-5.39)*** 
INDEP 0.002 
(0.14) 
CEODUAL 0.04 
(2.38)** 
BRDSIZE -0.07 
(-1.12) 
LEV -0.30 
(-13.11)*** 
MTB 0.11 
(3.84)*** 
CONS 0.02 
(0.13) 
Year fixed effects Yes 
Industry fixed effects          Yes 
No. of obs. 
No. of firms 
2310 
582 
Wald chi2 14.79 
Adjusted R2 
Highest VIF 
0.08 
8.90 
Lowest VIF 1.08 
 
Note: STDDEV: total risk calculated as the standard deviation of a firm’s daily stock returns for each fiscal year; STDDEV2: 
total risk squared, computed as STDDEV*STDDEV; INDEP: the percentage of board members who were independent 
calculated as the independent board total/total number of board; LEV: the financial leverage of the firm, computed as total 
liabilities to total assets; lnMKTCAP: the natural logarithm of market capitalisation; MTB: market to book ratio. The ratio of 
year-end market capitalisation to total common equity; BRDSIZE: number of board members; ROAt: current year return on 
assets; ROAt-1: prior year return on assets; CEODUAL: dummy variable, taking a rate of 1 if the CEO was also the chair, 0 
otherwise;   
  
Chapter 5: Results 169 
without a RMC. This is because a RMC ensures that risks of diversification or non-
focused strategy are managed effectively (Kallamu and Saat, 2014). Specifically, the 
board, through its RMC platform, can monitor the risk-taking activities of managers, 
review the overall risk exposure of the firm (Ng, Chong and Ismail, 2012; Tao and 
Hutchinson, 2013), and provide advice on how to deal with firms’ present and future 
risks to identify potential risk opportunities. Therefore, a RMC plays a crucial role in 
monitoring managers’ risk-taking behaviours (Subramaniam, McManus and Zhang, 
2009) and in minimising the agency conflicts between shareholders and managers 
(Carter, D'Souza, Simkins and Simpson, 2010), leading to a decrease in agency costs 
and an increase in firm performance, according to agency theory.  
Although there is a strong theoretical relationship between the existence of a 
RMC and firm performance, to date, research in this area is sparse. A number of papers 
have examined the determinants of a RMC and suggested that leverage, board size, 
and board independence determine the formation of a RMC and separate RMC (Hines 
and Peters, 2015; Ling, Zain and Jaffar, 2014; Subramaniam, McManus and Zhang, 
2009). Hines and Peters (2015) investigated the impact of RMC existence on firms. 
They found that in the US, RMC formation is not significantly associated with 
profitability and short-term risk outcomes (level of loan charge-offs and the presence 
of a Chief Risk Officer). 
In addition, previous research has suggested that delegating a separate RMC 
instead of a combined committee to oversee risk activities is a better way for 
companies to manage risk (Aebi, Sabato and Schmid, 2012; Brancato, Tonello, Hexter 
and Newman, 2006; Kirkpatrick, 2009; Mongiardino and Plath, 2010, Subramaniam, 
McManus and Zhang, 2009). This is due to the overload of the audit committee, as 
they may have insufficient skills for overseeing non-financial risks, such as 
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operational, strategic, reputation, and regulatory risk (Brown, Steen and Foreman, 
2009; Daly and Bocchino, 2006). As a result, having a separate RMC may be better to 
control for managers’ opportunistic behaviour regarding risks, leading to a decrease in 
agency costs and an increase in firm performance. A number of studies have examined 
the relationship between enterprise risk management (ERM) and firm performance; 
however, the results have been mixed. Hoyt and Liebeneberg (2011) determined a 
positive relationship between firm value and the use of ERM. Pagach and Warr (2010) 
found little impact of ERM adoption on firms’ outcomes. Gordon, Loeb and Tseng 
(2009) showed that the relationship between firm performance and ERM is contingent 
on the match between risk management and firm characteristics. To the best of the 
researcher’s knowledge, there is currently no research that has examined the 
relationship between a separate RMC or a RMC and firm performance or the 
likelihood of financial distress. 
This study investigated the existence of a RMC and separate RMC on firm 
performance and the likelihood of financial distress. Firstly, after controlling for the 
possibility of self-selection bias, the results showed that the existence of a RMC and 
separate RMC were not significantly associated with firm performance, indicating that 
RMC existence may represent a symbolic governance practice. Firms could use this 
symbolic practice to manage their reputational legitimacy, even though the formation 
of a RMC or SRMC may not be associated with performance (Westphal and Graebner, 
2010), which corresponds with the argument by Hines and Peter (2015). Secondly, the 
results further document that the relationship between risk and firms’ accounting 
performance was moderated by the existence of a separate RMC, indicating that the 
existence of a RMC is associated with better risk management and better firms’ 
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accounting performance, which supports the agency theory regarding monitoring and 
control.  
H2(a): there is a negative relationship between risk and the likelihood of 
financial distress for firms with a risk management committee. 
H2(b): there is a negative relationship between risk and the likelihood of 
financial distress for firms with a separate risk management committee 
Previous literature has suggested that risk management reduces the likelihood of 
financial distress. Specifically, Smith and Stulz (1985) provided the initial financial 
distress arguments regarding risk management, arguing that efficient risk management 
can reduce the likelihood of financial distress and increase firm value by reducing 
allocative inefficiency (i.e., deadweight costs) and increasing debt capacity, which in 
turn benefits the firm through valuable tax shields or by decreasing agency costs in 
excess free cash flow. As a RMC can help firms identify potential risks and effectively 
manage risks, this thereby decreases the probability of financial distress.  
In addition, signalling theory also suggests that firms disclose the existence of a 
RMC to signal the market and create a favourable image in the market. Even though 
RMC formation is not mandatory, firms may establish a RMC to flag their 
commitment to good risk management practice. In turn, such disclosure is expected to 
minimise any issues in relation to debt capacity and investors’ devaluation of the firm 
(Subramaniam, McManus and Zhang, 2008), therefore reducing the likelihood of 
financial distress (Cotter, Lokman and Najah, 2011). This study found no significant 
relationship between the existence of a RMC or SRMC and the likelihood of financial 
distress. Furthermore, the relationship between risk and the likelihood of financial 
distress was not moderated by the existence of a RMC or separate RMC after 
controlling for the self-selection bias. This result may suggest that the mere the 
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existence of a RMC or separate RMC does not decrease firms’ likelihood of financial 
distress, which confirms the view that RMC establishment may serve as a symbolic 
practice or as a signal to the market (Hines and Peters, 2015; Rodrigue, Magnan and 
Cho, 2013). 
5.6.2 RMC human capital, firm performance, and the likelihood of financial 
distress 
H3: there is a positive association between RMC human capital and firm 
performance. 
Human capital theory indicates that the crucial aspects of human capital and 
resource dependence theory highlight the importance of skills and experience of 
individuals. Although the literature regarding RMC human capital is sparse, a number 
of studies have highlighted that human capital in the audit committee is positively 
associated with performance outcomes (Chan and Li, 2008; DeFond, Hann, and Hu, 
2005; Tao and Hutchinson, 2013). Since both the audit committee and the RMC are 
monitoring mechanisms within firms, the characteristics of the audit committee can be 
applied to a RMC (Ng, Chong and Ismail, 2012). In addition, a number of studies have 
examined some RMC attributes in relation to firm performance. Kallamu and Saat 
(2014) found that independent RMC members are positively related to market 
performance and negatively related to accounting performance and an independent 
RMC chair is positively associated with accounting performance. Lastly, they found 
management experience to be significantly and positively related to both market and 
accounting performance (Kallamu and Saat, 2014). These results highlight the 
importance of some RMC human capital characteristics in relation to firm 
performance.  
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After controlling for potential endogeneity, the results of this study show that 
RMC human capital was positively related to accounting performance, indicating 
RMC human capital is related to better risk management and higher firm performance, 
which is in line with the human capital theory and resource dependence theory.  
H4: There is a negative association between the probability of financial distress 
and risk management committee human capital. 
A RMC has been regarded as an important platform to specifically address risk 
management issues within firms. As a result, the level of RMC human capital may also 
influence firms’ likelihood of bankruptcy (Ng, Chong and Ismail, 2012). Specifically, 
a number of studies have indicated a negative relationship between some RMC 
characteristics and the likelihood of financial distress (Berk, Stanton and Zechner, 
2010; Dimov and Shepherd, 2005; Jaggia and Thakor, 1994). Ng, Chong and Ismail 
(2012) found that RMC size and independence were negatively associated with 
underwriting risk, leading to a low likelihood of financial distress. The results of this 
study show that RMC human capital was negatively related to the likelihood of 
financial distress, which is consistent with human capital theory and resource 
dependence theory, indicating that RMC human capital is associated with better risk 
management and lower likelihood of bankruptcy. In addition, after controlling for 
potential endogeneity problems, the results show the relationship between risk and the 
likelihood of financial distress was negatively moderated by RMC human capital. 
These results suggest that at higher risk, firms that increase the level of RMC human 
capital will decrease the likelihood of financial distress. 
H5 (a): Firm performance is positively associated with risk management 
committee firm-specific human capital. 
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H5 (b): Firm performance is negatively associated with risk management 
committee general human capital.  
Previous studies have suggested that firm-specific human capital is more 
valuable to firms than general human capital because it can retain companies’ value 
through competitive advantage and performance advantage, and competitors are not 
able to purchase such resources (Crook, Todd, Combs, Woehr and Ketchen, 2011; 
Datta, Guthrie and Wright, 2005). As a result, firms with greater firm-specific human 
capital are more likely to generate benefits for firms (Carpenter and Westphal, 2001; 
Crook, Todd, Combs, Woehr and Ketchen, 2011). This study examined three types of 
firm-specific human capital: risk management tenure, board tenure, and share 
ownership of RMC members. The results show that there was a negative relationship 
between board tenure and firms’ market performance (Tobin’s Q). This result suggests 
that the market is discontent with the risk management monitoring of long-tenured 
directors, which corresponds with Hillman, Shropshire, Certo, Dalton and Dalton 
(2011). In addition, tenure may serve as an indicator of age, as the longer RMC 
members serve on the committee, the older they are. Therefore, an alternative 
explanation of the finding is that there is a negative relationship between RMC 
members’ age and firms’ market performance and the market penalises firms with 
older RMC members.  
However, the literature shows inconclusive results between board tenure and 
firm performance. For example, Kor and Sundaramurthy (2009) found director tenure 
to be positively related to annual sales growth, while other studies found no association 
(Johnson, Hoskisson and Hitt, 1993; Sundaramurthy, 1996). These inconclusive 
results may be due to tenure having a nonlinear effect. In fact, Musteen, Datta and 
Kemmerer (2010) found an inverted U-relationship between tenure and firm outcomes.  
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This study further examined the association between RMC general human 
capital (i.e., experience and qualifications) and firm performance. The results show 
that the amount of experience of RMC members was positively related to firms’ 
accounting performance, which is consistent with previous literature (Carpenter and 
Westphal, 2001; Dalziel, Gentry and Bowerman, 2011; Khanna, Jones and Boivie, 
2014). Specifically, research has suggested that previous experience is valuable, as 
directors need to understand and evaluate the actions taken by managers and analyse 
the potential impact of those actions (Kallamu and Saat, 2014). More experienced 
directors have more relevant skills and are able to generate abstract principles from 
specific situations (Dalziel, Gentry and Bowerman, 2011). Experience can help an 
RMC member to understand large and complex risk management information, thereby 
improving their risk management efficiency, leading to an increase in firm 
performance (Carpenter and Westphal, 2001). 
This study found no significant association between RMC qualifications and 
firm performance, which is consistent with Daily and Dalton (1994) and Rose (2007), 
who found that qualifications had no impact on firm performance. In contrast, Kim 
and Lim (2010) documented a positive relationship between the education of outside 
directors and firm value in Korea, which may be due to country-specific factors. 
H6 (a): The probability of bankruptcy is negatively associated with risk 
management committee firm-specific human capital.  
H6 (b): The probability of bankruptcy is positively associated with risk 
management committee general human capital.  
The results show that RMC firm-specific human capital and general human 
capital were not significantly related to the likelihood of financial distress, which was 
contrary to expectations. The literature suggests that the greater the level of directors’ 
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firm-specific human capital, the more costly the event of bankruptcy for the directors 
(Chemmanur, Cheng and Zhang, 2013; Rose, 1992). This is due to the fact that firm-
specific human capital reduces the employability of individuals, as such human capital 
is not perfectly marketable (Berk, Stanton and Zechner, 2010). 
In addition, research suggests there is a negative association between general 
human capital and the likelihood of bankruptcy, as people may protect their reputation 
for future employment (Aivazian, Lai and Rahaman, 2010). Previous literature has 
suggested that firms with less likelihood of bankruptcy tend to have more directors 
with CEO experience than bankrupt organisations (Platt and Platt, 2012), indicating a 
negative relationship between general human capital and the likelihood of bankruptcy. 
Even though individual RMC human capital was not significantly related to the 
likelihood of financial distress in this study, the results show the RMC human capital 
factor score was associated with a lower likelihood of financial distress, indicating that 
individual RMC human capital characteristics may have much less explanatory power, 
leading to insignificant results.  
5.7 SUMMARY  
The results discussed in this chapter provide evidence about the relationship 
between the existence of a RMC and firms’ management of risk in terms of firm 
performance and the likelihood of financial distress, and about the relationship 
between RMC human capital and firms’ management of risk. In terms of RMC 
existence, this study found that separate RMC existence moderated the relationship 
between risk and firms’ accounting performance. This illustrates that at higher risk, 
firms with a separate RMC are associated with better firm performance, indicating the 
importance of firms having a separate RMC. However, this study failed to find that 
RMC existence moderated the relationship between risk and firm performance. This 
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may suggest the importance of having a separate RMC instead of merely having a 
RMC. When testing the existence of a separate RMC or a RMC on the relationship 
between risk and the likelihood of financial distress, this study failed to find significant 
results. This may suggest that merely having a RMC or a separate RMC does not play 
a significant role in managing firms’ likelihood of financial distress. It is the human 
capital of RMC members that matters. Accordingly, this study paid particular attention 
to RMC human capital.  
With respect to RMC human capital, this study determined that RMC human 
capital was positively related to firm performance and negatively related to the 
likelihood of financial distress, which indicates the importance of having a high level 
of RMC human capital in firms. In addition, this study determined that the association 
between risk and the likelihood of financial distress was moderated by firms’ RMC 
human capital. This result suggests that at higher risk, firms that increase the level of 
RMC human capital will decrease the likelihood of financial distress. Results of testing 
general and firm-specific RMC human capital highlighted the association between 
these characteristics and the outcome variables. Specifically, board tenure, as a type of 
firm-specific human capital, was found to be significantly and negatively related to 
firm’s market performance. The average amount of experience of the RMC members, 
as a type of general human capital, was positively related to firms’ accounting 
performance.  
This study conducted a number of robustness tests. The results remained 
constant after control for self-selection bias and endogeneity problems. By comparing 
the results of fixed effects models and random effects models, this study determined 
that the results remained constant.  
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The next chapter presents a summary of the thesis and main findings, 
contributions, limitations, and avenues for future research.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
Motivated by a lack of research on risk management governance and human 
capital, this thesis has examined risk management governance from the human capital 
perspective by investigating RMC human capital in Australian firms, based on human 
capital theory and resource dependence theory. The purpose of this chapter is to 
provide a brief summary of this thesis, including the objective and overall research 
question. A summary of the main findings of testing RMC existence, RMC human 
capital, and firm-specific and general RMC human capital characteristics in relation to 
firms’ management of risk is then presented. Finally, the chapter provides the 
contributions of this study, followed by the limitations and a discussion on future 
research opportunities.  
6.2 SUMMARY OF THE RESEARCH  
The objective of this study was to provide evidence regarding firms’ risk 
management human capital and firms’ management of risk, in terms of firm 
performance and the likelihood of financial distress. This was motivated by the lack 
of risk management research, the significant role that risk management practice plays 
in the market and firms, and the recent CGPR guideline (ASXCGC, 2014), which 
begins to address the importance of RMC human capital. In order to achieve the 
objective, an overall research question was raised: 
Is firms’ risk management committee human capital associated with firms’ 
management of risk? 
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Six hypotheses were developed to answer this research question, and they were 
embedded within human capital theory, resource dependence theory, and agency 
theory. Specifically, human capital theory provides insight on the overall theoretical 
relationship among risk management human capital, firm performance, and the 
likelihood of financial distress, suggesting that firms with a high level of risk 
management human capital may increase risk management efficiency and generate 
positive outcomes for firms. Secondly, resource dependence theory highlights the 
importance of firms’ human capital, such as experience and qualifications, and its 
positive association with firms’ outcomes. Thirdly, according to agency theory, firms’ 
risk management human capital is expected to contribute to the reduction of agency 
costs and enhance monitoring of managers’ risk-taking behaviours.  
Before examining the association between RMCs’ human capital, this study 
firstly examined the relationship between the existence of a RMC, a separate RMC, 
and firms’ management of risk, in terms of firm performance and the likelihood of 
bankruptcy, based on a sample of top 300 ASX listed firms between 2007 to 2014. 
This study then examined the association between RMC human capital and firms’ 
management of risk in terms of firm performance and the likelihood of bankruptcy. 
Data were analysed using a quantitative approach – regression analysis. This study 
also controlled for self-selection bias and potential endogeneity issues.  
6.3 SUMMARY OF THE RESEARCH FINDINGS  
6.3.1 The existence of RMC and separate RMC 
The analysis of the existence of a RMC revealed that the number of firms with a 
separate RMC remained stable, whereas there was an increasing trend of combined 
RMC formation of sampled companies, and a decreasing trend of the number of 
companies that did not have a RMC. Although the regression results regarding the 
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association between the existence of a RMC and firms’ management of risk revealed 
that the existence of a RMC and separate RMC were not significantly related to firm 
performance and the likelihood of financial distress, the existence of a RMC 
moderated the relationship between risk and firm performance. This illustrates that at 
higher risk, firms with a separate RMC are associated with better firm performance, 
indicating the importance of firms having a separate RMC. 
6.3.2 RMC human capital  
By developing an overall risk management human capital score utilising 
principal component analysis, the results regarding the association between risk 
management human capital and firms’ management of risk revealed that RMC human 
capital was positively related to firm performance and negatively related to the 
likelihood of financial distress. These results are consistent with human capital theory 
and resource dependence theory. In addition, this study determined that the association 
between risk and the likelihood of financial distress was moderated by firms’ RMC 
human capital. This results suggests that at higher risk, firms increasing the level of 
RMC human capital will decrease the likelihood of financial distress.  
The results of the model using individual risk management human capital 
characteristics to test the association between firms’ firm-specific, general risk 
management human capital and firms’ management of risk found that total amount of 
experience, as a type of general human capital, was positively related to firms’ 
accounting performance, indicating previous experience is crucial to enhancing firm 
performance. Additionally, the results show that RMC members’ board tenure, as a 
type of firm-specific human capital, was negatively related to market performance. 
However, this study failed to find any significant results regarding the association 
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between individual risk management human capital characteristics and the likelihood 
of financial distress. 
6.4 CONTRIBUTION  
This paper contributes to human capital literature in several ways. Firstly, to the 
researcher’s knowledge, this is the first study to examine firms’ risk management 
human capital. The literature has suggested that there is a lack of research on risk 
management governance. Therefore, this study contributes to the literature by 
providing evidence regarding the human capital theory from a risk management point 
of view. This study drew on research that has attempted to determine whether human 
capital is associated with firm performance (e.g. G. Chen and Hamrick, 2012; Crook, 
Todd, Combs, Woehr and Ketchen, 2011) and research that has determined the 
association between risk management and firm performance. 
Secondly, while some research has examined board human capital, this study 
focused on the role of RMC human capital, and captured five facets of human capital 
factors: tenure, experience, education, share ownership, and tenure. In doing so, this 
study provides a more comprehensive approach to investigating human capital than 
that undertaken in prior research. These factors allowed this study to examine a much 
more comprehensive range of RMC human capital characteristics. The 
comprehensiveness of the RMC human capital measures contributes to the board 
literature, as most board capital research has relied on only a few indicators (such as 
board independence and board education). In addition, a number of studies have called 
for future research to examine board human capital in a more detailed and 
comprehensive way (Johnson, Schnatterly, and Hill, 2012). Therefore, this thesis has 
responded to this call, and has investigated beyond the limited characteristics identified 
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in previous studies. Thereby, this study provides a more comprehensive picture of 
RMC human capital.   
Thirdly, this study also has practical contributions. It provides valuable 
information to the ASXCGC regarding the current RMC human capital practice in 
Australia and provides implications to policy makers in relation to regulating firms’ 
risk management human capital. In addition, the results provide firms with information 
about the benefits of RMC human capital. The results will be of interest to a range of 
shareholders. Directors may give consideration to these results when there is a change 
of RMC members. For regulators, these results highlight the importance of RMC 
human capital in firms. As a result, future reviews of corporate governance 
recommendations may consider providing improved guidance to Australian firms 
about the human capital level of RMC members. 
6.5 LIMITATIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
As with any research, this study has several limitations. Firstly, this study 
examined RMC human capital based on the risk information gathered from 
companies’ annual reports. It could be argued that companies may not disclose all of 
their risk management human capital information through annual reports, as other 
avenues may be utilised, such as social media and the company’s website. 
Consequently, if the annual report is not considered the dominant form of RMC human 
capital information disclosure, then this study may not comprehensively capture firms’ 
risk management human capital. However, this study included a manual check of the 
RMC information on each firm’s website, and found that firms disclosed identical 
RMC information through their companies’ website, compared to annual report 
disclosure. Therefore, this study shows that annual report disclosure is still the main 
source of RMC human capital disclosure. Secondly, due to some missing variables in 
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the annual report, this study was unable to collect some RMC human capital 
characteristics, such as age. This may have led to the omission of some important 
variables. Thirdly, this study did not control for board human capital when 
investigating the relationship between RMC human capital and firms’ management of 
risk. As a result, the results may be influenced by board human capital. However, it is 
generally believed that the board of directors would normally appoint members with a 
high level of risk management human capital into the RMC. Therefore, RMC human 
capital is the main factor that affects firms’ management of risk.  Finally, the sample 
was drawn from the top 300 ASX companies, which excludes small firms. Thus, the 
results may not be generalised to the whole Australian market. In addition, this study 
only analysed Australian firms, therefore, the results may not be applied to other 
countries.  
However, these limitations do provide opportunities for future research. 
Research could be undertaken by examining RMC human capital, not only limited to 
the information in annual reports, but also including firms’ risk management human 
capital information on social media (i.e., social media releases), to provide a more 
comprehensive picture of firms’ RMC human capital. In addition, this study adopted 
a quantitative research method; however, examining RMC human capital through the 
application of a qualitative method, such as surveys and interviews, could provide 
interesting and in-depth insights into the relationship between RMC human capital and 
firms’ risk management. In addition, future research could also examine the role Chief 
Risk Officer plays in managing firm risks.   
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